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Abstract 
 
 
 
A careful examination of events in Colonial Trans-Appalachia—the region 
geographically encompassed by territories west of the Appalachian Mountain 
Range and east of the Mississippi River—at the time of the French and Indian 
War facilitates analysis of regime formation amongst Amerindian and 
European Colonists. This thesis examines the effects of contact on 
Amerindian and European polities in a form that seeks relevance to 
contemporary issues. It draws on historical timelines that immediately pre and 
post-date the French and Indian War. It argues how distinctive decision 
making structures used by Amerindian and European societies provide 
preliminary models for understanding how their respective forms of 
sociopolitical organization conditioned political relationships. 
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Sect ion I 
Chapter 1 - Introduction to the Issues 
 
  This study will look at the role of trade and land tenure in the conflicts that arose in 
Colonial Trans-Appalachia, defined temporally as the period between 1754 and 1812 in the 
geographic region west of Appalachian Mountain Range and east of the Mississippi River. Trade 
and land tenure were central to regime formation during this time in this region. From the axes of 
the various regimes the origins to competing national and state ventures can be articulated. 
Colonial Trans-Appalachia represents a critical era in North American history. The outcomes of 
the region’s struggles determined to a decisive degree the future course of North America. Trans-
Appalachian wars settled many disputes among Europeans who had been jockeying for North 
American possessions and eventually the relationship among Colonial Europeans and their 
parent countries. Yet, some are unresolved as present day Quebec gives an apposite voice to an 
ethnic Colonial French nationalism. The Amerindian, or American struggle to retain an 
independent status has continued to this day.A
 The French and Indian War (1754-1763), maybe better stated as the French and Indian 
War, essentially failed to resolve the imperial contest between England and France in North 
America. The French and Indian War named from the perspective of the Anglo Saxon was much 
more complex in its geo-political dynamics than simply a struggle pitting the British against the 
  
                                               
 
A Scholar Forbes (1993) discusses the repopulation of the Americas by identifying the indigenous populations of the 
North, Central, and South America as Americans while identifying migrant colonial populations in the Americas 
with the prefix of their continents of origin. For example, Euro-Americans or African-Americans. I originally 
decided on the term Amerindian to imply First Americans while admittedly not being entirely comfortable with the 
term. 
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French and their Amerindian allies. The war was also a contest that followed the earlier and 
much more indecisive failures of the King William’s War, Queen Anne’s War, and King 
George’s War in the 1740s.1
 The conclusion of the French and Indian War initially seemed to provide an outcome in 
favor of British imperial interests. The North American experience had already been a partial or 
weighted successful British colonial venture with numerous coastline settler communities. 
However, the English were far from being free of French interference. Moreover, the British 
Imperial state would face continued dissension among its own colonies. Before the official peace 
that ended the war France transferred its claim to the Louisiana territory to Spain in hopes of 
preempting British hegemony on the continent. The British would at the conclusion of the 
American Revolution attempt to check the expansion of its former colonies by transferring 
territorial claims to southern Trans-Appalachia to the Spanish. The Spanish never effectively 
 These wars conducted in the interest of expanding national trade 
empires in which local indigenous became exceedingly entangled. The war was initiated in the 
midst of English and French negotiations over a suitable boundary line between their two 
Colonial empires in North America. The negotiations continued during the war and included 
proposals that would limit both French and English claims to the continent. By default and intent 
this arrangement acknowledged an unoccupied zone in Trans-Appalachia wherein the residing 
Amerindian nations stood as a bulwark to further territorial expansion.2 At the time the British 
Colonies and the French would have been hard pressed to expand their empires into these 
interior regions. This is evident when considering the events of the French and Indian War. 
Furthermore, these negotiations were typical European solutions that precluded direct 
participation of Amerindian leadership. 
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fulfilled this role as a counter threat in the region’s balance of power dynamics even though they 
too parlayed with Amerindian nations to prevent the emergence of one dominant European actor 
in the region. In all these plans Amerindian partnerships were considered necessary for success 
yet between the events of the American Revolution and the invasion of the Ohio Country by the 
Federal government of the United States in the 1790 Amerindian resistance would only acquire 
the necessary logistics for five offensive operations against the early American Republic.3 This is 
largely a failure on the part of the Europeans who either over committed themselves or failed to 
deliver on their obligations. 
 England expanded its empire globally during the French and Indian War by also gaining 
territories in Africa and India. The Treaty of Paris officially ended the French and Indian War for 
European participants.B
 The French and Indian War was a regional strategic theater in which local trade and land 
tenure conflicts prompted a much larger global scale war commonly referred to as the Seven 
Years War.4 The Seven Years War was a global conflict that was ordered around the ambitions 
of European kingdoms or early European nation-states and marked a beginning to a number of 
global, colonial, and imperial wars that continued into the 20th Century. War participants 
 The status of Amerindian nations was tenuous in the broad region of 
Trans-Appalachia despite agreements concluded by Amerindian nations and British colonial 
authorities. The primary resistance to colonial expansion into the interior resided with 
Amerindian society who had to contend with the ever changing and unstable nature of European 
colonial administrations. 
                                               
 
B The Treaty of Paris that ended the French and Indian War was concluded in 1763. 
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included all the major European powers of the day.C
  An immediate question for imperial England in North America no longer beleaguered by 
New France was the manner in which it was going to administer its colonies or manage its 
relationship with the Amerindian nations of the interior of North America, west of the 
Appalachia Mountain Range, and east of the Mississippi River. There was much too consider, 
the fur trade being but one of many under contention. Under the terms of the Paris Treaty, as 
noted before France was able to transfer ownership of the Louisiana Territory to Spain in 
recognition of Spain’s loss of Florida and in light of her comradeship during the war with 
England.6 This transfer of ownership included the port of New Orleans. While the British gained 
total control of the trade center of the Great Lakes and St. Lawrence River region they would 
continue to lose approximated revenue of £80,000 of British Sterling from the fur trade occurring 
west of the Wabash River in which the furs were transported down the Mississippi River to the 
port of New Orleans which was outside of England’s jurisdiction. England had plans to subvert 
 & 5 Within such a context the "world wars" 
of the Colonial and Postcolonial era were largely determined by unresolved issues amongst great 
European powers. The Treaty of Paris determined the then current world order wherein the Great 
Colonial Powers divvied up their claims to worldly dominions. For example, the claim to the 
Philippine Islands in the Western Pacific Ocean was returned to Spain. The geographic scale of 
the treaty included Africa, the Americas, Europe, and southern Asia. 
                                               
 
C Amerindian participants included: Iroquois League, Delaware, Shawnee, Ottawa, Ojibwa, Wyandot, Creek, 
Cherokee, Choctaw, Chickasaw, Mingo, Miami, and Pottawatomie Nations. European participants included: Great 
Britain, France, Spain, Holy Roman Empire, Portugal, Russia, Sweden, and Saxony among others.  
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the New Orleans trade but with no eventual success.7 Already, economic regulation alone 
presented a high stakes game to participants.  
 In all this economic globetrotting England—like other European agents commonly 
operated in and occupied foreign territories without first establishing sound diplomatic ties to 
local inhabitant nations and acted upon an assumed authority; commonly a conquering and 
exploitive authority. Beyond the fur trade, other issues for England included land policy, public 
revenue to finance new and existing colonial enterprises, and the necessity to formalize relations 
with Amerindian nations, while also finding a manner to fund its war debts and existing military 
deployments. In periods of crises when Colonial authorities required Amerindian assistance, the 
appearance of legitimate diplomatic ties were upheld, but these usually crumbled with the 
passing of the crises coupled with colonial economic goals. 
 Normatively, Amerindian polity of Trans-Appalachia during 1754-1830 should be 
characterized in cross cultural terms of state seeking societies. Primitive, savage, and pre-modern 
interpretations of Amerindian political organization are inappropriate if the organizational 
characteristics of Amerindian society served its populations in a meaningful and effective 
manner from the individual to the aggregate.D
                                               
 
D The modern label as a descriptor of an historic age (1500s to the 2nd World War of the 20th Century) is somewhat 
problematic in universal or cross cultural terms. Indigenous Scholar Smith (1999) suggest the modern era for 
indigenous populations is an era noted for two priori themes—resistance and survival. I suggest there may be a 
neutral ground for which to consider the modern era. The modern era understood through generic factors  such as 
the rapid rise of global trade, frequent inter-societal contact, and global population redistribution may provide such 
an opportunity. In other words, the modern era is an era of globalism and colonialism—these two interpretations to 
history have a dialectical relationship. It is unlikely that the populations of the world would have remained isolated 
from one another. On the other hand, the philosophical split between the philosophers or men of reason with the 
traditions of the church  was an event that occurred in the context of European society—it was an unresolved local 
and social event in which both European traditions were artificially transplanted upon indigenous populations. One 
cannot without careful consideration reduce the modern era as definitively European. For example, scholar Jennings 
 Furthermore Amerindian social organization 
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suggests a complexity that was absent or functionally moderated in Colonial social orders.E This 
complexity in part explains the difficulties of the Colonial or contact era of Trans-Appalachia. It 
alone cannot explain the difficulties experienced. The inherent goals of colonial ventures are 
problematic. Their success too often was only achieved through the means of exploitation 
derived from imperial policies or local phenomena that beset more equitable social designs. 
 Besides at the time, European colonies in North America were themselves not state 
societies but rather dependent society types contingent upon greater political organizations in 
their overseas mother countries. These dependent colonial societies derived their status from 
what may potentially be characterized as pre state European monarchial societies. In a balanced 
analysis the early colonies were not only dependent upon their European countries of origin but 
also to a large extent, upon the cooperation of Amerindian societies. In this regard European 
colonies were also state seeking societies.F
                                                                                                                                                       
 
(1975) questions the likelihood of European success in the Americas without the knowledge and technology of 
Amerindian society. In addition, Jennings frames the issue by asking  in what manner is the modern state is 
obligated to indigenous society. 
 The British colonies are unique in that their charters 
gave them some level of local control through the selection of some officials but also operated 
with officials appointed by the royal court. I will advance an analysis that attempts to identify 
the various underpinnings to state seeking behavior through an historical presentation of Colonial 
E Jennings (1975, Page 72 and 85) reports the position that Amerindian integration into the "executive power" or 
hierarchical  command structure of Euro-American stately society had the effect to create a peasantry with severely 
limited social agency. He adds that Amerindian contact with Europeans had the effect to reduce economic 
differentiation and specialization as the only substantial trade products or materials of pre-contact intertribal trade  
that survived were those sought after by European merchants. 
F Jennings (1975, Pages 107, 109 &) reports that colonial charters were in line with English law, customs, and 
governance were "feudal" in substance and character. In the 1600s the legal precedent had been set in which 
"colonial governments" were equated with a "lordship" therefore ensuring Crown jurisdiction over colonial matters 
rather than Parliamentary jurisdiction. The legal status of the British colonies has also been described as "estates." 
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Trans-Appalachia.G
Additional Thesis Goals  
 My methods identify the strategies employed by Amerindian and European 
agents.  
 This thesis sets the stage for contemporary state politics in the United States. The final 
struggles in colonial Trans-Appalachia occurred primarily between Amerindian polities and the 
early Republic. These events in all can be measured as an apocalyptic event for Amerindian 
society.8— H
 Donald Fixico reiterates Federal policy effectively developed “as a problem to be 
solved.”9 Tribal nationalism has not been acknowledged in that tribal sovereignty has been 
reduced to something less than a national experience. Sadly, the problem has been effectively 
resolved in favor of colonizing agents such as the federal government. While Federally 
recognized today work toward sovereign self-determination in line with U.S. policy, they appear 
to be emerging as a new sort of political community to be ordered in the ranks of U.S. federalism 
next to municipalities and states. Concurrently, many non status tribes continue to seek entry into 
 My first goal is provide an interpretive historical sketch that illuminates the political 
arena of Amerindian Affairs experienced today through a set of historical briefs. My second goal 
is to illuminate the manner in which the pursuit of national and counter nationalist strategies 
resulted in the disenfranchisement of many Amerindian polities  that are not recognized through 
Federal enrollment and exist today as "non-status" tribal nations, without any formal status or 
only a limited independent political status. 
                                               
 
G For the purpose of this study, Colonial Trans-Appalachia is also referenced as the interior or the western country.  
H Scholar Gross (2002) suggests that colonialism in North America had such a relatively immediate, profound, and 
lasting effect that it resulted in the large scale disintegration of Amerindian society ranging from such general 
institutions associated with governance to the severe breakdown of the family unit. 
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the new federal order as witnessed by the letters of intent filed by different groups with the 
Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) of the U.S. Department of Interior. While Federally recognized 
tribes hack out their existence in the courts and lobbies of Congress, non-status tribes continue to 
contend with accusations denying their status as a tribe, a people, and so forth. From this 
situation the concept of Amerindian nationalism has remained a contested, fluid, and undefined. 
There has never been one prevailing notion.  
 We can revisit the origins of this so called problem to indeed discern the nature of 
Amerindian nationalism in the context of a Trans-Appalachia history.  From this framework the 
means to distinguish the motives at work will be achieved by exploring the range of tribal 
political strategies that developed with the introduction of European authority in Trans-
Appalachia and concomitantly, how the outcomes of these strategies bear on tribal populations 
today.  The situation of these non-status groups may be reconciled through a critical examination 
of Trans-Appalachia history in the terms of a Postcolonial critique. The key issues addressed and 
reported on from the backdrop of Postcolonial Theory include unknown or hidden histories of 
indigenous groups, identity politics, state endorsed violence, and nationalisms born of the 
colonial experience.10 
 Since at least the 1930s to the current day, the United States has seen a number of 
Amerindian nations attempt to establish formal political ties with either the federal government 
or local state governments. During the 1930s the Indian Reorganization Act effectively began 
returning local control to tribal nations. In other words the IRA established the legislative trend 
towards self-governance for Amerindian nations. Self-governing Amerindian nations today hold 
a legal status descriptively known as Federal recognition. Federal recognition is a formal legal 
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relationship between a tribal government and the U.S. government primarily administered 
through the BIA. Historically, the Bureau of Indian Affairs originated in the U.S. Department of 
War. Currently federal recognition conveys a sovereign to sovereign government relationship in 
theory, in practice it may be described more accurately as a relationship between a greater 
sovereign and a lesser sovereign.  
 Incidentally, a number of Amerindian nations have chosen to forsake a relationship 
altogether with any government entity. For example, one such tribe is the Independent 
Traditional Seminole Tribe of Florida associated with Danny Billie.11 The number of non status 
tribes is unknown but there are acknowledged to be dozens of these groups that vary greatly in 
their demographics and organization. Why these tribes choose not to seek government 
recognition is open to speculation. I would consider it arrogant to speak on their behalf without 
first having established a dialogue with them. However, I hope my exposition of the history of 
western expansion will assist in understanding these sorts of decisions. 
 Debates concerning non-status tribes, are grounded in the unnerving practices of identity 
politics and the politics of recognition. I
                                               
 
I For a quick overview of the subject of identity politics see the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy @ 
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/identity-politics/ & For a good discussion on the subject of recognition politics see 
the article written by Glen Coulthard in the online magazine—New Socialist @ 
http://newsocialist.org/newsite/index.php?id=1011 
 These inevitably hinge on the question of legitimacy of 
tribal groups that exist outside the federated order in contrast to the groups of tribal nations 
officially recognized by the U.S. federal government. The issue of these "non-status" tribes is far 
reaching and often provokes sharp dialogue focused on "ethnic fraud" by members of groups 
who have recognition.12 A critical history of North America may disclose a record of the 
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existence of numerous non-status tribes, bands, families and so on. This can be achieved by close 
examination of the practices and effects of early policies toward Amerindian societies,  and the 
conflicts that arose within Amerindian societies in the context of aggressive colonial 
intervention. 
 Recognition schemes that are a product of colonialism ensures variation in tribal status 
politically, socially, and culturally. Some groups hold a non-Federally recognized status due to a 
long history of the United States employing a policy of non-recognitionJ
 Given this last, it is surprising that some wonder why some tribal groups chose to go it 
alone and forsake any sort of relationship with the federal government. There are many reasons, 
 to achieve its goals 
associated with territorial expansion. Explicative More particular to this study is the early 
Republic's agenda to establish an “Indian-free zone” in the region known as Trans-Appalachia.13 
Other non-recognized groups, for example, such as the Delaware, Shawnee, Wyandot, and 
Miami families of northeastern Kansas are remnants left over from the calamity of the former 
U.S. removal solution; a solution that was more palatable to government humanists than actual 
extermination. Extermination as a solution was actually considered by at least three U.S. 
Presidents including George Washington, Thomas Jefferson, and William Henry Harrison.14 
Some relevant dialogue by George Washington reads, “It is much to be doubted whether these 
wretches will ever suffer our Frontiers to enjoy tranquility till they are either exterminated, or 
removed to a much greater distance.”15 
                                               
 
J In classic usage and in international law, non-recognition refers to the act of one government’s diplomatic choice 
not to recognize the legitimacy of another government. In the context of post-colonialism non recognition as a 
state’s diplomatic choice can compound the issue even further by not even acknowledging a legitimate claim to an 
ethnic, cultural, or national identity. 
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most due to active strategies towards their extinction. Some individual tribes were forcibly 
placed under the authority of larger tribes such as was the case with the Loyal Shawnee and the 
Cherokee Nation of Oklahoma. Only later would the Loyal Shawnee gain an independent 
Federally recognized status.16 In consideration of the frenzied creation of the United States 
driven by its early nationalist goal of expanding its territorial dominion to the Pacific Ocean, 
there is much to uncover in examining its creation. Some tribes seek only limited recognition or 
have failed to achieve their recognition goals. These sorts of groups included the Miami Nation 
of Indiana or the Shawnee Nation United Remnant Band of Ohio who sought and obtained 
relationships with their local state governments.17  
 It would be beyond the scope of this thesis to review every application for federal 
recognition submitted in the past 30 years and it would be unrealistic to think that a series of 
smoking gun documents would be found in every case. Non-status tribes are unlikely to have 
been documented on government rolls as they were not historically beneficiaries of public 
annuity programs or land tenure schemes in many cases. Rather the evidence for their existence 
rests in other actions taken by government agents and recorded historical events. For example the 
1817 Fort Meigs treaty rewarded those Shawnee bands who had aided the United States during 
the war of 1812 with annuities and land entitlements while barring those Shawnee associated 
with Tecumseh’s band from the treaty process.18  The Shawnee associated with Tecumseh had 
not only defended their homes and Canada by virtue of their reluctant partnership with the 
British, but had invaded the territorial claim laid by the United States in the Congressional 
passage of the Northwest Ordinance in 1787. At the Treaty of Ft. Meigs and in the 
commissioners own language: 
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That in consideration of the faithful services of the Shawnees in the late war with England, and 
for divers of other considerations, the government of the United States settle on the Shawnees an 
annuity of two thousand dollars annually, forever, to be paid to them at Wapaughkonetta.19  
 
 Ohio became a refugee region of non-recognized Indians who were rejected from the 
reservation system of the annuity chiefs and the U.S. social order during the years following the 
War of 1812. The annuity chiefs who controlled the reservations denied rights of citizenship to 
non-status Indians.20 But Amerindian refugees or dislocated populations may date to an even 
earlier decade when a traveling missionary in far western Pennsylvania in 1753 noted from his 
visit in the Amerindian town of Shamokin, “it is uncomfortable for Indians there, for if they plant 
they cannot enjoy it, so many strange Indians pass through the town whom they must feed.”21 
 Today, no less than sixty-two tribes are currently recognized by sixteen states in which at 
least five of those states host tribes originating in Trans-Appalachia where additional states have 
developed some type of “recognition scheme.”22 In a key respect, many of these tribal polities, 
families, etc, can probably be viewed as tribes that were in former times endured something 
similar to termination whether it was the result of an official  act of the Federal government or 
not. In some cases Amerindian polities  lost formal political status to negotiate several decades 
prior to the official policy of termination. Termination was an official policy during the 1950s 
and 1960s in which the federal government sought to integrate tribal citizens into society at large 
by ending their status as a Federally recognized tribes and extending to them a single exclusive 
citizenship in the United States. Similar sorts of schemes were applied during Oklahoma’s 
statehood in which the government of the Cherokee Nation in Oklahoma was dissolved by 1906. 
The Cherokee Nation of Oklahoma loss of tribal status is associated with the General Allotment 
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Act of 1887.K
 Between the 1740s and 1850s the struggle for the North American interior is highlighted 
by a number of apparently distinctive conflicts that hold some common underlying threads. Wars 
of this era include the French and Indian War, the American Revolution, and the War of 1812. 
Other wars of this era include Pontiac’s War, Cornstalk’s War more commonly known as Lord 
Dunmore’s War, the Wars for the Ohio River Valley beginning in the 1780s, the Chickamauga 
Resistance, the Red Stick Resistance, Black Hawk’s War, and the Seminole conflicts of the Old 
Southwest among other conflicts associated with time frame. The status of Colonial society 
relative to that of Amerindian society was consistently at issue even when a specific war 
involved Colonial societies in conflict primarily with each other. 
 It would take until the 1970s before they would  regain their federal recognition. 
The early practice by the U.S. of nonrecognition as a diplomatic tool, also practiced earlier by 
England and France, gave rise to a long history of tribal termination whether it occurred in the 
field of conquest or in the halls of the executive, congressional, and judicial branches of 
government. For example the U.S. government would routinely only negotiate with certain tribal 
polities based on how those polities happen to fit into U.S. policy schemes or affect U.S. tribal 
allies. Similarly England and France were reluctant to recognize the authority of tribes who 
existed outside established trade networks. 
  What arose from mandates were an eventual colonial rebellion and a series of wars that 
marginalized Amerindian society as their homelands were usurped in the march westward. After 
                                               
 
K The General Allotment Act or Dawes Act ended tribal legal status by breaking up tribally held lands and 
distributing land allotments to individual Amerindians. The act further opened up tribal lands to non-Amerindians 
for settlement or commercial development. The Dawes Act was followed by the Burke Act of 1906 which prompted 
further tribal land loss and fostered Amerindian assimilation  through exclusive U.S. citizenship. 
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the French and Indian War the British attempted into issue in a new era of colonial 
administration with King George’s Royal Proclamation of 1763. A significant tenant of that new 
administration included an arrangement of borders that demarcated colonial populations from 
Amerindian populations. In this aspect the attempt at a new colonial administration was designed 
to maintain colonial dependencies to serve British commercial interests while easing Amerindian 
concerns over unwarranted land annexation practices. Taken as a whole, these post—French and 
Indian War conflicts can be grouped together as the Proclamation Wars. 
  At the end of these wars it was clear as to who would control the future of North 
America. With the 1830 Indian Removal Act the Mississippi River, the far western boundary of 
Trans-Appalachia, was gained and the quest to reach the Pacific Ocean was to come with 
insidious diligence. This is seen in the advance military expedition by Lewis and Clark a mission 
of intelligence gathering before the invasion of the Trans-Mississippi Region. It is unreasonable 
to think that Amerindian polities would remain stable and functionally intact under such a 
scenario. The whole scenario of the Proclamation Wars and Indian Removal Act resulted in a 
diaspora of tribal populations and remnant tribal polities. To think otherwise would be naïve.  
  While some of these non-Federally recognized groups have maintained more coherent 
communities over time, such as the Miami Nation of Indiana, others have had to struggle at 
restoring their communities such as the widely dispersed Chickamauga Cherokee also known as 
just Chickamauga a tribal nation that entered into an armed resistance movement over activities 
of the Henderson Land Company. In the region of the Old Southwest the Chickamauga more 
often than not stood alone in a two decade long resistance after the American Revolution.23 The 
Chickamauga were a key member in an Amerindian regime that stretched to the northern regions 
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of Trans-Appalachia and more specifically to the resistance movements occurring in the Ohio 
region. They developed close associations with the Shawnee and Delaware among other nations 
as the Chickamauga also participated in the defense of the Ohio Country during the 1790s. 
 The Amerindian regime that formed to contain western expansion into Trans-Appalachia  
has can trace its roots with such early leaders as The Mortar of the Creek Nation, individuals 
from the Shawnee, Delaware, Wyandot, and Miami Nations of the Ohio region, and Pontiac—
even though Pontiac also sought the restoration of French power. Later leaders of note included 
Dragging Canoe, Captain Pipe, and Cornstalk.L
 Outlining the dispersion of ethnic Cherokee is no easy matter. In 1788 Cherokee 
migrations west of the Mississippi River into Missouri and Arkansas were becoming more 
common. So many Cherokee including Chickamauga inhabited villages in the area that Spanish 
officials were not able discern their numbers.24 Dislocated Cherokee populations or refugees 
reported in central New York and Pensacola, Florida during the opening years of the American 
Revolution.25 During the days of forced removal in 1838, the Ocanluftee Cherokee or Eastern 
Cherokee of North Carolina were not hiding in the mountains but were instead actively 
cooperating with the U.S. Army in arresting unruly Cherokee citizens residing in the removal 
towns. This cooperation led the Ocanluftee gunmen to participate in an impromptu firing squad. 
 In the 1790s Amerindian regime leaders also 
included Blue Jacket, Little Turtle, Buckongahelas and the Badger. By the War of 1812 
leadership had passed to such individuals as Tecumseh, Roundhead, the Trout, Tenskwatawa, 
and Main Poc. 
                                               
 
L 1770s to 1780s. 
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The unruly Cherokee from towns designated for removal were killed for their role in the deaths 
of some U.S. soldiers.26 Earlier, many Chickamauga and other Cherokee voluntarily removed 
themselves to Arkansas for lands reserved to them by treaty in 1817. Two decades later with the 
forced removal Cherokee populations still residing primarily in Georgia the Federal government 
attempted to force the Arkansas government to integrate themselves into the jurisdiction of the 
new Oklahoma Cherokee government under John Ross.27 The migrations associated with the 
treaty of 1817 were by no means the first migrations to Arkansas as up to a thousand 
Chickamauga had migrated to Arkansas in 1809.28 Cherokee migrations are much more complex 
than implied by the typical history associated with the story of the Trail of Tears. The typical 
history of the Trail of Tears itself has come under some recent criticisms.29 
 I urge the reader to consider the nature of the North American colonial project that 
eventually emerged after the Royal Proclamation as a project in imperial nationalism that created 
the United States. It is known today through an arbitrary and ubiquitous claim to much of North 
America along with the Amerindian nationalisms that either sought sanctuary through armed 
opposition to this claim or who sought relief from the accompanying onslaught of this claim 
through appeasement— however reluctant it may or may have not been and just potentially 
necessary.  
  One significant issue for many of these tribal groups is whether or not the pursuit of 
federal recognition is really in their best interest. They wonder if the end result of the process 
will serve to restore their communities even though this choice has been considered and resolved 
by many Native polities. Federal recognition as a choice should be considered with a risk and 
reward analysis, but it should be noted that these were unavailable to 18th century Amerindian 
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nations. Among contemporary risks, one only needs to observe the invasive role of the B.I.A. 
amongst other federal and state authorities or the manner in which casino politics has 
erroneously affected tribal citizenship standards or community stability in some limited cases.30
 One approach to understanding the status granted by federal recognition can be viewed 
through the framework of protectionist economic regulation.31 The federal government 
legitimizes tribal authority through licensing tribal governments in which the licensed 
governments can then pursue the securitization of public entitlements and exploit private 
economic privileges, e.g. the right to conduct gaming activities. Such licensed governments can 
then participate in the political process (lobbying) to prevent admission into the system by 
potential competitors—non-Federally recognized tribes. Non-Federally recognized tribes are at a 
distinct disadvantage. They lack the financial parity to compete with Federally recognized tribes 
in political gaming. While the political process provides a right for all to participate it does not 
mean that all participate with the same measure of resources. Therefore justice may be 
untenable—not that federal recognition is necessarily the means to achieve social justice. 
Critiquing federal recognition through the lens of economic regulation alone is a reductionist 
approach for it precludes other issues that go along with political autonomy. 
  Federal recognition eventually became the United States policy choice of preference 
alongside a policy of non recognition as it fit the needs of the Federal Government and its 
constituents. Through this choice of internally domesticating tribal authority, the United States 
has committed itself to an entanglement of affairs that it hopes to endure—as does the tribal 
party involved in the affair. The problem to understand the damage that was done through 
colonialism, the damage that continues to be done and the confusion that it promotes. Part of that 
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damage can be remedied in an impartial review of history that explains how present conditions 
came to be to alleviate the confusion accomplished with the direct and collateral damage of 
colonialism. Part of the problem is the manner in which Amerindian society has been historically 
interpreted through texts that are either eroticizing or dispassionate. 
Methodology 
 The study operates within the narrative, topical historical research tradition. Although it 
was my original intention to do so I do not utilize interviews or operate from oral tradition for 
several reasons. First and foremost I lacked the funds and the time to conduct a thorough 
interview process. I initially began this process by spending the summer of 2005 in Ohio 
traveling on my own finances. However I had also lined up interviews with individuals whose 
habitats stretched from Arkansas, Missouri, Tennessee, Alabama, Florida, and New Jersey. 
Unfortunately in these circumstances, telephone, email, or any other long distance interviews 
were not feasible. I have also found that people are very uncomfortable discussing such personal 
matters with individuals they have not met in person regardless of who may have referred or 
vouched for them. While I am an insider into some of these communities, my reach and intimacy 
only stretched so far.  
Temporal and Geographic Scope 
The Appalachian Mountain Range is the dominant landform of the Eastern United States and 
served initially as a natural barrier to westward expansion. It is politically significant in that the 
Royal Proclamation of 1763 attempted to establish an international demarcation line between the 
British Colonies and the Amerindian Interior. The demarcation line was fairly consistent with the 
physical mountain range itself. For the purpose of this study, the Trans-Appalachian region is 
24 
  
further divided by four sub regions: 1) the Old Northwest Territory that encompasses the current 
states of Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Michigan, Wisconsin and Minnesota, and  2) the Old Southwest 
Territory represented by the present states of Kentucky, Tennessee, Alabama, Mississippi, 3) and 
Florida, and 4) the territory of upstate New York and southeast Canada. Granted, Florida would 
seem to be an unconventional selection but in the Colonial era Florida was divided into western 
and eastern divisions. The western portion extended across the Gulf of Mexico coast line as far 
as the port of New Orleans. the Iroquois League, or the Six Nations, is represented in the study 
for their unique role from the Trans-Appalachia locale of upstate New York and southeast 
Canada for they had a substantial impact in the affairs of the Old Northwest and Old Southwest 
geographies.  
 Trans-Appalachia is defined as the region between the Appalachian Mountain range and 
the Mississippi River.  The range extends itself from southeast Canada to central Alabama and 
historically was the geographic frontier to the British colonies. Settler movement westward and 
colonial military campaigns into the region would rely on different roads that cut through the 
Appalachian Mountains such as the Mohawk Trail of western New York and the Forbes Road 
that stretched from Philadelphia to Pittsburgh. The latter granted access to the Ohio River which 
in turn granted access to the Mississippi River. Another example was also Braddock’s Road that 
connected Baltimore to Pittsburgh. Further south, the Cumberland Road adjoined the Potomac 
and Ohio Rivers. At the far southern end of the Appalachian Mountain Range the Great Valley 
Road provided access to the Cumberland Gap from which the north-south Wilderness Road 
provided access to the Ohio and Tennessee Rivers. In addition there was a compliment of roads 
used by Amerindian nations to conduct movements and trade within the interior. 
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Source Materials  
In the process of conducting my research I discovered there is plenty of material available 
in primary and secondary sources to conduct the study. The study is weighted toward secondary 
resources but relies on a triangulated analysis of the sources to attain consistency, accuracy, and 
reliability in reporting. Primary sources such as private journals, diaries, recorded minutes, and 
recorded personal histories were used when they could be readily accessed.  Secondary sources 
include dissertations, journals, anthologies, and books. Source material publication dates range 
from 1855 to the present with scholarly accounts from at least the United States, Canada, 
England, and Japan numbering roughly 150 works cited. This provides a broad array of 
representation covering the topic from which to verify and analyze emergent and outstanding 
positions for theoretical propositions and conclusions. 
Theoretical Aims 
 Dowd suggests the error in understanding the dynamic between various native polities is 
the manipulation of the tribe or nation as the unit of analysis in that both the intratribal and 
intertribal element must be acknowledged.32 Other scholars have relied on other units of analysis 
to understand tribal politics. White considers the matter at the level of the village or town noting 
that village composition was commonly multi-tribal in its citizenship.33 Further delineation 
points towards the clan as a worthwhile unit of analysis.34 I will use the generic concept of polity 
as a unit of analysis because it essentially identifies what is at issue. Simply put, a polity is 
significant in that its members regardless of tribal, village, or clan citizenship shared the same 
values and goals; but that is not to say that the units tribe, village, or clan did not have a 
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significant role in political affairs. I suspect kin networks also held a role but that this role should 
not be overstated.M
 Four predominant polities emerge from the research. First a containment polity that 
sought to maintain a national existence and prevent colonial expansion into the interior of North 
America through dedicated hard power discourses and intertribal affiliations who participated 
reluctantly in security regimes with European kingdoms. Secondly, an appeasement polity that 
favored soft power dialogues with Colonial authorities and later the American Republic 
primarily through land concessions, trade agreements, and annuity subsidies with the expectation 
of maintaining a diminished national experience as agreements entered often afforded colonial 
authorities undue influence into the domestic affairs of Amerindian polities. Third, a free rider 
polity that actively used both hard and soft power engagements to gain status, trade benefits, and 
territorial benefits by manipulating the balance of power between the containment/appeasement 
polities and the colonial establishment much in the same manner as a colonial power would have 
done. This polity at times appears more as a possible cooperative polity that sought full 
partnerships resulting in regime making with Colonial authorities. The final polity that attempted 
by choice or circumstance to maintain a non-alignment posture and resist entry into any standing 
or burgeoning regime. These strategies were not necessarily static in application. As regional 
  For the purpose of this thesis polity will signify strategy and vice versa. 
                                               
 
M From the discipline of anthropology Amerindian society has been described as "kinship states" noted for a socio-
political structure organized through extended familial relationships such as clans that were incompatible with 
European bureaucratic state forms. (Jennings, 1975) Yet, in the contemporary politics of America we can observe 
how some families are forces to be reckoned with such as the Kennedys or the Clintons, for example. So in 
retrospect, some Amerindian leadership organizations may parallel this sort of phenomena rather than be indicative 
of hereditary title or privilege. Besides the turnover rate of Amerindian leadership due to disease, warfare, and 
slavery substantially reduces the likelihood of a hereditary system and places sever limitations on an overly familial 
system of leadership. Let alone a historical record that indicates otherwise. 
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political dynamics changed so did the strategies employed by some Amerindian polities. Other 
Amerindian polities remained more or less consistent with certain strategic themes. 
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Chapter 2 - Amerindian Nat ionalism: A Theoretical Foundat ion 
 
 One of the things I hope to demonstrate in this thesis is that the conflicts that occurred in 
Trans-Appalachia roughly between 1750 and 1830 were primarily a result of incompatible 
nationalist expressions by Amerindian polities and the British colonies of the Atlantic Seaboard. 
The contemporary effects can be discernable in current tribal status and condition, and range 
from unrecognized Diaspora tribal populations, to tribes that are state and/or Federally 
recognized. Some of these tribes have more recently faced the prospects of termination and 
integration that would ultimately ensue with the Termination Policy of the Federal government 
during the 20th Century.A
Cook-Lynn and Anti-Indianism 
 Whereas, some unrecognized tribes have come through the other end 
of integration as a result of nonrecognition policies, state actions, and self directed tribal choices, 
to again emerge with reconstituted communities. One factor in the general status issue is the 
inequity of the national relationship between status tribal nations with their state and federal 
counterparts. A clearer understanding of the 18th and early 19th century roots of tribal status 
policies reveals how current issues came into existence long ago. 
 The John Hopkins Guide to Literary Criticism begins its Native Theory review of 2005 
by highlighting the dimensions of the contemporary debate regarding tribal identity significant of 
national North American borders, treaty relations, historical differences, questions of 
authenticity, colonization, and ideology in line with the tenets of Postcolonialism. The text 
identifies Elizabeth Cook-Lynn, a scholar of Sioux ancestry, as the foremost advocate of an 
                                               
 
A Most notably during the 1950s and 1960s. 
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Amerindian nationalist perspective.1 Cook-Lynn’s point of view cuts to the heart of the matter.   
In "Anti-Indianism in Modern America a Voice from Tatekeya’s Earth" she explains, “… 
America’s First Nations find themselves with the myths of their own national status against a 
long history of enforced denationalization.”2 Cook-Lynn extends her analysis by cautiously 
warning of flighty themes and dialogues with which many Amerindian authors are preoccupied. 
These include the seemingly never-ending quest for identity and the inevitable helplessness of 
tribal peoples in the face of institutions that intervene in Amerindian life.3 
From my perspective, Cook-Lynn’s discussion could have been written in 1830. 
Although her Dakota identity is comes from the Northern Plains, her words strikingly and 
accurately speak to the process and aftermath of westward expansion into Trans-Appalachia.  
This expansion was in conflict with Amerindian nationalism through the mechanism of a rogue 
agenda that still seeks to nullify Amerindian nationalism. Cook-Lynn’s work cuts through self-
serving issues of tribal politics to address the broader concerns of the community at large within 
the ongoing systematic and literal deconstruction of tribal nations. For Cook-Lynn, this is not an 
event that is adequately addressed by Postcolonial scholarship, but instead as a largely 
unrecorded event of genocide.4 Using a similar rationale the Arikara/Hidatsa scholar Michael 
Yellow Bird contends that a general “infatuation” with genocide by civil society in the U.S. can 
be seen in Indian-themed sports mascots, the media’s consistent portrayal of America as 
benevolent in spite of evidence to the contrary, and the retelling of uncritical histories that ignore 
or deny genocidal processes.5 
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The denationalization of tribal nations occurred in part through the Federal organization 
of tribes as racial groups rather than as nations. Definition of “blood quantum” and its 
relationship to government rolls became narrow standards for tribal citizenship. This confused 
biological with political categories. As a Chickamauga elder once conveyed to me, “The 
Cherokee were not a race, they were a nation!” He felt that the application of blood quantum 
criteria was “convenient” for the Federal government. It provided new and abundant 
opportunities to create division and strife in tribal communities—abetting a doctrine of “divide 
and conquer.” The terms “full blood” and “mixed blood” are disingenuous, living relics of the 
Colonial era.  They manage to betray the concepts of family, clan, and—in due course—the 
nation itself. However, these terms served and continue to serve a colonial establishment quite 
well.  In skewing the conceptual and practical implementation of citizenship within reified 
“nations,” they do not emancipate so much as abet processes of domination and control. 
Dowd’s Paths of Resistance 
Gregory Dowd’s Paths of Resistance: American Indian Religion and the Quest for 
Unity—1745-1815, is a seminal study of Trans-Appalachia.  It weighs in on the subject through 
examination of the ethnic Shawnee, Creek, Cherokee, and Delaware nations in Trans-
Appalachian border regions. Dowd’s work is admirable for its scope in considering multiple 
tribal polities and broad geographic coverage. He states that his dissertation “suggests” and 
“interprets” the resistance to western expansion with a dual view point: first a “Western” or 
“modern” point of view to understand tribal discontent from a growing economic dependence on 
colonial agents.6 Here the Amerindian and European regional trade economy was heavily 
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invested upon a singular fur or peltry commodity and to a lesser degree—the regional slave 
trade. 
 Additional context to consider in reference to the state of affairs that prevailed to the 
detriment of tribal polities occurred with regime change. At the time of the French and Indian 
War a strong bi-polarization of European spheres of influence operated in Trans-Appalachia 
through the British and the French that included considerable political ties to regional 
Amerindian nations. To say the least, Amerindian participants like their European counterparts 
attempted to manipulate these trade and security regimes to their advantage. During the French 
and Indian War the Spanish aligned themselves with the French and while the Spanish  had an 
influence their role was not as decisive. Regional changes turned more so on the British and 
French and less on Spanish intentions.   
For a little over a decade the British held a uni-polar influence, but not a hegemonic 
influence, on the region.  But the region's European element transformed into a multi-polar order 
after the American Revolution in which the British, the early Colonial Republic, and the Spanish 
competed for supremacy in the area. Any successful British or Spanish attempt to thwart the 
expansion of the early Colonial Republic occurred only with the participation of their 
Amerindian allies. Likewise the expansion of the early American Republic did not occur without 
vital Amerindian allies. These sorts of political arrangements reflect a changing balance of power 
that has been described through the political polarities or distribution of power in the region. To 
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this point I have not discussed the role of Amerindian nations in the regions balance of power 
politics.B
In the first point of view, Dowd defines the “nativist,” a theoretical individual of 
indigenous ancestry “who rejected the increasing Euro-American influence in tribal 
government.”7 The alternative to the nativist, identified as the “accommodationist” (or even 
“collusionist”) accepted Euro-American influence on tribal governance that allowed individual 
tribal leaders to expand or maintain their domestic constituency.  The latter categories of 
individuals were more strongly influenced by European authority and increasingly sought to 
identify with it. However, appeasement or accommodation on the part of the accommodationist 
was no long-term guarantee of acceptance or reward by the dominant Europeans. 
 
In Dowd’s second point of view, presented from an Amerindian perspective, offers a 
reductionist interpretation of Amerindian resistance movements as journeys in search of “sacred 
power”.8 While Dowd recognizes how trade both internally and externally affected tribal polities 
as it became a tool to undermine Amerindian nationalism; his hypothesis is otherwise chalked 
with ambiguous abstractions.  One could just as easily entertain a hypothesis that states, 
“Western expansion can be viewed in pre-modern terms that identify manifest destiny as the 
realization of sacred power.  In modern terms, the American Republic’s westward expansion was 
                                               
 
B Balance of Power politics are significant for describing the distribution of political, economic, cultural, military 
power classically within the states of the international system but for the purposes of this study the examination is 
looking at the distribution of power within a regional system with no clearly defined state actor. This sort of 
distribution of power is typically described by the number of polarities of power operating within the system. 
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a savage, genocidal precursor to successful state building.” However, this point of view is not 
uniquely indigenous. 
The so-called modern nation-state’s development begins with the Treaty of Westphalia in 
1648 that ended the religiously driven Thirty Years War.  This preceded the American 
Revolution by only 130 years.9  Therefore, modern nation-states were a relatively new 
phenomenon, appearing early on the scene—and during the process--of Colonial history in North 
America.10 The Westphalia treaty gave rise to principles of state sovereignty, self-determination, 
legal parity with other states, and supposedly a principle of non-intervention with the affairs of 
other states. However, none of the treaties associated with Westphalia mention “sovereignty” and 
they left the German principalities under the authority of the Holy Roman Empire.11 
Furthermore, the treaty guaranteed rights of intervention to France and Sweden should the treaty 
be violated. The treaty recognized the rights of both Protestants, including Calvinists, and 
Catholics.12 Significantly, the Westphalia event seems to be another temporary truce among 
European imperialists in which certain religious rights were obtained.   These included the right 
to worship the same divinity within different theologies but not the right to practice religion 
outside a God-centered monotheism. 
 Dowd’s study brings much needed clarity on other issues. He identifies the character of 
intratribal  or internal hostilities as an additional precursor dilemma to successful intertribal 
resistance while also observing intertribal dilemmas.  He draws a dichotomy between nativist 
and accommodationist polities, in which the contrasting dynamics of the two camps strained 
Amerindian nationalism. Dowd also points out that nativist leaders such as Tecumseh and 
 37 
 
Pontiac operated as the result of a long-standing tradition of intertribal resistance.  They did not 
represent the start of the tradition.13  
 Dowd’s commentary stands in contrast to Edmund’s provocative article, “Tecumseh, The 
Shawnee Prophet, and American History: A Reassessment” in which Edmund explains how 
Tecumseh was a “white man’s Indian.”14 His position is based on the idea that Tecumseh’s 
leadership represented a centralization of authority as conceptually foreign to Amerindian 
politics just as intertribal confederations or regimes were. Edmund identifies Tecumseh’s 
leadership style as one that appealed to whites because it was the kind of solution they 
themselves would have pursued.15 However, Edmund is attempting to co-opt or redefine the very 
traditions that fueled intertribal nationalism.  
 Edmund’s position can be interpreted as a thinly veiled attempt to undermine a clear 
expression of Amerindian nationalism.  In presenting this, he upholds a scholarly tradition of 
ignoring or denying certain forms of indigenous political organization.   Colonial Europeans 
never recognized any form of indigenous polity that they did not have a hand in creating. A 
common error is discrediting the validity of indigenous polities by describing them as something 
other than “Indian”. It is common for scholars articulating a “Postcolonial script” to suggest that 
the U.S. has had and still has a heavy hand in deciding what is Indian and what is not or who is 
Indian and who is not. The Comanche scholar Pierotti also notes that, "tribal politics can also 
often lead to exclusion and termination [of identity] at the personal level an issue often not 
addressed by scholars because they are recognized by their tribal governments."16 
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One common view of Tecumseh as considered by white Americans of his era reported in 
the Indiana Centinel of Vincennes in December of 1820 records: 
He was truly great - and his greatness was his own, unassisted by science or the aids of education. As a 
statesman, a warrior and a patriot, take him all in all, we shall not look upon his like again.”17  
Tecumseh’s appeal to whites rests in his character, charisma, talents, and his choice to 
stand tall in the face of great odds—all of which have cross-cultural appeal as an archetypal hero. 
This neutralizes Edmunds arguments on this point. However, many other Amerindian leaders 
also appealed to colonial figures and populations, e.g. Black Hawk, Sitting Bull, Crazy Horse, 
Geronimo, etc. Tecumseh was not unique in this respect.  
In regards to Tecumseh's cultural orientation he was not an empire builder but rather a 
consensus builder. He did not use his influence to create an Amerindian empire by conquering 
villages and incorporating captive males into an army to conquer more villages.  He did not seek 
to build a martial empire or even a chiefdom. He used his skillful oratory to draw like-minded 
individuals into a consensus that sought to resurrect a cross national, supra-cultural, polycentric, 
intertribal regime that had collapsed after the failure of the Battle of Fallen Timbers in Ohio and 
the corresponding defeats suffered by the Chickamauga after the death of Dragging Canoe. Even 
in his dialogues with colonial authorities such as with Governor, and later President, William 
Henry Harrison, it is evident that other Amerindian leaders also rose to the occasion and spoke 
their concerns. His leadership maybe better characterized as primus inter pares:  a first among 
equals. Those who aligned themselves with Tecumseh did so by choice and in so doing 
supported an intertribal response to prevent the annexation of the remaining Amerindian lands in 
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Trans-Appalachia. Tecumseh's success was less than total as many Amerindian nations wholly 
rejected his efforts, e.g. the slave holding Choctaw swayed by one of their leaders, Pushmataha. 
Tribal polities became increasingly polarized along the frontier.18  Dowd’s proposal of a 
dual response to the looming border crises is grounded on one side in a nativist camp that 
rejected foreign interventions that relied on self-directed approaches to reverse the rising tide of 
“social stratification that accompanied economic dependence” resulting from a one-sided fur 
trade. “Economic dependence” should not be understood in absolute terms but rather the result of 
social engineering and political maneuvering to create dependencies.  Whether it was 
Amerindian nations, French, British, or Spanish colonists, they were all dependent upon 
European trade. Logistic lifelines from European manufacturing and finance seem to have had 
more influence on outcomes than other local factors. This would remain an issue all the way up 
to the U.S. Civil War. The other side, an accommodationist camp that remained more traditional 
as it stressed the individual tribal unit as a point of reference and provided a counterpoint to 
intertribal associations that benefited from their access to Europeans and Euro-Americans who, 
in turn, would usually recognize these accommodationist agents as legitimate representatives.19  
This provided for one method in which tribal authority became more centralized. 
This polarization of tribal polities between nativist and accommodationist orientations is 
frequently the basis for numerous assumptions about Amerindian identity. Dowd considers the 
“traditional” orientation of the accommodationist camp a “critical issue of Indian identity.”20 
What was so critical about it? Dowd contends that the intratribal strife that occurred within 
individual tribal polities due to trade relations with Europeans was more problematic for 
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intertribal unification than was intertribal aggression.  Furthermore, Dowd asserts that while 
tribes did not necessarily share the same political structures, the new corporate structure of 
intertribal confederation was affected by the same ritual and custom practiced by its citizens 
before this structure emerged .21 Advocates for intertribalism didn’t have to invent a theory of 
polygenesis. It already existed in the dialogues of their ancestors for decades standing. 
 Another explanation for intertribal aggression rests in the mutual advantage condition or 
nature of trade before contact which shifted towards overly hegemonic or monopolistic or 
oligarchic trade that mimicked the hegemonic aspiring qualities of European trade. In this 
qualitative shift in trade practices some tribal nations attempted to insert themselves into the 
structure as brokers or middlemen between other tribal nations and Europeans.22 This 
explanation for intertribal aggression also provides an avenue to explain organizational change in 
Amerindian society. Not all tribal nations attempted a monopoly on trade but rather sought 
intertribal partners to negotiate trade reform with Europeans. 
 Dowd offers an excellent introductory discussion of how “Indian notions of power” and 
religious affinity may have provided ideological foundations for resistance movements. The 
indigenous leaders of that era knew they were facing a world of change it was all around them, 
yet the hallmark of many of those leaders was to address that change by approaching it through 
their cultural traditions. Cultural traditions that were chalked with  not only a repertoire of 
religious values but also considerations for practical, self-interested statecraft along with an 
awareness to the high politics associated with a national interest.23 Eliades’  "The Indian Policy 
of Colonial South Carolina 1670-1763" records the comments from Edmond Atkin, the acting 
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Superintendent of British Indian Affairs of the Southern Colonies, who stated, “No people in the 
World understand and pursue their true National Interest, better than the Indian.”24 In 1755, 
Atkin pursued a policy aimed at forming a British sponsored intertribal trade and security regime 
to aid the British in banishing the French from North America.  This organization was similar to 
the Covenant Chain enjoyed by the northern British colonies with the Iroquois League.C
Transformations: Nativists and Accomodationists 
 British 
Indian officials often failed to gain exclusive relationships with tribal nations since Amerindian 
leadership would attempt to reserve the right to participate in trade relationships with multiple 
European partners, hence to practice free trade. Furthermore, British officials would also fail to 
gain the support of their colonies for such ideas. Eliades states that the Colonial governments 
were opposed to this scheme.25 In contrast to Dowd’s use of the “nativist” label in the context of 
Amerindian spirituality, historian David Corkran originally used this label to describe the self-
interest oriented political practices of a Creek headman, The Mortar in the 1967 work "The 
Creek Frontier."26 Corkran portrays The Mortar as high-end user of statecraft whose style relied 
upon his ability to build practical consensus based solutions that attempted to preempt European 
designs on the region. 
A reexamination of the of the interaction between accomodationist Amerindians and 
Europeans lay bare any traditional explanations extrapolated from supposed Amerindian cultural 
                                               
 
C The Covenant Chain's influence did extend to the southern colonies but with the advent of two separate British 
Indian Departments one for the northern colonies and one for the southern colonies British regime building with 
Amerindian nations occurred through these two administrative regions with overlapping influence. The Charlestown 
traders of South Carolina political role had a similar impact on southern tribes as the Albany traders in New York 
had on the northern tribes. 
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orientations but rather exposes the risks associated with the interaction. Sara Parker describes an 
exception to Dowd’s interpretation of a traditional approach to identity by accomodationists in 
Transformation of Cherokee Appalachia, 1755-1808: 
Nancy Ward [a noted Cherokee woman] and other Beloveds [national head women] controlled 
an elaborate network of white men who had married Cherokee women and were acknowledged 
as Cherokees. Yet these same individuals were on the payroll of James Robertson during the 
Revolution hired as intelligence gatherers.27 
 
  Still more, notice Indian agent Hawkins comments before attending his post as Indian 
agent to the Creek nation: 
I believe I shall find no difficulty in establishing a national council, to meet once a year, at the 
town of my residence, but the expense must be borne by the government, and I think it may be so 
conducted as not to exceed 700 dollars.28 — D
 
 
 This evidence suggests that the accommodationist camp’s interaction with Europeans 
challenged and transformed tribal identity at the core in the arena of national politics and in due 
course ignored domestic tribal boundaries.  Cultural implications from foreign influence on tribal 
polities are apparent. Warren notes how the Post-Removal annuity chiefs or government chiefs 
on the Shawnee reservation in Kansas continually denied citizenship to tribal applicants and even 
participated in the termination of another Shawnee band despite protests based on cultural 
precepts from yet another Shawnee band.29—E
                                               
 
D Jennings (1975, Page 21) reports the position that the transformation of Amerindian society by foreign agency was 
an unlikely "if not impossible" task unless one factors in the broad and intense decline of indigenous American 
populations due to disease. 
 The annuity system also suggests that economic 
E Post-Removal refers to the timeframe after the Indian Removal Act of 1830 along with the subsequent removal 
treaties that resulted in the relocation of Trans-Appalachian Amerindian nations to the states of Kansas and 
Oklahoma. during the 1830s and 1840s. 
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dependence has been overstated in that the annuity system undermined vigorous Amerindian 
economic activity resulting in the creation of dependent nations. 
 Both camps, nativist and accommodationist, reconfigured tribal identities with distinctive 
differences. The nativist camp did so by finding common ground among tribal traditions and 
acknowledging the reality that they held a common enemy. While the accommodationist camp 
did so by absorbing foreign culture indiscriminately. Dowd notes how accommodationists often 
took up arms alongside nativists when the conditions were favorable to do so, but inevitably 
utilized their “clout” with Europeans or Americans to cooperate with an agenda that ran counter 
to the nativist camp.  This resulted in a great deal of discord and conflict among the two camps.30 
This state of affairs suggests that accommodationist leaders occasionally held reservations and 
doubts about both their European connections and their intertribal counterparts. The 
accommodationist camp may have preferred not to entrust their future to co-alignment with 
Europeans, but still saw no other viable alternative. Even so the accommodationist position may 
simply have been the resulted from a successful colonial parlay for allies. Whether it was French, 
British, Spanish, or British colonies, they were all adamant about acquiring allies to secure their 
own interests, or to at least secure the neutrality of tribal polities in order to advance their 
agendas in the interior. While in some cases Europeans sought the subjugation if not 
extermination of Amerindian nations that could not be incorporated into their interests or who 
could not be drawn from their association with other rival Europeans. 
 In some cases, the reconfiguration of indigenous identity became irreconcilable in that 
one camp identified with European authority and one camp did not.  However, in many cases the 
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issue may have been trivial.  The means by which colonial authorities secured potentially 
reluctant Amerindian allies came through various methods, including the wholesale destruction 
of unarmed and unattended villages in which the adult male population may have been absent (in 
hunting or other activities).  Another means by which European agents may have condition tribal 
relations in their favor came through medical technology. Sir William Johnson made it a point to 
address the dangers of small pox to tribal nations by having the Mohawks undergo preventative 
treatment through inoculations.31 This factor I came upon late in my research and requires further 
investigation. 
Intertribal Confederacies and Resistance 
 Many scholars regard intertribal resistance as originating in the policy goals of European 
or colonial agencies rather than tribal polities. Timothy Willig, in "Restoring the Thin Red Line: 
British Policy and the Indians of the Great Lakes 1783-1812," examines the issue through the 
perspective of British strategy.  He argues that British policy goals of creating security regimes 
to contest the American Republic were responsible for creating a united intertribal movement.32 
Willig claims that tribes fought in the War of 1812 exclusively as “British allies”33 and that the 
Tippecanoe affair in 1811 ended tribal support for nativist unification.34 Or one might argue 
British zealousness or arrogance over their involvement, and their often over stated pledges to 
their so called Amerindian allies complicated matters greatly to the detriment of Amerindian 
security. 
 Warren offers another view in his text "Between Villages and Nations: The Emergence of 
Shawnee Nationalism 1800-1870."  He argues that the destruction of Prophetstown in November 
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1811 served to “reinvigorate” the intertribal confederacy as the “Communal bonds in the old 
Northwest were too strong to relinquish power to any one man…”35 Warren suggests intertribal 
resistance was identified with public figures like Tecumseh but that their lasting organization 
relied on more than the leadership or influence of one individual.36 He contradicts Willig’s 
British hypothesis but also contends that the fundamental elements to intertribal partnership 
moved beyond the leadership of single individuals.  This supports a hypothesis of Amerindian 
regime formation based on Amerindian polities and leaders that held similar geo-political views 
about European intrusions into the region.F
 A fine distinction is missing from the dialogue:  European kingdoms were at times 
seeking to bring about collective trade and security regimes in which tribal agents actively 
participated in such a process. Colonial authorities tried to incorporate tribes into unified 
partnerships for fear that if they did not, they would be at a disadvantage when other colonial 
counterparts did. This was not the source of Amerindian nationalist movements, but rather as a 
byproduct of mutual security  and economic interests. Amerindian-European security regimes 
were born of necessity as each benefited the other in the pursuit of its own agendas. At times 
their agendas were in line with each other while at other times they diverged. Both European and 
Amerindian participants in these alliances were aware of their own and their partner’s strong 
points as well as their own vulnerabilities, and each probably viewed themselves in these 
security associations as the superior party. 
 
                                               
 
F Another factor to consider in the success of Amerindian regime building was the relationship between Tecumseh 
and his brother, the Prophet. 
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 Another example of an international security compact reported by Coker and Watson in 
"Indian Traders of the Southeastern Spanish Borderlands; Panton, Leslie and Company and John 
Forbes and Company 1783-1847."  They describe the 1793 Treaty of Nogales wherein the 
Spanish, through the authority of Carondelet, entered into a compact with tribes of the Old 
Southwest to thwart westward expansion. Carondelet, the local colonial administrator, obligated 
tribal participants to initiate a war in the event that no agreement could be obtained with the 
United States over border issues. In contrast, the Nogales Treaty obliged Spain to enter into 
diplomatic efforts on behalf of Amerindians. The Nogales Treaty also made it possible to end, 
for a time, the ongoing Creek and Chickasaw conflict. Therefore, these Amerindian-European 
agreements reflected the national interests of both parties and seem to be a result of consensus 
efforts.37 Richter notes, in "The Ordeal of the Longhouse: Change and Persistence on the 
Iroquois Frontier 1609-1720," that tribal participation in wars amongst European actors reflected 
a function of intertribal and cultural processes that valued alliances with Europeans rather than a 
function of European “squabbling”.38 
Dragging Canoe and Chickamauga Leadership 
 Amerindian participants in the Treaty of Nogales included the Chickamauga Cherokee of 
the Old Southwest. Much more attention has been given in historical literature to intertribal 
confederations commonly associated with Pontiac, Blue Jacket, Little Turtle, and Tecumseh of 
the Old Northwest.  More attention is given to the Old Southwest in an examination of the forced 
removal of Trans-Appalachian tribes that began in the 1830s.  James Pate’s "The Chickamauga: 
A Forgotten Segment of Indian Resistance on the Southern Frontier" documents in great detail 
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the experiences of the secessionist Cherokees who became known as the Chickamauga 
associated with the leadership of Dragging Canoe among others.  This group served as the 
cornerstone of resistance in the Old Southwest from 1774 through 1792. Pate outlines the scope 
of Chickamauga activity from participation in broader Trans-Appalachia native nationalist 
campaigns that ranged from Ohio, Kentucky, Virginia, Tennessee, to the Carolinas and Georgia.  
The Chickamauga maintained alliances with the northern tribes of the Ohio River Valley, also 
with the British and the Spanish through contacts in Detroit, Pensacola, and New Orleans.39 
 Dragging Canoe’s influence was powerful.  This is clear from John Brown’s "Old 
Frontiers," which recounts how former Tennessee governor William Blount, upon hearing of 
Dragging Canoe’s death in 1790s stated, “Dragging Canoe stood second to none in the Nation.”40 
Chief Black Fox, in a foreboding statement, remarked: 
The Dragging Canoe …was a man of consequence in his country. He was a friend both to his 
own and the white people. His brother is still in his place, and I mention it now publicly… for he 
promises fair to possess sentiments similar to those of his brother, both with regard to the red and 
the white. It is mentioned here publicly that both red and white may know it, and pay attention to 
him.41 
 
 Dragging Canoe left a powerful impression on colonial America.  It was rumored:  
…that White settlers and soldiers feared that Dragging Canoe had supernatural powers, and even 
possibly the ability to resurrect. When Dragging Canoe was buried…it was said that white 
soldiers confiscated his body, and divided it into two halves…This was done to prevent 
Dragging Canoe from coming back…42 
 
 Brent Cox’s "Heart of the Eagle Dragging Canoe and the Emergence of the Chickamauga 
Confederacy" broadly outlines the political dynamics at work during the era.  He makes a 
distinction between the Old Northwest, where the Iroquois League clashed with the Shawnee for 
preeminence, and the Old Southwest, in which the Cherokees were initially beset by the designs 
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of the Creek, Choctaw, and Chickasaw, noting that these intertribal intrigues occurred in the 
midst of an expansionary oriented frontier nationalism contrasted against the ineffectiveness of 
British colonial authority.43  Cox offers an interpretation of the Chickamauga resistance as a 
response to imperialism through “fight, flight, and reform” that represented the “high tide of 
Cherokee resistance”.44 Cox demonstrates that military resistance to imperialism was the true 
nature of the Chickamauga Cherokee polity as opposed to a savage response to imperialism.45 
What I think Cox is trying to convey is that Chickamauga resistance is significant for an 
organized effort involving strategic considerations indicative of a modern label as opposed to a 
primitive uncoordinated belligerent response without considerations for consequences. 
 Tom Holm, in "American Indian Warfare: The Cycles of Conflict and the Militarization 
of Native North America," describes differences between modern warfare equated with the 
modern state and primitive “savage warfare” equated with pre-states.  For him, the issue revolves 
around civilized interpretation and the nature of organization as it relates to intentions along with 
outcomes.46 Both modern terms and putative pre-modern terms must be closely scrutinized.  
They too easily operate in the self serving guise of one-dimensional state theory.  Too often, 
structural social change is hastily equated with progress or progressive evolution without 
considering the costs it entails or the impact of change. Holm notes that after John Watts, a 
successor to Dragging Canoe, established a peace in 1794 with the American Republic, a number 
of Chickamauga had already migrated west of the Mississippi River. Some continued to migrate 
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to Arkansas in 1817 only to become engaged in a long war with the Osage.  The Chickamauga 
became the Cherokee Nation West.47 & G
The Nature of the Amerindian State, Tribe, Nation, Polity 
  
 We have not gone far enough in the analysis to draw too many conclusions but the issues 
presented above should be kept in mind by the reader as they progress through the text and 
conduct their own analysis. We can say that the issue of Amerindian nationalism has been 
skewed in the literature. The non-critical interpretations of Amerindian motive, interest, and 
socio-political orientation indicate a gross misrepresentation. Amerindian  political discourse 
was copiously engaging and self-directed with the capacity to introduce their agency into the 
realm of European political systems. By the same token this prior statement is a fairly accurate 
statement of European capabilities.  
 One difference being is the manner in how the internalized agency of the other was 
effective in securing high priority goals. The effective manner for Europeans was indeed the 
trade system itself. For Amerindians it was their ability to effect military outcomes between 
Europeans or directly affect military outcomes between themselves and Europeans. Amerindians 
could not positively affect the trade system as a tool of agency with Europeans with great 
measure for its competitive nature placed tribes in direct competition with each other resulting in 
intertribal trade wars, despite intertribal attempts at trade reform. These dynamics worked to 
aggravate successful Amerindian nationalism or multi-ethnic nationalism while in turn creating 
                                               
 
G Holm’s abbreviated sketch of Chickamauga polity mistakenly identifies John Ross, Major Ridge, and John Walker 
as coming into leadership through their associations with Chickamauga Cherokee polity. 
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paradoxical  interpretations or expressions of Amerindian identity. Other constraints working to 
the detriment of Amerindian society included technological and environmental factors like 
disease. It should also be noted that as a general principle Amerindian society wanted trade with 
Europeans—Europeans wanted trade and much more and this is reflected in the high priority 
goals of their polity.  
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Chapter 3 – An Analysis of Conflicts, Proclamat ions, and Consequences 
Amerindian-Colonialist Conflicts Over Land 
Bacon’s Rebellion of 1676 in Virginia resulted from land grant recipient Nathaniel 
Bacon’s desire to drive tribal peoples off their lands.  However, he did not receive the consent of 
Virginia Governor Berkeley to do so.  When Bacon was denied a commission in the colonial 
militia he continued working out his plans on his own.1 Individuals like Bacon whose lands 
directly bordered tribal nations often had disputes with tribal officials over hunting areas, trade, 
domestic animals, and the continual annexation of land by frontier peoples; while individuals 
further east of the frontier and relatively free of frontier conflict preferred at times diplomatic 
efforts to resolve conflicts as it was cost effective in contrast to raising militia forces among 
other reasons. A decade later, Jacob Liesler a prominent New York land developer seized control 
of colonial New York for three years. An ethnic German immigrant, Leisler rebelled against the 
authority of England with the support of Dutch merchants and landowners. Land riots occurred 
in New York and New Jersey. In 1734 a royal surveyor was beaten by rioters pertaining to 
England’s right to the forest in New Hampshire.2  
England’s administration over land was concerned not only with agricultural 
commodities like tobacco but also the harvesting of timber for its ship building industry.3 
Exceedingly over time the personal ambitions of individuals seeking to reap the economic 
benefits associated with the proprietorship of land would forego any structural attempt by 
imperial authorities to bring or retain North America into an existing integrated political regime. 
Rather quickly land speculation companies emerged operating in the traditions originally 
established by colonial charters.4 The eminence of land companies and the impact of individual 
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land owners shaped land policy.5  For example, provincial Georgia and South Carolina were both 
recipients of regulatory reform from the Crown for landholders in that both colonies were home 
to a number of individuals that claimed disproportionate amounts of land which they had neither 
settled nor cultivated for agricultural purposes.6 Here the potential for private financial gain 
interfered with the Crown’s goal of developing their colonies. Land speculation would 
eventually drive westward expansion in Trans-Appalachia. Overtime the Crown’s exclusive right 
to appropriate lands would continually fall under scrutiny and resentment from it colonial 
citizens if it had not already become a point of contention. During Bacon’s Rebellion, a 
contemporary of Bacon provided a critique of the episode and stated that elements of Virginia’s 
citizenry: 
…endeavors to get tracts of Land…some take 2000 acres, some 3000 Acres, others ten thousand 
Acres…many have taken up thirty thousand Acres of Land, and never cultivated any part of 
it…thereby preventing others seating, so that too many rather than be Tenants, seat upon the 
remote barren Land, whereby contentions arise between them and the Indians…then they 
exclaim against the Indians beat & abuse them.7 
 
Colonial Land Companies 
The two principal land companies in colonial Virginia were the Ohio Company and 
Loyal Company.  Their actions and experiences were followed by formation of the Mississippi 
Land Company. Land companies would organize and lobby the Crown for a grant of land and 
then use surveyors to mark their allotment. They lobbied and enrolled all sorts of colonial 
authorities to gain favor for their schemes. They participated in the fur trade and acted as frontier 
military organizations. Their initial contact with Amerindian authorities were covert as they 
often hid their real agendas. Land companies had no problem securing title to Amerindian lands 
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through deceit as this had been common practice from the inception of the colonies. One of the 
older methods to defraud an Amerindian from his land was for a local colonial authority to 
impose a fine on him for some trumped up violation of the law. In which a private citizen would 
pay the fine on behalf of the Amerindian in return for a mortgage on the Amerindian's property. 
The altruistic Euro-American citizen would then proceed to foreclose on the property.8 
The Ohio and Loyal Companies 
The Ohio Company organized by Judge Thomas Lee in 1747 (also the head of the 
Virginia Company) whose members included George Washington, George Mason, and Governor 
Robert Dinwiddie.9 Other affluent local families and London merchants endowed this land cartel 
with their membership such as John Hanbury, Thomas Nelson, Colonel Cressup, James 
Woodrop, Nathaniel Chapman, Jacob Giles, Augustus Washington, George Fairfax, William 
Thornton, and so on.10 The second company was known as the Loyal Company who held close 
ties with Virginia House Speaker John Robinson. Both companies were staunch rivals. Early in 
the 1750s, in a gambit in what may be considered one of the opening salvos to the French and 
Indian War, Governor Dinwiddie dispatched George Washington with Virginia militia to evict 
the French from the Ohio and more specifically company lands.11 Colonial governors at the time 
had the authorization of the Crown to prepare a defense in the event of war with France but did 
not have the authority to initiate any acts of aggression. 
In 1748 the Ohio Company had acquired claim to 600,000 acres on the Ohio River while 
the Loyal Company in 1749 secured a grant for 800,000 acres of land while the less substantial 
Greenbriar Company gained a grant for 100,000 acres.12 During the French and Indian War, 
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defense appropriations for the Virginia frontier was undertaken in consideration of company and 
government affiliations. Land companies emerged in other colonies too. The Susquehanna 
Company became the entity in which colonial Connecticut pursued its claim to the Wyoming 
Valley (also claimed by Pennsylvania) according to the provisions of its 1662 sea-to-sea royal 
charter.13 Colonial charters as issued from the Crown of England constituted the executive 
legislative device by which land companies would attempt to fulfill a mandate of sea-to-sea 
westward expansion across the North American continent. While the companies acted in a 
classic colonial model whereby they sought to acquire new lands, settle them, and to exploit the 
economic opportunities presented by their actions they did so under provisions provided by a 
greater imperial authority.14 
Conversely, the events of the French and Indian War did not facilitate these sorts of land 
schemes. In October of 1758, colonial Pennsylvania entered the Treaty of Easton with the 
Shawnee, Delaware, and other Ohio tribal nations. Simply, Pennsylvania agreed not to expand its 
settlements beyond the Allegheny Mountains upon the conclusion of the war so long as the tribal 
nations did not aid the French during the war. By October of 1761 Colonel Bouquet, 
Commandant at Fort Pitt (Pittsburgh) ordered a declaration based on the Treaties of Easton that 
forbid hunting and new settlements by whites in the western country providing exceptions by the 
authority of colonial governors or the commander-in-chief. The proclamation was not received 
well in Virginia for many Virginians were holding patents to lands under the authority of His 
Majesty, nor was it popular among settlers who seemingly fought the war with the expectation of 
acquiring their own lands in the interior for services rendered.15 
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 Bouquet's proclamation also threatened the Virginia’s landed gentry’s long standing 
tradition of land acquisition as it had been officially altered.16  Nevertheless, upper class planters, 
in addition to petitioning His Majesty, attempted to continue to maneuver through the exceptions 
provided by Bouquet’s proclamation to secure the possession of large frontier tracts of land. 
These large tracts of land as with previous land development practices were to be populated with 
slaves and “landless” tenants or indentured servants.17 
The Mississippi Company 
Following the cession of past and any future claims to the entire Trans-Appalachia region 
by France at the Treaty of Paris new land companies emerged; for one—the Mississippi Land 
Company. Organized by planters and merchants from Maryland and Virginia that again included 
the membership of the Virginia Lee family and of course George Washington.18 By the time of 
the American Revolution, the cartel of land companies entertained designs that carved up nearly 
the entire interior region as far west as the Mississippi River. 
The Mississippi Company sought a colony along a cross section of land broadly ranging 
across the drainages of the Mississippi, Ohio, Wabash, and Cherokee Rivers consisting of an 
estimated 2.5 million acres. Land distribution in accordance with such huge tracts of land would 
conveniently serve to reinforce the colonial social order with those holding rights to land sitting 
at the top of the political/economic chain. Further company officials surmised that the Treaty of 
Easton had no bearing on their designs, as the treaty was only concluded with a limited number 
of Ohio River Valley tribal nations, long term plans involved the settlement of the vast land tract 
with new European immigrants.19 Returning to the subject presented by the Treaty of Easton, 
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Colonel Thomas Cressup went about trying to recruit Colonel Bouquet into the Ohio Company 
probably as a means to gain Colonel Bouquet’s favor. But Bouquet went about reminding 
Cressup that the Treaty of Easton had indeed been accepted and recognized by the English 
ministry at home and hence the colonies were bound by its restrictions on settling lands in the 
Ohio territory until the tribal nations of Ohio sanctioned such actions.20  
By this time the Lords of Trade and Plantations had issued orders that no grants of land 
were to be authorized regarding the Ohio region. The matter was a delicate one with potentially 
severe political ramifications. Hence, General Amherst (notorious for his ‘small pox decision’ 
during hostilities with tribal nations at Fort Pitt) warned Colonel Bouquet to shun measures that 
would give the colonies an opportunity to find fault with the military’s presence on the colonial 
frontier for reasonably it might provoke unwarranted hostilities.21 Therefore the Mississippi Land 
Company’s labors to secure a land grant from his Majesty were fruitless and further complicated 
by the issuance of the Royal Proclamation of 1763. As late as 1767 Mississippi Land Company 
officials were recommending to company share holders the recruitment of influential British 
citizens to carry out a successful lobby with the Crown to acquire the land grant they so 
desired.22 
Amerindians and the Royal Proclamation of 1763 
 
Beyond the land speculation companies and their ties with bankers and other influential 
peoples, the Indian Agents of North America also had a substantial role in the demise of the 
administration of the Royal Proclamation of 1763. The Northern Department of Indian Affairs 
headed by Sir William Johnson under pretext of bureaucratic duplicity out rightly disregarded 
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the policy course prescribed by the Proclamation and implemented it where his personal interest 
and the private interests of other individuals overweighed the broader public interest addressed 
by the Proclamation; and I am including the native interior as part of the public interest. On the 
other hand, the Southern Department of Indian Affairs seemingly tried in earnest to implement 
the designs of the Proclamation as Edmund Atkin originally provided a report with 
recommendations to Lord Shelburne during Atkin’s administration over the Southern Indian 
Department.23 But the Southern Indian Department was not without its problems either for its 
jurisdiction also hosted a number of land companies, speculators, and illegal land squatters that it 
had to contend with, but this office seems to have been more concerned with fulfilling its 
mandated duty. But at times the Southern Department's administrators were less than genuine. 
In November of 1763 John Stuart, the new superintendent of the Southern Indian 
Department organized the Augusta Congress attended by the governors of the four southern 
colonies and the corresponding five southern tribal nations including the Catawba, Creek, 
Cherokee, Choctaw, and Chickasaw. The purpose of the conference was to confer upon the terms 
of trade as well as the confirmation of territorial dispositions for the creation of a boundary line. 
The conference also provided for a public order in that all settlers residing on tribal lands were 
obligated to return to their colonies.24 The invitation to the Augusta Congress stated; 
 
As an incontestable Proof of his Majesty’s most benevolent and upright Intentions and 
Disposition towards you and the Other Indian Nations, I enclose you a copy of Orders which he 
has lately sent to his Governors in America relating to your Lands; and which I am ordered to 
Communicate with You, that you may cause them to be read and Published thro’out your Nation, 
to the End that all men may know his Majesty[‘s] determines resolution of maintaining you and 
the Other Indian Nations in Your just Rights and Priviledges and Observing inviolably his 
Engagements.25    
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Antecedents: The Proclamation of 1761 
The Crown had actually issued a proclamation in December of 1761 that declared a 
boundary line of sorts which required illegal land squatters to be removed from Amerindian 
lands. It was available to the colonies six months prior to the Royal Proclamation of 1763.26 As 
far back as the mid-1750s provincial New York and Virginia were under orders to end the 
practice of purchasing lands from tribal nations by private citizens who had neither a license nor 
sanction form duly appointed agents of the Crown. But the colonial governors or commander in 
chief were still able to approve land acquisitions, however, as long as they met these 
requirements: 
1) The lands in question had to be formally surveyed and recorded. 
2) An interpreter had to be present at the negotiations. 
3) A land acquisition cap of one thousand acres was to be observed. 
4) The survey itself had to be confirmed through written or verbal certification by the 
tribal counterparty in the transaction.27  
The 1761 Proclamation “Settlements Interfering with Frontier Indians Forbidden” 
provided punitive measures in that colonial governors and other royal agents would stand to lose 
their office if they proceeded with any new grants of land. This proclamation further provided for 
the prosecution of individuals who were currently holding lands without a license.28 
The Southern Indian Department, in July 1763, sent copies to the southern tribal nations 
in advance of the formal invitation to the congress.29 Even though British intentions were clearly 
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articulated not every issue was resolved without some tribulation. The Creek Nation had 
continued their commercial relations with the French during the war. Some Creek factions were 
active allies of the French during the war.30 The Creek Nation intended to maintain relations with 
the French and Spanish. The Creek Nation was therefore suspect of the English attempt to 
monopolize trade relations so a number of chiefs failed to attend the Augusta Congress; in this 
manner Stuart initially failed to gain full consent over the new territorial dispositions confirmed 
at the congress.31  
While English authorities might have considered their victory in the war a legitimate 
basis to exclude the French and Spanish from the activities on the continent it was probably a 
mistake to attempt a trade monopoly with the tribal nations of the interior. This action may have 
been interpreted or received as an excessive measure or instep on the authority of tribal nations. 
In theory, the English did create an open trade system in which anyone who qualified could gain 
license to trade under the terms of the Royal Proclamation as long as they were peddling English 
manufactured goods.32 The system was designed to operate under the tenants of Mercantile 
Theory in which colonies and tribal nations were to serve the purpose of providing the mother 
country with raw materials to support the domestic manufacturers and then to act as the primary 
consumer of the manufactured goods derived from the mother country.33 This sort of economic 
motivation is a definitive feature of the imperial scope of the Royal Proclamation in that it was 
constructed to serve the interests of the Crown and the broader empire rather than the stand alone 
interests or the self-perceived needs of the colonies themselves.34 The fur trade from Canada 
alone would eventually produce 200,000 lbs. sterling in annual revenue.35 
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The trade system was based heavily on credit facilities. Merchants would acquire their 
goods from firms in London on credit. These goods would then be forwarded to trade posts. In 
the spring, a trader would bring his furs to the trade post and acquire a new bundle of goods on 
credit and set out again in the fall to obtain more furs from tribal hunters. The credit facility 
reached as far as the hunters who received goods from the trader also on credit. The trader often 
used the proceeds from his spring sales at the trading posts to pay for the previous season’s 
goods. Great financial success would be obtained by large fur trade companies who directly 
partnered with traders.36    
The Royal Proclamation of 1763 
The Royal Proclamation of 1763 outlined the administration of England’s North 
American colonies, and extensively increased the role of the English Parliament in this 
governance.37 In this respect the Royal Proclamation sought to exert imperial control of the 
colonies and retain their status in the formal global order to serve in the broader hegemonic 
interest of British Imperialism.38 Henry Ellis, former governor of provincial Georgia, is 
responsible for the original draft that was submitted to the Board of Trade and Plantations. The 
document was titled Hints relative to the Division and Government of the conquered and newly 
acquired Countries in America.39 
 Lord Shelburne mulled over the document for weeks while working in close association 
with Maurice Morgan. Morgan considered the role of colonists in North America as minor 
organizations in the greater scope of the empire’s economic trade. Morgan felt colonial sea-to-
sea charters should be abandoned while taxes on existing trade should be utilized to finance the 
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operation of colonial governance in order to consolidate the gains achieved by the Seven Years 
War.A
…under the pretence of regulating Indian trade a very straight line be suddenly drawn on the 
back of the colonies…The provinces being now surrounded by an army, a navy, and by hostile 
tribes of Indians…and being thus limited and distressed in their finances and wanting an 
executive for the purpose of resistance, it may be time…to exact a due deference to the just and 
equitable regulations of a British parliament.41 
 & 40 Morgan further advocated military escalation on the frontier for the purpose of 
protecting Crown interests:  
 
In August of 1763, during the creation of the Royal Proclamation, Pontiac of the Ottawa, 
the Seneca of the Iroquois League, the Shawnee and Delaware of Ohio, and elements of the 
southern Creek Nation among others began a border war to expel the British from their newly 
acquired military and trade posts. The Cherokee had formerly been involved in a war with 
England over its borders that served as a sort of preamble to the broader escalation of conflicts 
emerging in the frontier lands of the interior country after the French had been defeated. While 
the tribal nations were probably not privy to the on goings of the British government they were 
nevertheless growing weary of the British occupation of forts in their territories. Hoping to defer 
future conflicts the Board of Trade and Plantations, a policy arm of British foreign affairs, 
insisted upon the public transmission of the Royal Proclamation to relieve the tribal nations of 
their ongoing troubles with settlement into their territories.42 However, other events, such as the 
resignation of Lord Shelburne an acting Lord of Trade would continue to delay its release.43 The 
                                               
 
A The original charters gave each colony differential rights and the cancelation of the charters would provide for the 
opportunity to create a uniform colonial system under the discretion of British Parliament. 
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Royal Proclamation was eventually completed in October of 1763 under the direction of Lord 
Halifax.44 
The Proclamation of 1763 established an Indian dominion or reserve west of the 
Appalachian Mountain Range while also prohibiting any land grants into the area except by the 
direct authority of the Crown of England. This act stood in direct opposition to the traditions of 
the early colonies where New England and New York for example operated under the directive 
to pursue the acquisition of large tracts of land from tribal nations.45 Tribal nations of the interior 
had no direct input in the articulation of the Royal Proclamation—their input would come later at 
conferences where terms of trade and the actual boundary line were negotiated between agents of 
the Crown and tribal agents. In addition, a regulated trade system was authorized for use within 
the native territories that incorporated licensing and taxing considerations.46 Four new colonies 
were created—Quebec, Eastern/Western Florida, and Grenada in attempt to control or at least 
influence the direction of future colonial settlement.47 The Proclamation stipulated the form of 
civil administration and judicial services for the new colonies. In addition it immediately opened 
the new colonies for settlement; although the Proclamation did not consider nor address the 
former French communities in the Illinois region of the interior.48 As a final point, the Royal 
Proclamation in terms of the western legal tradition did acknowledge a “new policy” in which 
indigenous claims to lands were “recognized as valid” by the British government.49 
The boundary line, according to Lord Shelburne’s personal notes was to generally apply 
with noted exceptions. Exceptions included Cherokee, Creek, and Catawba claims to lands on 
the east side of the Appalachia Mountains, the Six Nations claim on the Susquehanna River, the 
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military and trade complex at the Forks of the Ohio River, and the settlements already having 
occurred under the governorship of Virginia. Otherwise, no other exceptions were to be applied 
to the issue of the boundary line. These limited exceptions were based on the Treaty of 
Lancaster, 2nd Treaty of Easton, and the Treaty of Detroit.50 One specific case or exception 
provided by the Easton Agreements occurred when a group of lawyers representing a band of 
Delaware in September of 1758 arranged the release of title to Delaware lands and obtained land 
in provincial New Jersey for the Delaware; although these lands would eventually be forfeited 
too. As late as the 1950s the Sand Hill Band of Delaware was recorded as to still be residing in 
the New Jersey coastal regions.51 Today at least one Delaware band in New Jersey has obtained 
state recognition.B
Not surprisingly, the Royal Proclamation of 1763 was not a perfect instrument of 
imperial policy. For example, this proclamation included a provision permitting Colonial 
Governors and British Officials in the Army to provide land grants beyond the boundary line to 
soldiers and officers who served during the French and Indian War. Arthur St. Clair, a former 
These exceptions are unique as they stand in contrast to the typical western 
movements of tribal populations. By November of 1763 Thomas Gage sent copies of the Royal 
Proclamation to the commanders of the colonial and frontier forts ordering the dissemination of 
its contents.52 On a side note, Canassatego an Iroquois League representative during the 
discussions at the Lancaster Treaty urged the representatives of the British colonies to enter into 
a permanent union or confederacy in the same manner as the Iroquois had as to achieve the same 
sort of power enjoyed by League member nations.53  
                                               
 
B See www.nanticoke-lenape.org 
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British Army lieutenant, received a grant in proximity to Fort Ligonier, an auxiliary post in the 
Fort Pitt trade and defense network. This provision in all likelihood upset the landed gentry 
whose own plans of land acquisition had been thwarted by the Royal Proclamation. The Penn 
family alone who formerly had a monopoly on the buying and selling of land in Pennsylvania 
was locked out by the new regulations. Soon enough the military grant provision of the 
Proclamation would be abused. For example, Lord Dunmore of Virginia used the military 
provision to provide land grants to civilians such as the noted Thomas Jefferson.54 Such uses of 
this provision undercut the integrity and purpose of the royal decree. 
The Royal Proclamation served as a primary factor behind the Revolutionary War 
movement through its policy of terminating territorial expansion.55 Individuals such as George 
Washington never really conceded to the authority and designs of the Proclamation and insisted 
that the Ohio region remained within the bounds of Virginia’s colonial charter.56 Revolutionary 
War advocate, Patrick Henry bought the rights to thousands of acres in Kentucky and advocated 
“coerced” measures to modify land regulation.57 Officials, such as Virginia’s Lieutenant 
Governor protested directly to the Board of Trade and Plantations while the Governor himself 
responded by resisting the implementation of the Proclamation’s decrees.58 Speaker of the House 
of Burgesses—Virginia, David Robinson noted the uselessness of land claims as the land was 
“…given as compliment to our good friends and faithful allies, the Shawnee Indians.”59 
Pressure would continue to mount against the authority of the Proclamation as more 
companies were organized. Benjamin Franklin and other family members in 1763 formed the 
Illinois and Indiana land companies, however, without success as they were not able to obtain 
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grants of land despite far-reaching lobbying efforts with the Crown nor could they gain 
compensation for trade losses amassed during the French and Indian War.60 Indian agent George 
Croghan sought to petition the Crown to adjust the boundary line through his affiliation with the 
Indiana Company but to no avail.61 In any event, in violation of the Royal Proclamation of 1763, 
in 1768 the Indiana Company entreated with the Six Nations to obtain a 2 million acre tract 
below the Ohio River for compensation due to the losses incurred by the company’s trade 
activities during the border wars of 1763.62  
The Future Management of Indian Affairs Plan (1764) 
By 1764, the Future Management of Indian Affairs Plan was introduced by the Board of 
Trade and Plantations to assist in the administration of the Royal Proclamation of 1763. The plan 
articulated new trade and land regulations while also, in theory, centralizing the management of 
Indian affairs with the Northern and Southern Indian departments, thus relegating colonial 
governments and military administrators to a subordinate role. The plan also placed restrictions 
on Indian agents who were forbidden to conduct trade directly or as representatives of other 
parties with tribal nations. The same rationale was applied to members of the military.63  Some 
members of the military began their own land companies, such as General Phineas Lyman’s land 
company, the Military Adventurers.64 Regulations were enacted in consideration of future land 
purchases by corporations with the vested authority of the Crown within the geographical 
confines of established colonies.65 However, for the time being: 
 
…Article 41 [of the 1764 Plan] prohibited any person, society, corporation, or colony from 
acquiring any property in Indian lands, either by purchase or other conveyance from the 
Indians…66 
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As with the Royal Proclamation of 1763, the Southern Indian Department under John 
Stuart went about the business of addressing the contents of the 1764 Plan to create a boundary. 
However, Sir William Johnson, head of the Northern Indian Department continued with his 
bureaucratic craft as he was accountable for many of the tenants contained in the plan67—Sir 
William himself was a member of the Illinois Land Company.68 The Illinois Land Company also 
had the backing of New York as the governor was also a company shareholder.69 The Board of 
Trade and Plantations sought to avoid any renewed warfare with tribal nations.70 Warfare on the 
frontier was highly disruptive to the lucrative fur trade and for other issues such as England’s 
control of her colonies.71 The new plan centralized all negotiations between tribal nations and 
colonial authorities through the Indian Departments. However, the British Parliament 
undermined the plan by failing to enact a tax on trade conducted with the tribal nations of the 
interior therefore, failing to create an independent source to finance the operations of the Indian 
departments. The 1764 Plan was also undermined by members of the Board of Trade and 
Plantations whereas Lord Halifax singularly advocated for a standalone administration of Indian 
Affairs.72   
Basically at issue was the creation of an independent regulatory agency that was insulated 
from the influence of local colonial authorities. What was at stake was the creation of a fortified 
foreign affairs department to maintain relations with the indigenous population of North 
America. Such a department would respond to the Crown’s imperial orders through a select 
number of administrators compared to  weak foreign affairs departments  that essentially acted as  
front organizations for the interests and lobbyists of trade companies and land speculation 
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companies at the level of the colony. Except in this case, the plan was foiled as the lead 
administrator in the Northern Indian Department— Sir William Johnson, was performing his 
duties under the influence of land speculators. In classic political science terms the issue at hand 
was regulatory capture in which a regulating agency cannot successfully carry out its mission 
because its purpose has been subverted through the influence of those it is designed to regulate. 
To correct this situation, in the late spring and early summer of 1765, John Stuart of the 
Southern Indian Department held another congress, whose goal was to promote peace, trade, and 
the demarcation of a new boundary line. Stuart advocated the establishment of a trade tax to be 
exercised exclusively within the confines of tribal jurisdictions. Prohibitive regulations were also 
created regarding the sale of rum and armaments. Despite Stuart’s efforts, the colonies would not 
observe his administration’s goals and continued their trade with tribal nations to the detriment 
of the centralized trade system established by Stuart. They accomplished this through selling 
goods at cost, thus undercutting the pricing provided by licensed traders. By 1766 Lord 
Shelburne near his final days as an acting Secretary of State authorized Stuart to enact any 
provisions in line with the Rationale of the Royal Proclamation of 1763. Stuart responded with 
tougher trade licensing requirements—with the exception of the governor of Virginia, colonial 
governors responded with surface compliance.73 
The labors of individuals like agent Stuart and Secretary of State Lord Shelburne were 
immediately run amuck by the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Charles Townshend who ordered an 
abrupt military withdrawal from the Appalachia frontier along with a round of investigations into 
colonial finances, land settlement issues, and trade. In defiance, Shelburne, sought to uphold the 
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existing framework of the Royal Proclamation of 1763 by ordering a stringent adherence to its 
tenants and the formation of a boundary line. In the fall of 1767, the Board of Trade and 
Plantations began formulating a plan that would grant authority over Indian affairs to the colonial 
governors while authorizing three additional colonies on the Illinois River and at Detroit with the 
intention of maintaining only strategic military trade complexes to lessen the costs of operations 
in the interior. By winter the plan was abandoned.74 Speculatively, this plan represented the 
interests of London financiers, colonial trade companies, and the land speculators. 
To compound the issue of territorial expansion addressed by Royal Proclamation, during 
the same winter colonial newspapers began running articles describing the fertile lands of the 
Ohio Valley, in effect promoting westward migration and raising the expectant fervor of settlers 
wanting to partake in the great move west.75  In consequence the Braddock and Forbes Roads, 
military and trade routes, began to be filled with settlers seeking new fortunes.76 Within the year 
the Board of Trade and Plantations adopted convenient parts of Lord Shelburne’s plan and fore 
went the fundamental elements of his policy centered on establishing a firm boundary line.77 In 
all, these events had a destabilizing effect on the frontier and on the boundary line that separated 
colonial populations from tribal populations. These various plans seem to represent the 
compromises and struggles between the expansionary and non-expansionary interests in British 
government. 
Consequences: The Walpole Company 
Eventually the Crown would authorize certain land speculation designs west of the 
Appalachians.  By 1766 the Walpole Company was organized and lobbied for a 2.5 million acre 
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tract of land that was eventually approved by the Crown in August of 1772.78 Land speculation 
fever involved a consortium of lobbyists in London who even resorted to bribery of cabinet 
officials as a means to achieve their goals. In due course Lord Shelburne would be relieved of his 
duties in colonial matters either because the political maneuvering of land speculators cast an 
unfavorable hue on his policies or maybe because his policies didn’t favor the land company’s 
interests enough.79 Lord Shelburne's own thoughts on the matter seemed to sway. Lord 
Shelburne’s removal would only provide a temporary respite. The Mississippi Company renewed 
its efforts as a Walpole Company rival but achieved little.80 Implementation of the Proclamation 
of 1763 was compromised from the outset, because of the differences between those in British 
government who favored expansion and non-expansion. 
The Walpole land company was led by London banker, Thomas Walpole who in consort 
with Benjamin Franklin, a representative of Pennsylvania, actively pursued the company’s 
interest with the Crown. Simultaneously in colonial America, Sir William Johnson and New 
Jersey Governor Franklin, the son of Benjamin, worked towards the company’s goals by 
dispatching Indian agent Croghan to negotiate with the tribes of the Illinois region. The final goal 
of the Walpole Company was to gain control of the entire territory between the Ohio River and 
the Allegheny Mountains, a northern range of the Appalachians, and establish another Crown 
sponsored colony. The company recruited a number of influential individuals to aid in its efforts 
and even managed to gain hesitant consent from Lord Shelburne to proceed with its plans. 
Nevertheless, the company experienced stringent opposition from the Board of Trade and 
Plantations that was now headed by Lord Hillsborough. Hillsborough surmised and suspected 
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that the opening of the Ohio region to settlement would attract an enormous influx of Irish 
immigrants. Hillsborough was further concerned that a manufacturing industry could develop at 
the expense of England’s domestic industry. Hillsborough also described the potential expense of 
maintaining a colony so far inland from the coastline.81  
The Treaty of Fort Stanwix (1768) 
The basic structure of the Proclamation  of 1763 endured an unsound tenure as events 
like the 1768 Treaty of Fort Stanwix in effect nullified the Proclamation’s goal of bringing 
stability to the region by integrating the former colonies of New France, Amerindian society, and 
the British colonies under the administration of the empire. Nonetheless, the Royal Proclamation 
of 1763 was still being cited for the basis of royal directives to colonial governors all the way up 
to the American Revolution.82  
In 1768, behind the backdrop of irresolute and chaotic colonial policy, Sir William 
Johnson of the Northern Indian Department set about obtaining a huge land cession on behalf of 
his own interests under the guise of creating the sort of boundary line dictated by the Royal 
Proclamation of 1763 and the Plan of 1764. Sir William held intimate relations with the Mohawk 
of the Iroquois Confederacy, in large part because he was married to the sister of Mohawk Chief 
Joseph Brant.83 Mary Brant and Sir William would have eight children.84 Sir William proceeded 
with his extension of the boundary line by relying on claims of the Iroquois League to the whole 
interior stretching from the Mississippi River to the Appalachian Mountains. The Iroquois 
claims, whether accurate or not, would serve to legitimize Sir William’s land transactions.85  
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At the Treaty of Fort Stanwix in November of 1768, at Rome, New York—Sir William 
exceeded the boundary line authorized by Lord Hillsborough by going as far as the Tennessee 
River.86 So the boundary line issue fell into disarray as the northern Stanwix Line did not fall 
into alignment with the southern line created by Stuart and the Cherokee just a month earlier 
with the Treaty of Hard Labour; a line intended to settle territorial dispositions between Virginia 
and the Cherokee.87 Lord Hillsborough’s original authorization would have brought these two 
lines into agreement at the mouth of the Kanawha River. The two largest beneficiaries of the 
Stanwix negotiations were the Penn family who obtained the outstanding lands according to the 
precincts of their colonial charter; and the Indiana Company who gained two million acres plus 
in the Ohio River Valley. As a side note, due to his efforts in the affair, Indian agent Croghan 
was awarded a 200,000 acre grant at Fort Pitt that is today known as downtown Pittsburgh from 
one of the companies he was involved in.88 The Stanwix Treaty also observed the sovereign 
rights or hegemony of the Iroquois League over other tribal nations residing in the ceded lands. 
The Delaware and Shawnee Nations rejected League claims of sovereignty over their affairs and 
the Treaty of Stanwix itself.89 
In a politically motivated provocation, representatives of Virginia were disregarded at the 
negotiations despite their presence.90 Nevertheless Virginia would gain the Kentucky region for 
settlement due to the Tennessee River extension.91 This area south of the Ohio River included 
hunting grounds claimed by both the Shawnee and Cherokee Nations. In turn, the Southern 
Indian Department would be forced to seek new land cessions to form a coherent boundary line 
as the Stanwix debacle led to new settlements in the river valleys of Watauga, Holston, and 
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Clinch.92 In later years, these settlements were heavily contested in open warfare by the 
Chickamauga. 
The Illinois Land Project (1772) 
The Crown’s goal of establishing a boundary line was further damaged by the continous 
maneuvering of land company officials and their allies holding positions in colonial 
governments. By 1772, the Illinois land project was approved against the recommendations of 
Lord Hillsborough who understood that the lands in question were within the jurisdiction of 
Virginia and within the jurisdiction of tribal nations. Benjamin Franklin had won the Crown’s 
favor. Franklin’s success can be attributed to the company’s agreement to pay a onetime fee for 
the land, to collect land taxes, and to provide for the cost of maintaining a local colonial 
government. Lord Hillsborough resigned over the matter and was replaced by Lord Dartmouth.93 
Lord Dartmouth was himself the recipient of a land grant in 1770.94 
Almost immediately the Dartmouth administration ran into trouble with the ambitions of 
Virginia’s Governor Lord Dunmore. Dunmore had requested a personal land grant totaling 
around 100,000 acres, but was denied. Governor Dunmore also received communications from 
the Crown directing him and all other colonial governors to cease approving new land patents or 
initiating new land surveys according to the tenants of the Royal Proclamation. Dunmore ignored 
these instructions and continued the work of issuing new land surveys and grants by enlarging 
the counties in western Virginia. Dartmouth further instructed Dunmore to stop issuing grants of 
land to Virginia’s veterans of the French and Indian War who as local provincial militia soldiers 
were not entitled to the same benefits as soldiers who served in an official capacity as members 
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of the Crown’s army; again a position determined by the Royal Proclamation of 1763. 
 Dartmouth continued such actions by nullifying Virginia land grants and placing any 
open lands on the auctioneer’s block in which revenues from sales would be deferred to the 
Crown.95 In the same year, Dartmouth approved the formation of a new colony to be known as 
Vandalia that was situated south of the Ohio River and north of the Greenbriar River, though the 
project, the Walpole Company project, ultimately failed. The project had been discussed with the 
southern tribal nations at the Augusta Congress.96 Lord Hillsborough was somewhat vindicated 
as the Walpole grant that had been authorized by the Board of Trade in 1772 was never issued by 
the Crown as it was tied down with conspicuous administrative delays 97 In this manner no new 
colonies were chartered by the Crown of England except for the four colonies enumerated in the 
Royal Proclamation of 1763. 
Events continued to destabilize the entirety of the border regions. In 1773, the Illinois 
Company reached an agreement with the Illinois Nation for land north of the Ohio River and 
East of the Mississippi River. In due course the Illinois Company and the Wabash Company 
would merge their operations and lay claim to over 50 million acres.98 In the meantime, 
Governors Dunmore and Penn, using militia forces, began fighting over land claims in the Ohio 
region in which Pittsburgh served as a focal point of the contest. Lord Dunmore ordered militia 
forces into Pittsburgh and initiated the formation of a local government. In doing so, Lord 
Dunmore made a claim that the region rested under Virginia’s jurisdiction. Dunmore also sought 
to apprehend and take into custody Arthur St. Clair, a military agent of Pennsylvania.99 During 
the summer, Virginian George Washington, in a Maryland publication, began advertising land 
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for sale in the Ohio River Valley.100 Late in the year the Virginia High Court of Chancery 
nullified all claims that impeded upon the territory of Virginia according to the constructs of his 
Majesty’s imperial government.101 Soon enough, events like Pontiac’s War, the latter stages of 
the Revolutionary War and further legislative attempts by the Crown to place restrictions on land 
acquirement would put a temporary end to the grand designs of land speculators.  
The Quebec Act (1774) 
If there is any doubt to the Crown’s commitment of prohibiting new colonies it was 
removed by the Quebec Act. The Quebec Act of 1774 put an abrupt halt to existing land 
acquisition operations. The passage of the Quebec Act by British Parliament placed the territory 
of the Illinois region as far east as the Ohio River under the civil jurisdiction of British Canada 
denying the land companies access. But the Quebec Act does not sufficiently address the nature 
of this civil jurisdiction in regards to the Amerindian nations residing in those lands but rather 
addresses the French inhabitants. Accordingly the act severely reduces the lands reserved to 
Amerindians by the Royal Proclamation of 1763, however, it is unlikely that this stop gap 
legislation would have been the final determination regarding the matter. Furthermore, many 
Amerindian nations in this sub-region had historically held amiable relations with the French. 
The Rationale for the Quebec Act can be traced as far back as 1763, when Charles 
Wyndham the 2nd Earl of Egremont and then acting Secretary of State for the Southern 
Department in communications with the Board of Trade and Plantations stated that the interior of 
North America should be left to the tribal nations who inhabited it, but that a civil jurisdiction 
should be erected over the territory and assigned to Quebec.102 The Quebec Act, like the Royal 
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Proclamation of 1763, effectively amended colonial charters such as Connecticut’s whose 
previous western boundary was defined as the Pacific Ocean. Another significant factor involved 
in the passage of the Quebec Act was the influence asserted by the fur trading houses of Quebec 
and Montreal who wanted to lock out their competitors in Albany, New York.103 
New land companies ignored the Quebec Act and began direct negotiations with tribal 
nations for the purchase of new lands. One such company, the Henderson or Transylvania 
Company negotiated a land sale involving the majority of the Kentucky region with the 
Cherokee Nation.104 This agreement would lead to serious divisions in the Cherokee Nation, but 
perhaps the leadership of the time felt the Kentucky region had already been compromised by the 
previous Stanwix Treaty and thought this was an opportunity to receive compensation for 
something it could not undo without conducting a costly war.  
Henderson, who had consulted with Boone [a company agent] and reflected deeply over the 
subject, foresaw that the Western land, though ostensibly thrown open for settlement by the aegis 
of Virginia, could only be legally obtained by extinguishing the Cherokee title.105 
 
 In reality, the Henderson Company had no legal standing in the western dynamic to 
extinguish title to land from either the Crown or Virginia. 
Following the storyline three policy trends seem to emerge from the political milieu of 
the Royal Proclamation of 1763. Two of the trends had highly similar goals in that they both 
wanted the interior of North America opened to settlement. Between these two factions an 
ambiguous arrangement emerges as too who was involved with which camp. Between the two 
one policy goal sought to maintain the Crown’s authority over new and existing North American 
colonies along with Indian affairs in the fashion of an imperial administration while the other 
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policy construct was not concerned with the Crown’s objectives except in the manner in which 
those goals interrupted local colonial ambitions. In 1767 an amended plan by the Board of Trade 
was considered that favored local colonial ambitions but was never officially adopted. That plan 
would have granted the control of Indian affairs over to the colonies while also dissolving the 
Indian Departments, ordering a military withdrawal of the frontier, establishing three new 
colonies in the Old Northwest, and opening the Mississippi River Valley to settlement.106 
Instead, the 1768 plan was adopted; a plan that in many respects nullified the Royal 
Proclamation of 1763 and began a territorial expansion that, in theory, was under the exclusive 
control of the Crown. This plan left land purchases, the boundary line issue, and Indian affairs 
under the authority of the Indian departments wherein a military presence would be maintained 
at forts Niagara, Mackinac, and Detroit.107 The third policy construct sought to maintain an 
Amerindian interior though probably not for the reason of recognizing native authority for the 
Proclamation of 1763 measured Amerindian lands as falling under the sovereign authority of 
England; although it is not perfectly clear that this recognition of sovereign authority was to act 
as a counterweight to local colonial ambitions or to place Amerindian populations under the 
governance of the Crown or both. This policy trend attempted to secure a native interior to 
protect England’s economic interests and to help maintain control over its own seaboard colonies 
while diverting future conflicts with tribal nations. On the other hand, following the success of 
Pontiac’s War, the British began to modify their policy “…to acknowledge and accommodate 
native authority…”108 
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Today, the Royal Proclamation is considered a dead letter in the canons of U.S. law and 
therefore has no bearing in the field of Federal Indian Law. In Canada the Royal Proclamation of 
1763 survives and serves as a basis for indigenous land claims and other acknowledged rights. 
The Royal Proclamation is codified in Section 25 of the 1982 Canadian Constitution Act. It is 
also known as the “Indian Bill of Rights” or the “Indian Magna Carta”.109  
Conclusions 
In the end, what the French and Indian War accomplished was a further deterioration of 
Trans-Appalachia borders in that there was no longer a French counter threat to English 
ambitions, and as events would reveal, more so the ambitions of the English colonies. Under the 
previous state of affairs where a bi-polar European authority existed at the edges of Trans-
Appalachia perhaps Amerindian nationalism would have succeeded in the retention or formation 
of some sort of state(s) free of European subjugation and occupation. To clarify the position of 
Amerindians on the status of land, Sir William Johnson communicated to the Board of Trade and 
Plantations: 
That it is a difficult matter to discover the true owner of any lands among the Indians is a gross 
error, which must arise from the ignorance of the matter or from a cause which does not require 
explanation. Each nation is perfectly well acquainted with its exact original bounds; the same is 
again divided into due proportions for each tribe and afterwards subdivided into shares to each 
family, with all which are most particularly acquainted. Neither do they ever infringe upon one 
another or invade their neighbour’s hunting grounds.110 
 
  Regardless the French and Indian War induced a quickening pace for a rising nationalist 
movement in the thirteen colonies and also among the indigenous nations of the interior for upon 
conclusion of the war the British no longer sought unmitigated western expansion. Not until after 
the American Revolution would there exist again a bi-polar displacement of European authority 
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between the early American Republic along the Atlantic seaboard and the English situated in 
Canada. But British Imperialism lacked the institutional coherency and consistency in decision 
making to follow through with its North American project or to maintain control of its own 
citizenry. When the English colonies began to identify less and less with their mother country 
and more and more with their own ambitions as British policy swayed one way then another on 
key issues such as territorial expansion the English lost control of their empire and for the most 
part would prove to be unreliable allies in the abiding contest that ensued in Trans-Appalachia. 
This seemingly left tribes with the choice of either engaging in intertribal confederation or 
reluctantly identifying with colonial power.  Finally, the French and Indian War also did not 
explicitly determine the Spanish or French role in Trans-Appalachia either but it placed 
formidable restrictions upon them.  
Needlessly to say, the grueling contest for Trans-Appalachia that began with such 
personally motivated measures from individuals like trader George Croghan operating in the 
Ohio River Valley during the 1740s. A trade operation like Croghan’s fed the escalation between 
the French and English in their parlay for tribal allies and in this case led to the Conspiracy of 
1747 in which tribal authorities attempted to eradicate all French trade and defense posts like 
Detroit or at least according to Croghan’s personal notes.111 And ended with such events as the 
Creek Removal Wars that lasted well into the 1850s. In all these wars were about boundaries 
between societies whereas many if not all indigenous nations of Trans-Appalachia sought to 
maintain a separate existence. The Royal Proclamation has been addressed here because it was 
the first British government act to address the great border issue between tribal nations and 
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colonial immigrants that in its design curtailed the practice of annexing indigenous land or in the 
least provided a western legal basis to protect indigenous land. In all, tribal polities were 
devastated, subdued, and otherwise left without the capacity to continue resistance. Today a 
common form of resistance to the denationalization of tribal nations is the retention of rights to 
self-determination and autonomy through federal or state recognition; albeit a thorny affair. 
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Sect ion II Historical Briefs 
Chapter 4-The Ohio Front ier 
 
 
On October 31, 1753 Major George Washington, commissioned by the provincial 
government of colonial Virginia for militia service, journeyed to the French Fort Le Boeuf in the 
Ohio country on behalf of Lieutenant Governor Dinwiddie to demand the complete withdrawal 
of French troops.1 Significantly, Major Washington and the provincial government of Virginia 
acting under the authority of its sea-to-sea charter to acquire new lands, was taking the first steps 
into the French and Indian War, a war that would essentially hasten the impetus for settlement of 
the Trans-Appalachia interior. In his even earlier days, George Washington was a land surveyor 
employed by Virginia land owner Lord Fairfax.2 Although the French Crown would continue to 
involve itself in the affairs of North America even with a future plot to reestablish New France 
during the American Revolution, this war was the critical factor to ending its imperial ambitions 
in North America. 
Eleven weeks later in the winter of 1754, Major Washington returned and advised the 
Virginia Council to erect a fort at the Forks of the Ohio River, where the Monongahela and 
Allegheny rivers join to form the Ohio River. From there, Washington maintained that the Ohio 
River Valley could be controlled in its entirety. That same winter the Virginia council conspired 
to eject the French from the Ohio country with the creation of a militia regiment consisting of six 
companies; units were dispatched to build Fort Prince George (Pittsburgh). By mid-spring a 
Franco-Amerindian force captured the fort and renamed it Fort Duquesne.3 
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While Major Washington was carrying out the Virginia Council’s and Ohio Company’s 
territorial expansion program in the interior of North America, the English and French Crowns 
had been, since 1750, attempting to negotiate, in Paris, a suitable North American boundary to 
distinguish their distinct territorial dispositions. The English pursued their objectives through 
previous agreements established by the treaties of Utrecht and Aix-la-Chapelle. They also relied 
on the dubious right of discovery in conjunction with the charters of their respective colonies.4 
The English further augmented their claims through their standing alliance with the Iroquois and 
additional claims that regarded certain tribal populations of the interior as rightfully subjects to 
the English Crown. At one point in the negotiations a French official stated, “The Indians in 
question are free and independent, and none of them can be termed subjects of either crown.”5 
By 1755 the negotiations entered a stage wherein the proposed stipulations included the removal 
of British and French forces from: 
…the Countries upon the Ohio, and a total Demolition of all Forts and Settlements in those Parts: 
so that the said Country, from the Back of His Majesty’s Colonies to the Lakes, and as far as the 
River Oubash, may be left in the same state as It was by the Treaty of Utrecht.6 
 
Subsequently the proposal called for this vast area to be considered a neutral country for 
the exclusive possession by tribal nations where the respective European powers could 
participate in free trade and enjoy open passage for trade reasons on primary waterways such as 
the Great Lakes and other navigable rivers. In addition the final proposal called for the 
cancellation of all land grants into the region. However, the compact was never entered into as 
neither France nor England could compromise over certain strategic locations such as Fort 
Duquesne at the Forks of the Ohio.7  
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The Ohio River eventually merges with the Mississippi River thus granting trade 
advantages to whoever controlled it. These negotiations should not be mistaken as a European 
acknowledgement of sovereign tribal rights just for the sake of acknowledging such rights; rather 
these rights were considered by the manner in which they also served European interests for at 
one point in the negotiations, “France, like England, insisted on leaving the tribes between 
Canada and Louisiana neutral and independent, to serve as a barrier [state].”8 In this respect the 
tribal nations would remain available for future alliance seeking and security designs rather than 
risking a diplomatic failure by forcing the issue. During these negotiations the Crown of England 
ordered the colonial governors to prepare for a defense against a French invasion, but were also 
instructed not to engage in any acts of aggression themselves.9 
Generally speaking, European authorities acknowledged Amerindian status in the context 
of their own quarrels and how that status could be manipulated to reflect upon inter-European 
issues, but Amerindian status was also recognized in the context of internal European politics. 
Often Amerindian status was only recognized with advantageous prejudice when Amerindian 
polities affected positive outcomes for themselves from successful martial adventures. Other 
contexts in which Amerindian status held sway with European authorities occurred in trade and 
security issues in which colonies were dependent upon their Amerindian allies. The nature of 
European acknowledgement of Amerindian status has a very provisional feature to it, but less so 
with Franco-Amerindian relations. 
Fort Duquesne at the Forks of the Ohio was not the only contested strategic ground 
among the French and English, but was also contested between the colonies of Pennsylvania and 
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Virginia as understood in the design of their independent and separate colonial charters.10 By the 
virtue of the colonial charters a divide occurred between British Imperial policy and the goals of 
British colonial provinces in North America.  While the colonial charters themselves were a 
creation of British Imperial Policy, their existence became the institution that would no longer 
respond in accordance to His Majesty’s directives and simultaneously became the device from 
which colonial rebellion would develop. Here the local ambitions of colonies undermined the 
Crown’s ability to exercise its authority unilaterally. Not until May of 1756 would England and 
France formally declare war on one another. Nonetheless, the actual war,  as noted before,  had 
begun years earlier in a manner that reflected local actors involved with the fur trade and land. 
Both France and England had made an attempt to avoid renewed warfare, but without success. 
Accordingly, the French would ally themselves with primarily Algonquian tribal nations  while 
the English primarily allied with Iroquoian peoples such as the Six Nations and the Cherokee.11 
By 1750, Christopher Gist was commissioned by the Ohio Company to survey lands 
along the Ohio River.12 Gist travelled as far as the Great Falls of the Ohio River, modern day 
Cincinnati, while operating covertly. He never revealed the purpose of his travels to tribal 
authorities. The company’s structure was organized to act in multiple capacities that included 
military, population settlement, and trade roles; its charter required it to construct forts and 
provide for settlement of 200 individuals before proceeding with any further developments. As 
early as the summer of 1752, company representatives had negotiated an agreement with local 
tribal authorities to construct a fort.  However, the tribal authorities did not consent to any land 
cessions or settlements. During this time the French and their tribal allies countered the 
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Virginians’ presence into the Ohio Country by attacking Miami villages hosting British traders.13 
Forts acted as regional trade, diplomatic and communication centers and were therefore valued 
by both tribal and European authorities. 
In due course, land acquisition and territorial expansion emerge as the germane issue, 
even at this early time for the English colonies and it would become a definitive and substantive 
feature of the thirteen colonies’ movement towards a nationalist state. The Loyal Company 
commissioned Joseph Martin to investigate as far west and south as the Cumberland Gap where 
he was to begin his land survey after erecting a company station for future operations. The Loyal 
Company’s land grant was centered in the proximity of the Virginia-Carolina border and boasted 
a roster of recognizable figures such as Edmund Pendleton.14 Other prominent members included 
Peter Jefferson, father of Thomas Jefferson, and Thomas Meriwether, the grandfather of 
Meriwether Lewis.15 The story of American nationalism unfolds as a mad self-serving scramble 
for land despite the initial and probable long term consequences. In the 1750s, Jacob Martin and 
others established themselves on the waterways of what is now West Virginia. By 1764, these 
settlements ceased to exist due to the action of tribal authorities who kept settlers out of the 
region until 1769. Families risked severe outcomes when they did not heed to orders from their 
own government to remove themselves from tribal lands.16 
Japanese scholar, Shosuke Sato suggested, “Perhaps slavery and the public domain are 
the two most important factors in the politico-economic history of the United States.”17 He points 
out that public lands were used as bounties to veterans stretching from the Revolution to the 
Civil War, provided a basis for national finance and public revenue, and often held center stage 
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in national diplomacy through the purchase of territories. Boundary negotiations were 
highlighted by the involvement of statesmen ranging from Pinckney, Livingston, and Monroe. 
Additionally, the administration and survey of public lands were begun by Jefferson as a 
committee chairman in Congress in 1784, and by Secretary of Treasury Alexander Hamilton in 
1790.18 Hamilton proposed the selling of western lands to pay off the government's debt 
obligations to European nations.19 Public land grants have been the method by which to improve 
the public infrastructure through canals, levees, highways, and railroads while also providing the 
means to promote public education via state universities or other public schools. Public land 
grants created mechanical and agricultural institutions. Public land grants also provided for the 
development of mineral resources creating benefits for the general economy.A
Lastly, the relation of public lands to immigration suggests an important economic problem. ‘No 
State without people’ should be the political maxim of statesman in encouraging foreign 
immigration. Free homes and free institutions, free labor and free soil, are the best capital for the 
development of the resources of the Great West … Such is the scope of the land question in the 
 Slavery served a 
similar purpose. Christopher Columbus, in part, used indigenous American slaves that were sold 
in European and African markets to finance his voyages. The American export slavery market 
was also a manner that provided revenue to develop the British colonies. 20 Sato concluded:  
                                               
 
A The subject matter of land and slavery also provides a basis to understand identity standards that developed during 
the Colonial era. Forbes (1993, Page 5) points out that indigenous people of the Americas were arbitrarily assigned 
to racial categories in conjunction with the emergence of Colonial era social ranks or castes. Indigenous Americans 
often were inappropriately misidentified as black or African by government institutions and "powerful outsiders." 
Forbes considers these events as racist and hopes that research into this topic will aid in the development of human 
rights. Counterpoise, indigenous Americans also manipulated government institutions at the risk of convoluting 
outsider perceptions of their identity. Scholar Foster (2003) reports on the involvement of ethnic Cherokee in the 
territorial courts of Arkansas in the early 1800s. One Cherokee individual known as Connitue also known by his 
Anglo name John Hill had served on two juries, a right reserved to white males. One case involved assault and 
battery charges while the other case involved robbery allegations. But John Hill or Connitue was no longer able to 
serve in the jury system when a civil case brought against him was dismissed as he claimed the court held no 
jurisdiction over him as he was a Cherokee. The court happened to agree. 
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general economy of the United States. In this and all other questions, the public interest is deeply 
concerned with the administration and disposition of the public domain. Notwithstanding the 
rapid disposition of the public lands, there yet remain scattered all over the southern, the western, 
and the Pacific regions, vast tracts of unoccupied lands, the aggregate area which is almost twice 
the as great as that of the national domain in 1783. Tides of immigration still flow from across 
the ocean. Millions of homes can be created. An immense wealth and vast resources can be 
developed. Towns will multiply; counties will grow; free institutions will spring into life. This 
material advance and prosperity will be due to the public domain and its judicious disposition.21 
 
 Such is the critical scope of American nationalism. The evidence presented by the role of 
land in the affairs of those who created the American state confounds other explanations to the 
national unification of the thirteen colonies and their concurrent rebellion against their mother 
country England. Some scholars have acknowledged the ancillary role of “some powerful 
democratic tendencies” while regarding the Revolution as primarily an “elitist movement” in 
which the role of “western expansion” necessitates further investigation22. Other scholars have 
also maintained that the fundamental character of the revolutionary nationalist was territorial 
expansion.23 
 Consider for a moment at what point did Amerindian nations or European kingdoms 
become a threat to the liberty and livelihood of the English colonies?  Amerindian nations and 
European kingdoms became threats only at the intersection of continual westward expansion. 
From the paradigm of American nationalism would arise three government directives of U.S. 
foreign policy to navigate these contrived threats. The first being the Northwest Ordinance, the 
second, Federal Indian Policy and the third, the Monroe Doctrine that transformed a series of 
land company projects into a nationalist movement.  The original architects of Federal Indian 
Policy were none other than President George Washington and the Secretary of War Henry 
Knox.24 From the institution of Federal Indian Policy within the framework of American 
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nationalism centered in an ethic of territorial expansion, then this policy (or this institution) can 
be branded with the goals of defeating, controlling, and eventually reinventing Amerindian 
nationalism. Meanwhile, the Monroe Doctrine preempted any further European intrusion into the 
affairs of the American Republic or with the Amerindian nations within its claimed jurisdiction. 
The Northwest Ordinance established the first U.S. territory in the Trans-Appalachia region.
 Events accelerated rather quickly in the Old Northwest.  The Ohio Company failed to 
secure the Forks of the Ohio, and Major Washington’s plans to recapture Ft. Duquesne, with the 
help of a thousand Cherokee and Catawba warriors, never materialized.25 From Fort Necessity in 
Great Meadows, Pennsylvania, Major Washington began offensive operations by attacking a unit 
of French regulars. Major Washington would continue with an unsuccessful attack on Fort 
Duquesne. By mid-summer, a Franco-Amerindian force numbering over a thousand  warriors 
forced Washington to surrender Fort Necessity. Washington unknowingly confessed to the 
murder of a French officer when he signed the papers of capitulation. Later on in the year 1754, 
Major Washington resigned his Virginia militia position, and without success requested a 
commission into His Majesty’s British Army. Subsequently in the summer of 1755, Washington 
would gain a new commission with the rank of colonel in Virginia’s reformed militia regiment, 
all this at the age of twenty-three.26  
All told, framing American nationalism in the necessary terms of land abrogation, it is a 
mistake to consider the actions of George Washington, the Land Companies’ and the colonial 
legislatures as a reflection of British Imperialism because it  necessitates a diverging point where 
British Imperialism and the British colonies of North America no longer saw eye-to-eye in the 
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provisions of their North American affair. By 1761 the authority to procure Amerindian lands 
was exclusively returned to the authority of the British Crown and removed from the colonies.27 
In subsequent years the American rebellion was the result of diverging interests over territorial 
expansion and, at first, the European relationship to the Amerindian nations inhabiting that land. 
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Chapter 5-Six Nat ions a Front ier Broker 
  
In 1754 Half-KingTenachrissan, leader and  acting authority for the Iroquois League in 
Ohio, murdered Jumonville, a French soldier, after Washington’s attack on a French unit.  He 
proceeded to communicate to French officials of a British directed slaughter in an attempt to 
motivate the French toward open warfare with the British.1 Tenachrissan, or the Seneca Half-
King, habitually offered resistance to a French presence in the Ohio country and was now trying 
to also resist English authority. In prior months, Tenachrissan had informed  French Commander 
Pierre Paul Marin that the region belonged to the Six Nations, upon which Marin informed 
Tenachrissan that the region rested under the authority of the French.2 The Seneca Half-King 
conspired to weaken both European authorities through initiating a conflict between the two. 
Here,  the Six Nations would also be able to re-establish a persuasive authority over the Ohio 
tribal nations.3 Such extra political measures taken by Six Nations’ representatives, at a time 
when the Iroquois League was bound to an agreement of neutrality in conflicts between the two 
Crowns, is reminiscent of the politics pursued by the Huron leader The Rat decades earlier. The 
Rat’s political endeavors resulted in the Six Nations agreement to neutrality. 
 The Iroquois League, or the Six Nations, officially maintained a non-alignment posture as 
late as 1759, although they were heavily invested in the campaigns during the early years of the 
war. Six Nations leaders accompanied English and French military forces in Ohio Valley and 
Canadian campaigns in an attempt to maintain their non-alignment posture, but eventually these 
escort commitments turned into combat commitments. These martial entanglements placed the 
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Six Nations at odds with other Iroquois populations.  During the 1660s some Iroquois 
immigrated to Montreal and would later be distinguished in a separate entity as part of the Seven 
Nations of Canada who often aligned themselves with the French. The Six Nations may have 
attempted to deploy an elaborate strategy to keep both the French and English dependent upon 
League status as a diplomatic intermediary and buffer.4 In this respect the League’s access to 
both the Montreal and Albany fur trade would have been secured. Past events and conflicts 
suggest the League was divided over its inclinations to act multi-laterally with the French. 
However, the League in its entirety was obligated to some degree to act in a multi-lateral fashion 
with the English, as the Six Nations was the pivotal Amerindian nation in the Covenant Chain 
regime. 
This sort of free rider strategy carried significant risks to the national interest of the Six 
Nations, for by its nature it eventually alienated both the English and French, not to mention the 
client native states the Iroquois were presumably providing for. This was a free rider strategy in 
that the League relied on the commitment of resources by other actors than itself to achieve its 
goals. Their strategy, if successful, would have left the English, French, and other tribal nations 
more dependent on the backing of the Six Nations. Further, it appealingly assumed that, as in 
previous colonial conflicts, there would be no clear victor between the English and the French, 
thus preserving the status quo of Six Nations ascendency. Ultimately in the French and Indian 
War, the Six Nations Confederacy would begin to unravel as it would ultimately commit its own 
resources into the war. Eventually the Mohawk actually fought alongside the English while the 
 102 
 
Seneca participated in joint war parties against the Crown.5 At the Battle of Lake George both 
League Seneca and League Mohawk would fight on opposite sides. 
Furthermore, the Iroquois claim to holding authority over the Shawnee and Delaware, a 
position that allowed them to grasp more influence with colonial authorities, also began to come 
under strain. Nonetheless the Iroquois would continue well into the future to exploit this claim 
while bargaining with colonial authorities at the expense of other tribal nations. Herein again, the 
resources of others were manipulated to achieve League goals without ever committing a 
significant resource of their own, a free rider method of negotiating wherein the League was able 
to manipulate the stakes and goals of other parties to advance its own security. This was 
achieved by a purported claim of regional authority that did not necessarily represent the actual 
political demographics of the region.  
During the winter of 1755 the Susquehanna Valley Nations, consisting primarily of 
Delaware and Shawnee, rejected the governing Onondaga Council of the Six Nations and began 
raiding settlements. The Shawnee and Delaware began breaking formal ties with the League by 
kidnapping one of their own representatives in the League council and threatening the lives of 
others on that council. Formal ties to the League were further extinguished when the Delaware 
sachem Teedyuscung began cooperating with the English colonies directly to form a peace; he 
did so without regard for the Onondaga Council.  Despite his efforts, the Munsee Delaware 
would continue to war against the English. Consequently, many Shawnee and Delaware of the 
Susquehanna Valley, living under the indistinct sphere of Six Nations authority, would depart to 
the Ohio River Valley.6 
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In 1756, French General Marquis de Montcalm, captured Fort Oswego, the only British 
post of significance on the Great Lakes. From this point on, the Mohawks alone of the Six 
Nations would retain an allegiance with the English or at least to Sir William Johnson, future 
Superintendant to the Northern Indian Department.7 Closer scrutiny uncovers a Mohawk 
tradition of operating independently at times in reflection of their own commitment to the 
Iroquois League Council, or rather they may have considered their nation proprietors to the 
League Council, thus granting them more freedom in diplomatic action.  To understand the Six 
Nations national interest, and equally, to understand the dynamics of nationalism in Trans-
Appalachia, the Covenant Chain must be examined. The likely origins of the Silver Chain or the 
Covenant Chain date back to the 1670s when New York Governor Edmund Andros solicited the 
Mohawk and the then Five Nations Iroquois League to assist in the New England campaign 
against Metacom of the Wampanoag. The Wampanoag were a threat to the territorial expansion 
of New England.  By 1677 the Iroquois League was invited to Albany by officials of Maryland 
to converse further over the war raging about the Chesapeake provinces. Arguably, the 
Onondaga leader Garakontie, through the process of these meetings, established the initial terms 
of a Silver Covenant Chain.8  
 Metacom’s War is significant in that 11,000 native people participated in the conflict 
with thousands of natives and colonists losing their lives.  Starvation and disease were 
devastating to Metacom’s efforts.  As the war turned for the worse, the English hunted down the 
various remaining defenders, executing some, and selling others into slavery for service in the 
West Indies. The Abenaki, along with others, migrated to St. Francis in Quebec, which provided 
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shelter to the refugee peoples of Metacom’s War. Other peoples took sanctuary in a Mahican 
community provided by Governor Andros in New York. Still others would flee elsewhere, while 
some would stay and endure.9 The Six Nations responded to the colonial call for aid, and an 
exclusive party of Mohawk engaged Metacom’s forces in 1676. By the 1680s the coordinated 
efforts of New York Governor Thomas Dongan and Lord Howard of Effingham of Virginia 
expanded upon the institution of the Covenant Chain with the then Five Nations through an 
arrangement that expanded the Albany trade further west, prescribed divisions of control over the 
native peoples on the borders of Virginia, and elaborated on sovereign English claims to North 
American territories.10 
 The Six Nations found in the English an opportunity to thwart French designs against 
them. In 1665 the French sent the Carignan-Sallieres Regiment to New France in which they 
executed a devastating campaign against the Five Nations so that New France could institute 
regional control of the fur trade. By 1690 the Iroquois League, as cohort to the English, began 
campaigns against the Saint Lawrence River Valley and Quebec City. By 1693, French regulars, 
accompanied by Mission Iroquois and militia, had defeated the League Mohawk. Richter 
suggests that by the turn of the century,  the Iroquois League faced the possibility of extinction 
from continual war.11 In 1701 the League of Iroquois were obligated to sign a treaty whereby 
they declared their neutrality between the European Kingdoms of France and England.12 That 
summer, the League signed two treaties: one in Montreal with New France, and one in Albany 
with New England. From then on, the Five Nations would continue in a relationship of duplicity 
with the English, French, and tribal nations as would English and French authorities who sought 
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to maintain Iroquois non-alignment with economic and political concessions. Rarely would 
France or England exercise the obligations of an exclusive alliance with the League.13 From here 
perhaps the League developed their non-alignment and free rider strategies.A
…we are not like you Christians for when you have taken Prisoners of one another you send 
them home, by such means you can never route one another. We are not of that nature, when we 
have war against any nations we endeavor to destroy them utterly.14     
 The League from 
then on would hesitate to side with any one European power against another European authority. 
The Rationale expressed by an Onondaga leader to Governor Robert Hunter in 1711: 
 
The Covenant Chain, over its duration, is questionably proposed to best have served the 
interest of British Imperialism; nevertheless, it served the League interest also. For example, 
during the French and Indian War, the Crown ordered both Virginia and New York to not issue 
any land grants into League territory, but to aid the League in maintaining the integrity of their 
territory. Its general structure tied New York and other colonies of New England to the League 
and its tribal adherents.15 More so, the Covenant Chain required certain commitments upon its 
participants. On the part of the colonies, it required them to acknowledge the leadership of the 
League in the affairs of other tribal nations, which the colonies were happy to indulge, for it 
often aided them in extinguishing Amerindian claims to lands. 
In the 1710s, the League’s influence grew as Nanticoke, Conoy, Shawnee, and Delaware 
(to name a few) began migrating to the Susquehanna Valley where they would settle under the 
increasing southern sphere of Iroquois influence. Here in the Susquehanna Valley, tribal nations 
                                               
 
A Prior to 1701 The League actively pursued the expansion of its control of the fur trade through the direct conquest 
of other tribes. In this respect, The League could maintain its position as a trade broker between other tribes and the 
merchants of Albany with the additional goal of placing restrictions on the Montreal trade network. 
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lived under the authority and protection of the League. In the League’s southern expeditions they 
suppressed the Yamasee nation on behalf of requests from officials in New York and South 
Carolina who had been warring with the Yamasee. Furthermore, the League absorbed the 
southern Tuscarawa Nation who were being devastated by slavers, new settlers, and the 
Cherokee, Catawba, and Creek, as well as colonial provincials of North Carolina who were 
conducting a vicious war upon them. The Tuscarawa became the sixth member of the Iroquois 
League, hence the more common moniker—Six Nations.16 By 1717 the Covenant Chain grew to 
include the Creek Nation as they decided to ally themselves with the League.17 In the same year 
the League continued with its free rider strategy by declaring allegiance to both the British and 
French Kingdoms who were collectively at war with Spain.18 
 Yet, by the 1730s, the Six Nations would endure another exodus as League Seneca, 
among others, and in addition to Seven Nations emigrants, relocated to the Ohio River Valley in 
which two new nations were erected independently of the League, these being the Mingo and the 
Sandusky Seneca nations.19.  The tribal nations of the Susquehanna Valley in Pennsylvania were 
also weary of the Six Nations and the Covenant Chain and began migrating to Ohio. By the late 
1730s, approximately  2500 ethnic Abenaki, Ottawa, Ojibwa, and Delaware, along with ethnic 
members from the original five member nations of  the Iroquois League the Mohawk, Oneida, 
Onondaga, Cayuga, and Seneca settled  on the Cuyahoga River in northern Ohio.  By the early 
1740s, the Beaver, Muskingum, Ohio, Tuscarawa, and Scioto rivers hosted Shawnee, Mingo, and 
Delaware communities.20 
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These ex-Covenant Chain nations in Ohio produced an intertribal polity that became the 
basis for a containment nationalist movement that eventually reached beyond the confines of the 
Ohio River Valley as the Shawnee related a personal invitation to tribal nations of the Illinois 
country including the Wea, Miami, Kickapoo, and others, “Come to see us all, my brothers, and 
to be united as one people”.21 On a significant level, tribal nations were driven into a 
containment nationalist strategy and polity as they sought to avoid national integration into a 
foreign order engineered by an ensemble of agents seeking to employ grand designs of 
subjugation, territorial expansion, and wealth creation upon and through the tribal nations. 
Covenant Chain mediation in practice offered an illusion of protection for the clients of 
the Six Nations and an illusion of equity for member nations interests. In 1736 the Six Nations 
strengthened its partnership with Pennsylvania by entering into a treaty with undisclosed 
provisions wherein Pennsylvania would recognize the Six Nations as the official representatives 
of the Delaware and any other tribal nation on Pennsylvania’s borders.22 While the colonies 
courted the Six Nations, they did not extend any diplomatic courtesies nor politesse to other 
tribal nations. Notice in 1732, a treaty process between Governor Belcher of Massachusetts Bay 
and the Penobscot and other nations in which premature responses were demanded and 
deliberation for consensus was prohibited.  Common Amerindian protocol such as gift exchanges 
or ceremonial use of wampum were also barred from the negotiations.23   
In the summer of 1742, Pennsylvania hosted a treaty session in Philadelphia that included 
League Onondaga, Cayuga, Oneida, Seneca, and Tuscarawa. League client nations were 
represented by the Shawnee, Nanticoke, and Delaware. The central issue to resolve was land 
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claims by both native and colonial parties. One such assertion by colonial authorities involved a 
claim to the Forks of the Delaware River that had been allegedly purchased decades before. The 
declined the offer to vacate the territory. The issue was considered and League representative 
and Onondaga headman Canassatego resolved: 
You ought to be taken by the Hair of the Head and shak’d severly till you recover your Senses 
and become Sober…Your Cause is bad, your Heart far from being upright, and you are 
maliciously bent to break the Chain of friendship with our Brother Onas [Thomas Penn]…24 
 
But how came you to take upon you to sell land at all? We conquered you; we made women of 
you; you know that you are women and can no more sell land than women; nor is it fit that you 
should have the power to sell land since you abuse it. This land that you claim is gone through 
your guts. You have been furnished with clothes, meat and drink by the goods paid you for it; 
and now you want it again like children as you are...25 
  
 Canassatego continued to embarrass Nutimus of the Delaware council by declaring 
League rights to lands south of the Kittatinny Mountains. Despite the Six Nations overarching 
influence on Delaware affairs, if one were to peer back further into North American history one 
would find that the Iroquois League was initially created in response to Delaware power as 
suggested through Delaware oral traditions.26 Therefore the storyline may be more complex 
when considered from a longer timeline which may also be true for the entire region of Trans-
Appalachia.  In other words, the apparent autocrat of the moment may have formerly been the 
exploited recipient and vice versa, but not necessarily so. Regardless, free rider nationalism in 
lieu of the Covenant Chain and the Iroquois League operated from an intertribal orientation with 
varying degrees of membership ranging from complete participation in the decision making 
process to a subjugated role that relegated certain tribal polities to respite their own affairs to the 
authority of other parties. The benefactors of the Covenant Chain, the Six Nations and the 
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colonies of England, practiced a diplomatic form of nonrecognition to preserve their mutual and 
exclusive interests. In this manner the League’s free rider and non-alignment strategy was 
possible,  as they provided legitimacy to colonial directives with other tribal nations. In other 
words, western legal traditions were upheld through the Covenant Chain, but these legal 
practices should not be mistaken for just and equitable practices. 
 During the 1740s, in the Ohio Country, the League had granted widespread trading 
courtesies to the English and authorized the construction of trade facilities on the Cuyahoga, 
Sandusky, and Miami Rivers. The Miami Nation was even brought into the trade network. Trade 
operators included George Croghan. The League began institutionalizing governance over the 
Ohio country by appointing local Mingo leaders to positions of rank and assigning specific land 
tracts to the various native inhabitants.27 By 1745 the benefactors of the Covenant Chain met in 
Albany to treat with one another. Representatives from the League, Massachusetts, Connecticut, 
Pennsylvania, and New York aimed to secure native participation in the enduring trade conflict 
with the French. Mohawk Chief Hendrick reported his thoughts to the various native peoples of 
the Covenant Chain:  
We, the Mohawks, are your fathers and you are our children. If you are dutiful and obedient, if 
you brighten the chain with the English our friends and take up the hatchet against the French 
our enemies, we will defend and protect you; but otherwise if you are disobedient and rebel you 
shall die every man, woman, and child and that by your hands. We will cut you off from this 
earth as an ox licketh up the grass.28 
 
 Hendrick’s speech marks a turning point in League leadership from the Onondaga to that 
of Mohawk headsmen operating in close association with Sir William Johnson. What emerged 
from this relationship was a new Covenant Chain.29 In due course the new order would favor the 
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English and betray the League’s diplomatic preference for insistent non-alignment between 
England and France. This was probably the primary factor in the eventual collapse of the 
League. William Johnson obtained more influence than previous colonial officials as he went 
about building separate covenant chains, in the 1750s, with other League members and the tribal 
nations of Ohio and Pennsylvania. By 1760 Johnson had established a separate council fire of 
deliberation in Detroit with the nations of the interior without consulting League officials. Alas, 
Sir William Johnson, on the surface and in appearance to other colonial officials, began 
enlarging the Covenant Chain by bringing in new member nations. In reality, however, he was 
building new diplomatic institutions attached to him and not typical of previous diplomatic 
configurations involving the League.30 
 However, the League’s ability to follow through with the implementation and 
management of the Covenant Chain has probably been historically overstated.31 The League 
intervention into the Ohio trade with the English effectively motivated the French to attempt a 
dismantling of the League’s ability to continue with a strategy designed to curtail both French 
and English authority in the region. In 1752 the English trading post hosted by the Miami was 
sacked and pro-League Miami Chief Old Britain was killed by Franco-Amerindian forces. Three 
years earlier the French, with great technological sophistication and cunning, buried their lead 
plates into the soil of the Ohio country—the plates themselves proclaiming title to the land for 
King Louis.32 The French had plans for the Ohio country, plans that was free of League and 
English interference 
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 Through the month of June in 1754, the English colonies hosted a conference at Albany 
to build upon their alliance with the Six Nations and gain favor with other native nations per 
instructions from the Board of Trade, although colonies such as Virginia would forsake 
attendance at the conference.33 Nonetheless, much of the conference was dedicated to Benjamin 
Franklin’s Plan of Union. The Plan of Union hoped to achieve a unification of the English 
colonies to provide for an integrated defense in the event of war with France. The colonies were 
in a state of disarray, having never jointly cooperated to frustrate French schemes.  “The problem 
was to overcome the jealousies of the various colonies and to get them to unite…”34  
 Recommendations from the Albany Conference included an organized expansion beyond 
the Appalachian Mountains wherein current colonial borders would be restricted for the creation 
of new colonies. Conference attendees also issued a reprimand concerning the inability of some 
colonies to contend with any concentrated effort against the French. Other agenda items included 
temporarily suspending western expansion by placing a restrictive border along the backside of 
the colonies, and the potential reorganization of Indian diplomatic affairs. Sir William Johnson 
recommended fortifying Six Nations lands with garrisons to protect from French intrusions, and 
notified other colonial authorities of League expectations in expelling the French from the Ohio 
Country.35 
 In the meantime, the Lords of Trade in England were in the midst of creating yet another 
version of a colonial plan. This plan called for the King to appoint a single person as Commander 
in Chief, and for Indian Affairs to rest under this authority. Furthermore, this plan detailed the 
creation of additional frontier forts, and a method to recruit additional soldiers in the event of an 
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attack upon the colonies. British Imperial Policy originating in the events of the colonies and of 
various governmental agencies in England itself where a myriad of interests, events, and 
indecisiveness prevented a coherent consensus. The crucial interests to consider in British policy 
originated in private enterprises such as corporate land charters, incorporated colonial charters, 
and so on. In part, these layers of policy explain the discontinuity among the colonies 
themselves, and with their home government in England.36 
 Pennsylvania, in 1758, made an offer to return all lands purchased from the Six Nations 
at the 1754 Albany Conference with the hope of ending the raids being conducted by native 
forces in the Ohio country and made further overtures concerning a hunting preserve in Ohio.37 
Pennsylvania had been making such offers as early as 1756, as the war had not been going well 
for the colonies. At the conclusion of the 2nd Treaty of Easton, George Croghan left Pennsylvania 
and joined Sir Johnson in the Mohawk Valley to repair the Covenant Chain with the Six Nations 
so that the chain of friendship could again be employed in future deliberations with the Ohio 
natives.38 The Covenant Chain, as once engineered through League diplomatic maneuvering, 
would never again serve the Six Nations as it had in the past. The French were to be defeated; 
hence the League could no longer stage-manage the French and English with misleading claims 
and actions. Even so, the League through the Covenant Chain would still serve the colonial goal 
of western expansion. The structure of the struggle changed after the war. No longer were the 
French a frontier threat and no longer would the colonies need to rely so heavy upon the League 
as a buffer to New France. The new frontier diplomatic structure would increasingly involve the 
Amerindian leadership of the western interior. 
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With the defeat of New France in 1760, Six Nations, through Sir William Johnson, 
attempted to reinstitute the Covenant Chain in terms of Six Nations supremacy over other tribal 
nations. This worked to a very limited degree as the strategic reality forced Superintendant of 
Indian Affairs Sir William to conduct diplomatic labors and trade regulation directly with Ohio 
natives who had been victorious in preserving their position during the war, and with the former 
members of the Franco-Amerindian regime. The military, trade, and diplomatic posts of Detroit, 
Fort Pitt (Pittsburgh), and Michilimackinac became the new centers of Indian affairs as Six 
Nations’ influence waned. The new state of affairs also left Britain with a multitude of problems 
as Britain now claimed title to all previous French settlements and presumed to have a vested 
authority over the natives located west of the Appalachian Mountains. Simply, the British just 
did not have the institutional structure in place, nor the manpower to execute colonial authority 
over such a broad area.39 Nor did the British, as later events would reveal, have the means to 
quell the appetite of its own colonial subjects for the resources and land of the North American 
interior.  
The events of 1761 highlight the growing division among the League’s member nations. 
League Seneca began plans to launch an attack of Fort Detroit.40 In the interim, Sir William 
Johnson hosted a meeting with the Mohawk at his house to inform them of his forthcoming trip 
to Detroit where he was going to call upon the Ottawa Confederacy, along with other local 
nations, to settle a treaty of peace and trade on behalf of General Amherst.41 Before leaving, Sir 
William also parlayed a conference with some Onondaga chiefs of the League who stated:  
We are surprised at your going to call a council at Detroit, when you know that the chief and 
only council fire burns at your house and Onondaga; besides these Indians you are going to, 
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ought rather, as being aggressors, to come to you. You recommend it to us to mind our hunting 
and trade, and live in friendship with our brethren at the several posts. It is what we would be 
very desirous of, but they, by their behavior to us at the several posts, seem not to have any 
liking for us, and use us very ill at times without any cause, taking our women from us by 
violence, using them and us ill besides, and hindering us from fishing and hunting on our own 
grounds near the posts, and often taking what we catch or kill from us. This is not agreeable to 
the promises made us, or the friendship so long establishing between us and you. We beg, 
brother, you will interpose and see justice done us…42 
 
Later during the actual trip to Detroit, a pair of Mohawk pleaded with Sir William not to 
continue into what they considered to be inhospitable country. They further warned of a potential 
attack on his party due to Sir Williams’ association with the Mohawk who were regarded as 
Englishmen by the tribal nations in the vicinity of Detroit.43 In the meantime, Guyasuta, an uncle 
to the prophet Handsome Lake, and a number of other Seneca, took a wampum belt of war from 
the Council of the Onondaga to Detroit. In Detroit, they called upon the Ottawa, Huron 
(Wyandot), Ojibwa, and Potawatomie to come together with the League in a synchronized 
surprise campaign to capture British garrisons at Detroit, Fort Pitt, Presqu’le Isle, Niagara, and 
Venango. The Delaware and Shawnee were also invited, but refused to participate and foiled the 
plans by revealing the scheme to the British commander at Detroit. The Seneca revived the plan 
in 1763 by sending red wampum belts to the Miami on the Wabash River, the Shawnee and 
Delaware on the Ohio River, and the tribal authorities located in the vicinity of Detroit.44 
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Chapter 6-The Nat ions of the Ohio 
 
  
 Many Amerindians lived in the locales of English forts, settlements, and trade stations in 
western Pennsylvania. These inhabitants were notified to evacuate in advance of upcoming 
military operations targeted for the region. The notification extolled the Rationale that if 
Amerindian inhabitants in these areas chose to stay they would be considered kin to the English 
and suffer the potential consequences. In 1755, Shingas, a Delaware leader from the Ohio 
Country, proceeded with accompanying Shawnee and Mingo leaders to meet with the British 
Majesty’s General Braddock to discover British Intentions should they defeat the Franco-
Amerindian regime. General Braddock informed that “the English Should Inhabit and Inherit the 
Land.”1  When Ackowanothic, another Delaware leader during the war, was asked why the Ohio 
Nations were assaulting the British, he responded that the French could be removed at any time, 
but that their participation in the war would help offset the numerical superiority of the British.2   
 Other recent events also gave purpose for the tribal nations of Ohio to enter into war with 
the British. The Shawnee and Delaware suffered a number of depredations. One instance 
transpired in South Carolina where The Pride, a Shawnee leader who had been warring with the 
Catawba, was apprehended and later died in prison in 1753. A second instance cropped up when 
Shawnee and Delaware ambassadors approached Pennsylvania concerning Iroquois League land 
sales. Pennsylvania exercised great diplomatic skill by taking the ambassadors into custody, 
whereby they proceeded to hang the delegation of Shawnee and Delaware.  In due time, the 
French reported the circulation of Shawnee and Delaware war belts without deliberation or 
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consultation with French authority.3 These events, in light of even earlier  episodes wherein the 
Delaware and Shawnee had been politically marginalized by the Covenant Chain, seems to have 
left them fairly contemptuous of alliances with either the French or the English. Earlier, at the 
turn of the century, the Shawnee in the Cumberland region of Tennessee had come under great 
pressure from League attacks.4 
 From the early days of the French and Indian War, nationalist strategies in the 
borderlands of Trans-Appalachia can be observed to materialize in two prominent and dynamic 
forms that originate in a vein of self-preservation. Tribal nationalism may be seen to have 
developed in a prolonged and acute period of crisis brought on by an inequitable trade system 
with Europeans and a dwindling population base due to disease and famine, keeping in mind that 
native populations were not buttressed with a constant supply of new members stemming from 
immigration to offset their losses as were the British colonies. Not to mention the issue of 
constant warfare, loss of hunting and agricultural lands, or the domestic slave trade. The slave 
trade cannot be underestimated, for as far back as the early 1700s, census figures indicate that 
Kingston, Rhode Island of the New England colonies alone contained a population of 233 Indian 
slaves and 335 African slaves contrasted against a population of 835 free Europeans, for 
example.5 
 The balance between trade dependency eventually favored colonial authorities. 
Unavoidably, trade relations translated into a political currency that would empower and alter 
native polities in an inequitable fashion, giving rise to a host of interesting characters and strange 
bedfellows. The fur trade, and trade in general, became a source of division among and between 
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tribal polities, as it had also served as a source of rivalry among European Kingdoms. The trade 
itself often lacked equity for tribal participants, which further exacerbated the trade imbalance or 
dependence in favor of colonial traders. French dominance in the Northwest fur trade ended in 
1760. The British would retain control of the Northwest fur trade only temporarily, as it would 
lose the Great Lakes portion of the trade to the American Republic by the early 1780s.6 On the 
other side, Europeans and colonials were also dependent on trade with natives, though not in the 
critical area of manufactured arms and weapons, which acted to the disadvantage of tribal 
nations. Additionally, the colonies became less reliant on trade with natives as the colonies 
matured and grew with continual immigration. 
 *Revisiting the concept of the containment strategy to describe one vein of tribal 
nationalism, the reader may notice a polity that often valued intertribal participation and 
communion accompanied with an objective to retain an existence where it could decide its own 
terms and conditions in maintaining territorial integrity that utilized alliances at times with 
various European authorities to advance tribal agendas, though initially such alliances would not 
be entered into until after the French and Indian War.  In the case of the Ohio nations, another 
factor stands out. Many of these nations or bands had restored themselves from unfavorable and 
marginal status conditions as they had previously suffered significant defeats at the hands of the 
Iroquois League in earlier decades. While tribal nations needed allies, the crippling reality was to 
ask if there existed any allies worth having? Eventually, some individual tribal units that 
operated in this manner would themselves surrender the fight by either voluntarily moving 
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further west, typically beyond the Mississippi River, or by taking a nonalignment posture in an 
attempt to avoid further conflict.  
   Another vein of tribal nationalism was built around an appeasement or cooperation 
strategy. Tribes employing this strategy sought to achieve territorial integrity and tribal 
sovereignty by emphasizing the individual tribal unit, but at the same time providing admission 
to their internal polity to direct participation by non-native authorities through colonial annuity 
and trade system. This was sometimes the choice of the tribe, but it also occurred through elicit 
persuasion,  or through diplomatic coercion with the backing of colonial power. Direct 
participation by foreign agents into native polities provided a primary means by which the 
American Republic could model, shape, and endorse tribal governments that in return would 
acquiesce and consequently support the nationalist movement of western expansion consistent 
with an appeasement stratagem. Tribal nations utilizing an appeasement strategy would also 
intermittently find cause to support their containment counterparts, while on other occasions they 
would find cause to counter the designs of the containment regime of the Old Northwest and Old 
Southwest. The appeasement strategy became more common at the completion of the American 
Revolution, and was not so much in use during or immediately after the French and Indian War. 
Moreover, tribal nations practicing appeasement diplomacy attempted, on occasion to also 
practice a nonalignment style of diplomacy seeking retention of their rights. As the crisis of 
western expansion became more acute, any non-alignment approaches became extremely 
difficult.  
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 From this dichotomy of containment-oriented tribal polities and appeasement polities, a 
crucial issue of identity arises,  an issue that I think still permeates tribal and American culture 
today. Both polities over the entire course of the Proclamation Wars developed intimate relations 
with Europeans through marriage, adoption, captive-taking, holding of slaves, trade and security 
relations. Through these elaborate social practices, the definition of whom and what is Indian, 
tribal, American, Native American and so on, emerged. Importantly, the definitions that hold the 
most validity only do so through those individuals and institutions that retained formal socio-
political power. In this respect, these identities may always remain contested. 
 It has been suggested that the Delaware and Shawnee, of the Ohio country, participation 
in an alliance with New France provided the opportunity for an extended tribal consensus. This  
consensus included other tribal allies of New France, such as the Ottawa, Ojibwa, Wyandot,  
certain bands of the Miami, and Illinois regional tribes, and even members of the Six Nations 
League.   However, at this time the Franco-Amerindian security regime, and the British 
equivalent in the form of the Covenant Chain, already existed in which the Ohio nations had 
established themselves as an independent entity. Shawnee and Delaware members would 
maintain resistance to an alliance with New France. Earlier in 1749 the Shawnee had 
contemptuously removed French stakes indicating a Royal claim to the Ohio River Valley.7 In 
1745 the Shawnee were noted to be the “most restless of all the Indians” and had been in 
communication with New Spain.8 By 1759 the tribal authorities of Ohio sought and requested the 
removal of both French and English troops from the Ohio River Valley.9 Between 1755-1757 the 
related and simultaneously independent efforts of the Franco-Amerindian Security Regime and 
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the Ohio tribal nations had enjoyed great success against the British in the Illinois and Great 
Lakes regions.  However, their cooperation buckled at the moment the French asked and 
expected native leaders to serve under the command of regular French officers.10 
 In the summer of 1755, forces under British General Braddock, Commander in Chief of 
British forces in North America, were entirely routed during the Battle of the Wilderness near 
Fort Duquesne. Braddock’s force consisted of 1,200 British regulars and colonial militia under 
the command of Colonel George Washington. Approximately 300 would survive the ordeal 
having been led to safety by Colonel Washington. General Braddock was counted among the 
dead.11 General Braddock’s command had been operating without the assistance of indigenous 
scouts that may have prevented such a disaster. The “Indian Scout Dilemma” led to the 
organizational development at the unit level of light infantry.12 Native scouts and light infantry, 
such as colonial ranger units, often served larger forces in crucial reconnaissance roles. By May 
of 1756 the new Commander in Chief of British forces in North America, Governor Shirley, 
created the American Ranger Company, more commonly known as Rogers’ Rangers.  Eventually 
the outfit would include a company of Mohican natives.13 
 British administrator, Sir William Johnson, with League Mohawk and a substantial force 
of colonial militia, established Fort William Henry near Lake George of colonial New York in 
September of 1755.14 Within the next two years both Fort Oswego on the banks of Lake Ontario, 
and Fort William Henry would also fall to Franco-Amerindian armies. Fort William Henry was 
surrendered when its troops were offered terms that included safe passage from the fort by 
General Montcalm. The retreating column included British Regulars, elements of Rogers’ 
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Rangers, and colonial militia. Montcalm’s Amerindian allies did not agree with his terms of 
surrender and attacked the column, inflicting heavy casualties while also taking prisoners. 
However, at this apex of success, the French forts became logistically challenged and in dire 
need of supplies necessary to continue operations. These unfavorable conditions would persist 
for the remainder of the war to the detriment of the French.  
 By July of 1758, a British force consisting of such units as the 42nd Black Watch 
Highland Regiment, Rogers’ Rangers, and some 9000 colonial militia proceeded to capture the 
key Fort Carillon (later Fort Ticonderoga)  whose location granted control of the lakes and 
waterways of Upper New York. The British force endured a 60% causality rate. Control for 
Upper New York was costly, as a year and a half earlier Rogers’ Rangers had advanced up to 
Lake Champaign only to suffer substantial losses at the Battle of Barbue Creek.15 The Fort 
Carillon campaign was part of Prime Minister William Pitt’s strategy to make over the war as a 
contest between regular European forces. Pitt enjoyed additional victories at Louisburg and Fort 
Duquesne.16 His success was due more to the adverse French logistical situation than to his 
application of strategic aspirations, unless you consider his utilization of the British navy to 
deprive New France of its supply lines. Yet another potentially equivalent source to French 
logistical problems was French officials themselves who confiscated and hoarded agricultural 
products for their own private gain. These officials, such as Bigot, also failed to forward supplies 
to the French forts.17 When British regulars and colonial militia under Colonel Washington 
marched on Fort Duquesne, they did so to only find it abandoned by the French.18 Fort Duquesne 
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was renamed Fort Pitt and transformed into an eighteen acre compound. The campaign had cost 
½ million pounds.19 
 Earlier in the fall of 1755, the tribal nations of Ohio associated with the containment 
strategy provided the Christian Indians of the Gnadenhutten Mission a forewarning to evacuate 
before executing the destruction of the mission in which eleven Moravian missionaries were 
killed. The tribal leaders of Ohio probably viewed the mission as a front for colonial operations. 
Frontier colonials also held reservations towards the mission. They assumed and accused the 
native converts at the mission of spying on behalf of the Ohio tribal nations.20 These tribal 
nations probably viewed the Moravian institution as an unwelcomed intrusion upon their internal 
national affairs. Furthermore, the tribal leaders of Ohio may have considered the Moravian 
activities as something akin to witchcraft, as the missionaries actively sought to not only erase 
cultural native affiliations, but to also literally change the spiritual paradigm from which natives 
understood the world and themselves. Finally, the Moravian missionaries were probably 
considered to be acting beyond a supposed spiritually benevolent role, and viewed as apparent 
colonial agents in the contest for the Ohio country. 
 In 1756 Sir William Johnson began holding conferences with various tribal nations to 
reassert British influence in light of recent failures in the war effort. Johnson had communicated 
to the Six Nations of his desire for them to exercise control over the warring Delaware who were 
theoretically dependents of the Six Nations. Johnson further added that if the Six Nations were to 
hesitate in exerting their authority over the Delaware they would find themselves involved in a 
much larger war.21 Johnson proceeded to enter a treaty with some Delaware and Shawnee known 
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as the first Treaty of Easton. Delaware sachem and Moravian mission convert, Teedyuscung, met 
with Pennsylvania’s Governor Robert Morris to discuss the fighting on the Pennsylvania frontier, 
whereupon Teedyuscung agreed to parlay for peace with other elements of the Delaware nation.  
Sir William Johnson pressured the Six Nations and entered into a treaty in hopes of stopping the 
devastation on the Pennsylvania frontier being caused by factions of Delaware and Shawnee.22 
 By January of 1757, at a conference hosted at Fort Niagara, Delaware leaders would 
contemptuously offer their symbolic petticoats, significant of their status as women by League 
standards, back to the Six Nations headsmen. The Delaware suggested that the Iroquois should 
adorn them for not openly declaring their loyalties in the current conflict. Other Ohio attendees 
included members from the Shawnee and Mingo Nations.23 The ethnic Iroquois of Ohio, 
otherwise known as the Mingo, residing within the intertribal villages of the Shawnee and 
Delaware, quit responding to the leadership of the Six Nation’s council by the 1760s, and maybe 
even earlier as indicated by the Fort Niagara conference. At one point, the Six Nations invited 
the Mingo to relocate in a closer proximity to the towns of the Six Nations, but the offer was not 
accepted.24 
 Nonetheless, the stage was set for new peace talks. In the fall of 1758, the Ohio factions 
of Delaware and Shawnee entered into the Second Treaty of Easton with Pennsylvania.A
                                               
 
A The return of prisoners initiated by the Treaty of Easton reunited the brothers Simon, James, and George Girty. In 
order they had been adopted and raised by the Seneca, the Shawnee, and the Delaware. 
 The 
Shawnee and Delaware agreed to stop fighting. In return, British Pennsylvania agreed not to 
establish any settlements west of the Allegheny Mountains, a stretch of the broader Appalachian 
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Mountain Range. The Ohio nations also agreed to a return of their colonial prisoners. Hatheway 
suggests the 2nd Treaty of Easton marked a shift in British Indian Policy as the affluent Penn 
family of Pennsylvania had agreed to yield all their land titles null and void west of the 
Appalachia crest. Here the effects of the war forced a shift in colonial policy.25 
 Prior to and during the French and Indian War, another demographic trend began to 
emerge. The Ohio tribal nations, who held League authority in disdain, began to entertain and 
host new tribal migrants from the southern tribal nations of the Old Southwest Region. In 1752 a 
number of Cherokees journeyed north to council with the Shawnee on the Ohio River. They 
foretold of a desire to relocate over 1,000 of their kinsmen to settle among the Shawnee; these 
Cherokees  had been accused of murdering English traders, although they denied any role in the 
matter. By 1755, a group of Cherokee did relocate to the intersection of the Ohio and Kentucky 
Rivers.26  The towns of this area would be known by its neighbors as the Indian Republics.27   
This region, bounded in the north by the Great Lakes, in the west by the Wabash River, in the 
south by the Ohio River, and in the east by the Appalachian Mountains, was where more migrant 
tribal nations would gather to form a resistance movement that eventually spanned generations 
and covered  nearly  the entire length of the Appalachia Range.  
 Other tribal nations to enter this region included the Mascoutens, Kickapoo, Miami,   
Wyandot, and Creek. Logstown was a principal republican community. Conrad Weiser, in 
reference to Logstown’s citizenry, stated they were, “very jealous at one another, they being of 
so many different nations. Each of them pretending to have as wise people as the rest.”28 
Attempts were made by the French to affix the Indian Republics to form a joint frontier security 
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bloc, but to no avail. The Cayuga of the Iroquois League informed French representatives that 
the republics were now a part of the landscape.29 Any British intention of gaining favor with the 
tribal nations of Ohio faded when Virginians travelled to Logstown to notify Tenachrissan that, 
by the tenants of the 1744 Lancaster Treaty, the Iroquois League had transferred the land rights 
of western Pennsylvania, western Virginia, and Kentucky to the jurisdiction of Virginia. The 
Virginia representatives hoped to gain recognition of the Lancaster Treaty and the approval of 
Logstown’s tribal authorities in order to begin settlement of said territories. Virginia’s 
representatives fell short of their goals.30 
 While the Ohio Nations agreed to a separate peace with the Easton Agreements, it was in 
1762, at Lancaster, where an additional treaty was concluded. The Lancaster Agreement required 
the removal of both the English and French from the Ohio region, yet General Forbes left a 
garrison at Fort Pitt to protect British trade interests. For the Ohio Nations, the accord may be 
seen as an early victory in their quest to retain independence from foreign powers, whether 
colonial or tribal in origin. Yet the Ohio Nations were not held in high regard, as one 
Pennsylvanian reflected of the republics as “ye Scum of the Earth…this mixed dirty sort of 
people.”31 By this time, the Ohio Nations, like the League, began to consider the British and the 
French as a solitary Christian danger to their well being, even a “conspiracy”.32  
 Around 1761, near the end of the French and Indian War, notification was received by 
British authorities of forthcoming plans to contend with British intrusion in the region. This 
notification originated from a Creek town located on the Sandusky River.33 While the current 
war was coming to a close, Neolin, the Delaware Prophet, began to foretell of an impending war 
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with England.34 During the summer of 1762, a grand council was hosted by an Ottawa town 
north of Detroit attended by the most venerated leaders of the interior nations.35 A year later 
Pontiac’s War would begin in which tribal members of the former Franco-Amerindian Alliance, 
along with current members of the British-Amerindian Covenant Chain, and the independent 
nations of the Ohio region, participated in a loosely unified effort to evict the British from the 
interior. Here cooperation among Amerindian society prevailed. 
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Chapter 7-The Path to Civilizat ion 
 
  
 In the later years of the French and Indian War, Prime Minister William Pitt planned to 
remove the French presence in the Old Southwest through a combined tactical land and sea 
campaign. Fort Loudon would be the source of the land campaign, hosted by the Cherokee 
Nation. The naval campaign would embark from South Carolina via the Mobile and Mississippi 
Rivers. The British hoped to capture Fort Toulouse, deep in the territory of the Creek Nation. 
The operation was never initiated. The Creek Nation’s non-alignment posture barred such 
actions. Superintendant of Indian Affairs in the southern colonies, Edmund Atkin, failed with his 
diplomatic overtures to carry the Creek into British favor. The Creek did not necessarily herald 
the French cause either, for their employment of a non-alignment strategy preempted European 
attempts at undermining Creek autonomy. Different methods were employed by the Creek to 
maintain a non-alignment posture that included the utilization of multiple trade agreements, and 
the holding of commissions by tribal leaders from the various European authorities.  
 The Creek Nation of that generation held steadfast to a decision of impartiality that had 
been reached by their ancestors in the Coweta Resolution. Hahn notes the difficulties of such a 
strategy, as it mandated an unswerving degree of consensus and application of military 
deterrence.1 However, these factors of consensus and application of military deterrence may not 
be so unique to this strategy in the context of indigenous North American culture that valued 
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consensus building approaches to decision making and therefore these factors may be relevant to 
many sorts of strategies. 
  Commissions were often granted by the various colonial authorities to individual native 
leaders. Commissions could entail one time monetary or trade payments, annual payments, or 
some other form of compensation. Individuals holding commissions usually held some title or 
rank useful to European agents. In this manner holders of a commission often acted as point men 
or men of arbitration in various diplomatic and trade settings. Amerindian leaders exploited 
commissions to advance various national interests regarding both domestic and foreign matters; 
simultaneously, commissions provided Europeans with the means to advance their own national 
agendas within tribal nations. A similar instrument was employed by native authorities who 
would adopt colonial men of influence into their tribes (such as Indian Agents or traders) or 
firmly connect them to their tribes through marriage. In this manner, security and trade regimes 
were developed according to the national interest of all parties. These sorts of arrangements often 
provided the ample opportunity for uneven associations and unwarranted relationships.  
 While Edmund Atkin was busy trying to develop a pro-British native consensus, The 
Mortar (an early Trans-Appalachia advocate for intertribal nationalism) of the Creek Nation was 
active in trying to create a consensus that favored the containment strategy. Atkin described The 
Mortar as “too Indian.” Characteristically, Atkin considered The Mortar as, “the compleatest Red 
man in principle” for The Mortar scoffed at the opportunity to hold a colonial granted 
commission.2 The Mortar represents a type of tribal nationalism that in large part held colonial 
authoritative and cultural institutions in a severe state of contempt even in the arena of treaty 
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making as witnessed in later generations of containment leaders. One can only peer so far into 
The Mortar’s personal politics and motives, but a survey of the state of affairs in the Old 
Southwest might provide some answers. 
 In the early 1700s a delegation of Cherokee traveled to South Carolina to meet with the 
royal governor to discuss the problem of slave raiders. Eventually the slave trade for South 
Carolina would commercially trump other sources of trade such as that of the fur trade. Author 
Minges describes the Carolinian involvement in the slave trade as “…an orgy of slave dealing 
that decimated entire peoples. Carolina was more active than any other colony in the exportation 
of Indian slaves.”3 A little over a decade later Creek slaving parties were so successful at 
acquiring Cherokee slaves  that it became necessary for the Cherokee to negotiate an 
arrangement with the Spanish benefactors of Creek slaving.  Scholar Drew records, “Over time 
Indian slaves were lumped together with blacks in plantation records under the general heading 
‘slave’ an erasure of their ethnic identity.”4 Ongoing tribal hostilities in the Old Southwest were 
probably so lengthy in duration as a direct result of the colonial slave trade and potentially could 
be considered a series of ongoing slave trade wars or conflicts. 
 In 1708 the Carolinas were populated by 5,300 whites, 2,900 African slaves, and 1,400 
Amerindian slaves.5 During the early and mid 1700’s, Crown officials became worried over the 
ethnic demographics of their colonies, especially in South Carolina where they felt the Ratio of 
free whites to slaves was to narrow in that the risk of rebellion became too great. The officials 
issued a directive to encourage the importation of white contract laborers who would eventually 
be entitled to land grants of 50 acres for either female or male servants upon the fulfillment of 
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their service contracts. These grants of land would also, for 10 years, be removed from paying 
quit-rents (taxes) to the Crown. The same sort of scheme was endorsed by the Crown in 
provincial Virginia in the late 1600s and early 1700s, except the grant of land to white 
indentured servants was only 30 acres.6 From such practices, British policy developed and 
produced expectations that were not consistent with such landmark policy innovations as the 
Royal Proclamations of 1763. 
 In 1720 Britain’s Board of Trade and Plantations primed a set of reports on the subject of 
the South Carolina colony which formed the original intentions of frontier policy. The plans 
called for the construction of forts along the southern colonial borders and upon the rivers 
Tennessee, Altamaha, and Chattahoochee. The placement of western forts was intended to 
prevent French encroachments from both Louisiana and Canada. Other expansionist designs 
included the acquirement of territories west and south of the Savannah River although European 
title to these lands was contested not only by France, but also by Spain.7 Early on South 
Carolina’s colonial status was indeed delicate; therefore, the provincial assembly determined, 
“the safety of this Province, under God, does depend on the friendship of the Cherokees.”8 
 The Cherokee, like other borderland tribes, were of strategic concern for both England 
and France. The British made a concerted effort to gain tribal allies along their colonial borders 
to prevent raids into Virginia, the Carolinas, and Georgia by the Amerindian, French, or Spanish 
rivals. By gaining borderland allies, the British could create a buffer territory to protect 
burgeoning colonial populations and otherwise feeble colonies.9 
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 The Cherokee sent a delegation of seven representatives to England, and in 1730, the 
British Crown and the Cherokee delegation entered into the Articles of Agreement. The compact 
required the Cherokee to provide exclusive trade rights to England along with rights of 
settlement whereas South Carolina was required to supply any trade goods the Cherokee Nation 
wanted.10 Such agreements offer a potential source or historical basis to appeasement strategies 
that relied upon trade and land concessions. Other stipulations conferred upon the Cherokee 
included recognition of the Crown’s sovereignty, the extradition of any Cherokee guilty of 
murdering an Englishman, and the extradition of any slave who had run away. The King of 
England also granted the Cherokee with the right to domicile at their pleasure. The delegation 
included the young Attacullacullah. With the exception of the 1760-61 conflict, the English 
Crown and the Cherokee maintained a half century long alliance.11 The villages and towns of the 
Cherokee Nation, at the time of the agreement and for some length of time after the agreement, 
had been largely free of colonial traders and any other foreign guests whether of English, French, 
or Spanish origins.12 
 In the summer of 1746, South Carolina Governor James Glen offered, per instruction 
from the Crown, to construct a stronghold in the Overhill Towns of the Cherokee Nation, as the 
Upper Creeks and some Choctaw had been actively raiding Cherokee territory. By 1748, 
Cherokee headmen were requesting the construction of an Overhill fort. The benevolence of the 
Cherokee had been a fundamental condition to the success of the royal colony of South Carolina. 
The deerskin trade alone numbered as one of South Carolina’s top exports, even though traders 
routinely cheated the Cherokee. By 1753 Governor Glen had erected Fort Prince George near 
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Keowee Town, but it was an insufficient deterrent to enemies of the Cherokee. The early years of 
the 1750s witnessed trade disputes with South Carolina merchants that escalated into violent 
reprisals, and the continual desolation of the eastern Lower Towns by Creek forces,  as well as 
further depredations on the Cherokee from Shawnee war parties.13 From this antagonistic 
environment, the leaders of Chota an Overhill Town: 
 …assumed national leadership by concluding a long-desired peace with the French Indians, by 
formulating a new British alliance brilliantly designed to end the Carolinian monopoly with a 
rival Virginia trade…and by shielding the murderers of traders behind protracted diplomatic 
maneuvers…They also persuaded the British to build a fort in the Overhills to protect Cherokee 
women and children, before anymore warriors were recruited...14 
 
 The rout of Braddock’s forces in the Franco-Amerindian summer campaign of 1755 in 
the Old Northwest, and the British desire to recruit tribesmen to serve with British field armies, 
further prompted the construction of Fort Loudon in the Overhill Towns.15 Add to this other 
events, like the Shawnee parties  actively attacking the Carolina frontier settlements and taking 
Catawba prisoners in late 1754, further hastened Fort Loudon’s construction.16 During this time, 
the quarter century long Cherokee quarrel with the Muscogee Confederacy (Creek Nation) 
ended, leaving portions of upper Georgia and Alabama within the territorial confines of the 
Cherokee Nation. The Cherokee also defeated other tribal nations in the Carolinas, including the 
Catawba.17 All the while, Superintendant Edmund Atkin continued on a course to reinvigorate 
British policy towards gaining favor with all the tribal nations in the south.  
 Atkin hoped to achieve an imposing British-Amerindian alliance by bringing the various 
tribal nations into a security and trade regime through his personal efforts.  However, the 
colonies themselves were against any sort of Amerindian-Colonial bloc. Atkin reported in 
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writing to the English Board of Trade the basis for French success in building effective 
relationships with tribal nations. The report listed: 
1) A standardized and uniform French policy.  
 
2) Technological provisions to Amerindian communities such as gun smiths.  
 
3) The acknowledgement of Amerindian leadership and status through gift giving. 
 
4) The French practice intolerance of unwarranted behavior being inflicted toward 
Amerindian communities and individuals.  
 
All this is in contrast to an undeveloped or well thought out British policy. Atkin was motivated 
to move forward. Accompanying the report was his notes regarding the: 
Direction & Management of the Indian Affairs throughout North America, under one uniform 
Regulation of their Commerce, for retrieving & establishing the British Interest among the Indian 
Nations, & thereby the future Security of our Colonies against the Designs of the French.18  
 
 The construction of Fort Loudon across from Chota on the Little Tennessee River’s west 
bank was completed in the summer of 1756, but it was not garrisoned, so the Cherokee shortly 
put the fort to ruins.19 Meanwhile, after holding talks with the Cherokee, The Mortar reported, 
"which is that the English has now a Mind to make slaves of them all for [they] have already 
filled their nation with English forts and great Guns, Negroes, and Cattle.”20 That summer 
Cherokee headman Osteneco (Judd’s Friend) led war parties against the Shawnee north of the 
Ohio River, but with little success as the Shawnee only captured a Cherokee known as The 
Thigh.  While the Cherokee would endeavor to engage the northern Shawnee, they would cease 
any hostilities with the southern Shawnee domiciled in Creek territory.21 Various bands of 
Shawnee had resided among the Creek Nation for years. The Shawnee band associated with 
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Peter Chartier lived on the Coosa River. A decade earlier Chartier had taken a French 
commission, while at the same time taking advantage of Pennsylvania traders with his credit line, 
and then further taking the liberty to add insult to injury by looting English traders. Chartier 
probably never intended to carry out the duties of his French commission as he had opposed and 
avoided the relocation of the Shawnee to Detroit, and thus into the Franco-Amerindian 
Alliance.22 Two other band members, the Bride and Big Huminy, were at odds with Chartier 
over his questionable behavior, but nonetheless, the band retired from the northern country in 
1747 to join other southern Shawnee. Over time the Shawnee became an important diplomatic 
nexus between the tribal nations of the Old Northwest and the Old Southwest.23  
 In the later summer of 1756 a Creek party with The Mortar, also with some southern 
Shawnee, and Mankiller from the Cherokee Town of Tellico (another Overhill Town of 
distinction) ventured to the French Fort Toulouse down the Coosa River to parlay with the 
French. The intertribal delegation desired the French to construct a fort in the vicinity of Tellico. 
From here some members of the Tellico party journeyed to New Orleans for supplies while 
others visited the Shawnee towns on the Coosa River. At these Shawnee towns an alliance was 
formed, and members from each nation proceeded to erect a village thirty miles southeast of 
Tellico on the Hiwassee River. The alliance waned as logistical problems ensued.24 Tellico Town 
became a host for many Shawnee people.25 Like their neighbors in the north, elements of the 
southern tribal nations began to organize a containment-oriented nationalist movement that was 
intertribal in scope. 
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 By January of 1757, the new Fort Loudon was constructed and manned, but it was now 
positioned at the entrance of the Tellico River just south of the Little Tennessee River, otherwise 
known as the Cherokee River.26 In this year the Cherokee initiated hostilities with the Chickasaw 
Nation that would end a decade later to the detriment of the Cherokee. The Cherokee had 
become overstretched, as they were also at war with the Seneca and Shawnee north of the Ohio 
River,   during a time when small pox was also taking a toll on village populations.27 Fort 
Loudon further obligated the Cherokee to tax their resources, and by the summer of 1758 around 
700 Cherokee warriors were serving with the British in every theater of the French and Indian 
War.28 Individual Cherokee gunmen were compensated by British authorities with scalp bounty 
payments.29 
 General Forbes was accompanied by  400 Cherokee during his Fort Duquesne campaign 
at the Forks of the Ohio. The British-Cherokee Alliance fell on hard times when Virginia settlers 
murdered a number of Cherokee. In retaliation, the Cherokee took vengeance upon a number of 
settlers in the Carolinas, which prompted an embargo of weaponry on the Cherokee Nation by 
Governor Lyttelton.30 Previous treaty commitments required colonial authorities to seize and 
bring the murderers to trial, but Virginia failed to do so.31 Attacullacullah, the leader of the 
Cherokee force attached to General Forbes, decided to depart for home, but Forbes had other 
plans; by force, he temporarily detained Attacullacullah.32 The episode would eventually escalate 
into a full scale war between the Cherokee Nation and the southern colonies in 1759 that lasted 
until 1761.33 Later on, Virginia’s failure to prosecute the murderers was turned on its head when 
citizens of provincial Virginia preempted any formal proceedings by partaking in a jail break that 
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freed the accused. The mob professed publically, “that the killing of a savage is an action for 
which no man ought to suffer.”34 
 In April of 1759, The Mortar lobbied for the support of the Overhill Towns in his 
operations against the English.35 The Overhill and Valley Town divisions of the Cherokee Nation 
aided The Mortar in building a rendezvous camp on the Coosa River for Creek, French, 
Cherokee, and other allied forces in preparation for an attack on Fort Loudon. The Mortar’s town 
was located adjacent to the Etowah mound, hence the town name—Etowah Old Town or 
Etowhatchee, located in the proximity of present day Cartersville, Georgia. The Mortar and his 
uncle, a headman of Cussita, obtained most of their support from their own kin. Hahn suggests 
the continental movement towards intertribal nationalism was promoted through a labyrinth of 
kin networks.36 Tellico, home of the Emperor and Mankiller, had once been in the 1730s the lead 
Overhill Town in matters of national affairs, and had formerly enjoyed strong ties to Britain.  
Attacullacullah’s associate, Old Hop or Conocorte, would routinely impose gun powder 
embargos on towns such as Tellico for not supporting pro-British policies.37 
 In December, Governor Lyttelton’s colonial army held Cherokee hostages at Fort Prince 
George including Oconostota. After Attacullacullah was able to obtain Oconostota’s liberation, 
the pair of them treated with Governor Lyttelton and agreed to extradite any Cherokee citizens 
responsible for killing settlers. Oconostota began unrestrained warfare on South Carolina once 
Lyttelton’s army had journeyed back to Charlestown. By the following spring in 1760, 
Oconostota laid siege to Fort Loudon. A relief force under William Byrd III was organized in 
Virginia, but it never got afoot. Another relief force in South Carolina, numbering around 1,600, 
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successfully departed only to be turned back by an ambush in June. A number of the besieged 
men in Fort Loudon had Cherokee wives who routinely broke the ongoing siege by providing the 
fort with food.38 The Cherokee wives aiding the fort “laughed” when Cherokee warriors 
expressed their contempt.39 Attacullacullah himself, walking a diplomatic tightrope, betrayed 
Oconostota as he served the fort by acting as the primary source of information. In return, 
Attacullacullah was removed from the Council of the Cherokee, having been identified as an 
Englishman.40 
 Oconostota traveled to New Orleans in February of 1761, where he received a French 
commission with the rank of captain. Oconostota further asked for technical support in the use of 
cannon captured from the British.41 Oconostota’s ties to the French went back decades earlier, as 
he had developed a trade partnership with Priber, a French envoy, although Priber was eventually 
apprehended by the English in 1743. Priber’s fate was an untimely death at Frederica Prison in 
provincial Georgia.42 The Cherokee sought to expand their campaign, as they sent spokesmen 
north of the Ohio to encourage the Shawnee, Delaware, and Seneca to enter into an alliance 
against the British. Their efforts failed when the British were forewarned of the scheme.  
 The Cherokee delegation also approached the Wyandot, Ottawa, Ojibwa, and 
Pottawatomie Nations to dissuade them from conducting any further raids on the Cherokee. 
Their efforts had some effect, as the Shawnee began stopping war parties that were enroute to 
Cherokee territory. The Miami and Wyandot would continue with the raids.43 The early days of 
Trans-Appalachian intertribal containment-oriented nationalism fell short of its intended 
consensus, but never before had such a consensus even been attempted. In the future, the attempt 
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to gain a lasting consensus would have to navigate substantial obstacles such as logistics, a loss 
or lack of viable European allies, existing political orders such as the Covenant Chain, and the 
emergence of a unified thirteen colonies. Problematically, it would also be politically tempting 
for a member of the consensus to defect for short term gains, seeking temporary advantages and 
benefits through other relations. Such defection would sorely plague the containment consensus. 
Other problems also hampered efforts, such as the slave trade, and an ever increasing rate of 
tribal rivalries intensified by the fur trade, a primary means by which tribal nations acquired 
European weaponry. 
 Late in the summer, the men serving during the siege of Fort Loudon started to desert and 
endangered their officers with the possibility of complete abandonment of the post. The 
surrender of the fort ensued shortly thereafter. The survivors were allowed to return to their 
homes in the colonies of Carolina and Virginia.  Two hundred forty men and women embarked 
for Fort Prince George. In retaliation for the killing of Cherokee hostages during the siege, 
Osteneco ambushed the Fort Loudon party, killing three officers and twenty three privates. A 
few women also fell victim to Osteneco's attack. Other members of the Fort Loudon siege were 
ransomed to either South Carolina or Virginia. Colonel James Grant proceeded with a new 
campaign into Cherokee territory that drove some 5,000 Cherokee into the mountains after 
having toppled fifteen towns, and burning at least 1,500 acres of corn. As a result, in the winter, 
Attacullacullah was reinstated into his position on the Cherokee National Council where he went 
forward with a peace settlement. The postscript of the entire action included the French 
expedition’s failure to navigate the Suck of the Tennessee River, hence they were never able to 
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garrison the temporarily deserted Fort Loudon, and thus the lack of their presence would prevent 
them from gaining favor with the Cherokee.44 Years later, the Cherokee would give away 
territory in Tennessee, Kentucky, and the Carolinas to erase their trade debts with the southern 
colonies.45  
 Events such as the forced dislocation of 5,000 Cherokee from their homes provides an 
excellent basis for understanding why tribal bands began voluntarily migrating west or moving 
north and south. It also makes me wonder if all 5,000 returned to their former homes. In 1776, 
the Seneca River in central New York hosted a Cherokee refugee camp, and colonial practice of 
taking Indian captives added to the problem of dislocated Amerindian families and individuals. 
Indian captives included children and women who often became farm laborers or were sold into 
slavery.46 In 1777, around 500 Cherokee refugees were reported in Pensacola, Florida where they 
expressed their intentions to fight with the British.47 The dislocation of Amerindian populations 
was widespread and the ethnic composition of Amerindian nations during this time frame 
became more diverse to the point of initiating or creating identity issues another element to 
consider in the discourse on identity.  
 By the 1750s, a large number of displaced Natchez tribesmen took residence in the 
Cherokee Nation. The Natchez were kinsmen, as far as Cherokee headman the Raven was 
concerned.48 Conditions in the Old Northwest were much the same. In 1753, in western 
Pennsylvania at the Amerindian town of Shamokin, a missionary noted, “it is uncomfortable for 
Indians there, for if they plant they cannot enjoy it, so many strange Indians pass through the 
town whom they must feed.”49 The Chickamauga towns not only hosted intertribal allies, but 
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also hosted refugees from Cherokee towns further east.  Eventually, these towns even became 
home to Tory refugees during the American Revolution as well as a number of blacks.50 Decades 
later, after the formal removal of the Old Southwest tribes to Oklahoma, a band of Delaware 
surrendered their tribal autonomy, status, and identity. They were coercively compelled to accept 
Cherokee leadership and the recognition of their children as Cherokee citizens if they were going 
to subsist within the jurisdiction of the Cherokee Nation.51 
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Chapter 8-Montreal Union 
 
 
After the Paris Convention that ended the Seven Years War, France and her ally Spain 
did not incur a total loss. Spain had become formally involved in the affair after England 
declared war on Spain in 1762.  In the treaty, Spain retained Cuba, and France regained the sugar 
islands Martinique, Guadeloupe, and St. Lucia. While France and Spain had sustained a 
devastating blow to their imperial and colonial ambitions, they would not be thwarted in the 
future from participating in any opportunities to recoup their losses. 
Initially the French were led into the war by the Ottawa.1 The Franco-Amerindian 
Alliance included the Ottawa, Ojibwa, Potawatomi, and the Menominee from their countries 
located in the western portion of the Great Lakes region. Seven hundred Ojibwa, Ottawa, and 
Potawatomie participated in the defeat of General Braddock.2 The Western Wendat or Wyandot, 
an incorporation of formerly distinct northern Iroquoian peoples not associated with the Great 
Peace that created the Five Nations Iroquois League, were also a primary agent in the French 
association.3 These core members were associated with the Michilimackinac trade and defense 
centers along with other centers such as Detroit. French policy developed around a doctrine of 
accommodation for its native allies.4 
The Franco-Amerindian security regime emerged from an earlier set of wars in which the 
Iroquois League defeated both the French and various Wendat peoples such as the Huron, 
Neutral, and Petun.5 During the 1600 and 1700s, the conflict between the French with the 
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Iroquois League often looks to be a personal contest between League Mohawk and the French. 
Indecision within the League over foreign policy regarding New France and disagreements over 
the incorporation of remnant Huron families, which led to some tense political drama during the 
1650s. On different occasions League members, the Onondaga and Seneca made attempts to 
arrange a peace with the French. During these peace discussions the Mohawk attendees 
acknowledged their responsibility in the murder of one Onondaga chief and the accidental killing 
of a Seneca ambassador. These acts were unconventional but served to aid in securing the 
Mohawk interests at the talks. The Mohawk were also accused of additionally killing two other 
Seneca in the sorted affair.6 
By the 1680s, the French and the Western Lake Nations formalized their association 
through an alliance to counter the League’s influence. The French feared a sort of domino effect 
in that if one nation fell to the League, then eventually all the nations would fall as far as Green 
Bay, leaving French Canada exposed to the designs of the League and their British ally. The 
French were prescribed an arbitration duty within the alliance and were relied upon for logistical 
support.7 The population of French Canada was 1/20 the size of the British colonies.8 The French 
were at an obvious disadvantage without membership in a collective security regime. This 
provides a practical explanation for France’s willingness to recognize and cooperate with tribal 
authority.  
Samuel de Champlain, an originator of policy for New France, keyed in on the role of the 
fur trade. Champlain vied for French mastery of native culture, language, and tradition as 
compulsory for the preservation of the fur trade and the security alliance. He further sought to 
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indulge New France’s native allies as contemporaries in political and commercial affairs. Many 
individual ethnic French intermarried and adopted native customs, forming a new ethnic culture 
known as the Métis.9 New France stretched from the North Atlantic to the Gulf of Mexico 
through the Great Lakes down the Mississippi River. Cities included Detroit, St. Louis, Natchez, 
and New Orleans. There were also a number of smaller communities such as those along the 
Illinois River. New France was nestled and surrounded by a vast Amerindian presence. 
Amerindian communities controlled the flow of commerce through New France. Simply, the 
demographics favored tribal populations in that the disparity between the sizes of French 
colonies and the numerous native communities precluded the agendas of French officials.10 In 
line with the demographic reality of the interior country, the French Catholic Jesuits were also 
hard pressed in their spiritual endeavors as native communities viewed such dealings as not 
suitable to them.11  
French congeniality did not extend beyond the reach of her immediate native allies, as 
Montreal alone at some point received about 60 native slaves annually through the security 
regime.12 Similar to the English Covenant Chain, the institution of slavery working in the 
confines of the Franco-Amerindian alliance served political agendas in addition to traditions of 
colonial economy. In the 1680s, the French Crown authorized enslavement of League citizens as 
a means to advantage the French position in North America. The Crown authorities stated that 
during conflicts in which prisoners would be acquired, they should be sent to France to serve in 
the “Galleys”.13 
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Through trickery and deceit, rather that open warfare, Lamberville, a Catholic Priest and 
member of the mission serving the Onondaga, succeeded in capturing 36 Onondaga and Oneida 
chiefs in addition to their diplomatic compliment that included additional League citizens. 
Lamberville’s success was achieved by extending an invitation to negotiate a peace at Fort 
Frontenac. Governor of New France, Denonville wanted the incarcerated delegation sent to 
France, whereas Lamberville desired to retain the captives as potential leverage in future talks 
with the League.14 The League, in many respects, did not appreciate the presence of intrusive 
French authority; 
 
…if that be a good title [reference to French claims] then we can claim all Canida, for we not 
only did soe, [that is, they conquered it] but subdued whole nations of Indians that liv’d there, 
and demolished there castles in so much, that now great oake trees grow where they were built, 
and afterwards we plyed the French home in the wars with them, that they were not able to go 
over a door to pisse. We are the just and rightful owners of all our lands and these which the 
French now pretend...15 
 
 Nevertheless, the French endeavored to bring about the demise of the League and 
employed multiple methods to do so. For one, they initiated an arms escalation by constructing 
new forts on League lands. From these forts, the Catholic missionaries would begin to 
depopulate the League itself by relocating converts to mission towns located in New France. 
New France would continue to arm its native allies as a deterrent to League influence in 
economic trade. The League responded by enticing New France’s native allies to conduct trade 
with the English or the Dutch of New York. League officials encouraged traders to undercut 
French prices as an incentive to gain market share. Lastly, the League took to war with the 
Huron, Illinois, Miami, and Ottawa nations to drive a wedge between them and the French.16 
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 Alarmed by a potential peace between New France and the League,  in the summer of 
1695 the Ottawa and Huron (Wyandot) entered into secret negotiations with the League. By 
doing so, the Ottawa and Huron would gain better trade terms with the English.17 A lasting peace 
between the League and New France had been attempted in the previous decade, but The Rat of 
the Western Wyandot used his statecraft to block any such outcome. The Rat organized an 
ambush of Iroquois peace delegates, assassinating many of them, while others were allowed to 
survive. The survivors fell into The Rat’s ruse: the surviving delegates were under the 
impression that the ambush was requested by the French governor himself, rather than an 
independent act committed by The Rat. The Rat further held one hostage, whom he delivered to 
a French fort conveying to the fort’s commandment that the hostage was an Iroquois spy. By 
these means, the war continued.18 The Rat was the individual  that de Callieres, Governor of 
Canada, instrumentally relied upon in the maintenance of the Franco-Amerindian security 
regime.19  It has been stated of The Rat, that “…he was the type of man to manage the most 
ticklish affairs of a flourishing state.”20A year later the League would push for the English to 
enter into war with New France. Dozens of raids were undertaken by both the League and the 
Franco-Amerindian alliance.  On three separate occasions,  the League sent forces of over 1,000 
men against the colony of New France, killing or capturing around 600 people. In addition, they 
made raids on tribal nations aligned with the French.21 League officials stated to their Covenant 
Chain partners: 
 
We are now down upon one knee, but we are not quite down upon the ground; let the Great King 
of England send the great canoes with seaventy guns each, and let the brethren of Virginia, 
Maryland, Pensilvania, the Jerseys, Connecticutt and New England awake, and we will stand up 
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straight againe upon our feet; our heart is yet stout and good; we doubt not but to destroy the 
enemy…We are not able of ourselves to destroy them. We are become a small people and much 
lessened by the war. If the people of Virginia, Maryland, Pensilvania, the Jerseys, Connecticutt 
and New England who have put their hand to the Covenant Chain will joyne with the inhabitants 
of this place [New York], we are ready to go and root out the French and all our enemies out of 
Canida.22 
 
 The war was more than fruitless for the League.  They failed to bring New France’s 
native allies into the Covenant Chain, but also substantially weakened their own influence with 
the English. Late in the decade, the French and English agreed upon terms of peace, even though, 
against British protest, the French would not allow the League to participate in the treaty 
proceedings. The League would have no choice but to seek a separate peace with New France.23 
In the summer of 1701, The Great Peace of Montreal was concluded with 39 tribal nations and 
New France. Over 1,200 signatories endorsed the document. Here, the League agreed to remain 
neutral in future conflicts between the French and the English, another probable source of their 
future nonalignment and free rider foreign policy strategies. The Rat of the Wyandot, once an 
opponent to any sort of peace, now used his diplomatic dexterity to bring about such a peace. At 
the Montreal Conference: 
He spoke at length, and being naturally eloquent, no one perhaps ever exceeding him in mental 
capacity, he was heard with boundless attention. He described with modesty, and yet with 
dignity, all the steps he had taken to secure a permanent peace among all the nations; he made 
them see the necessity of such a peace, and the advantages it would entail on the whole county in 
general and each tribe in particular, and with wonderful address showed distinctly the different 
interests of each. Then turning towards the Chevalier de Callieres, he conjured him so to act that 
no one thereafter cold reproach him with abusing the confidence placed in him.24  
 
The Montreal Peace lasted a little over a decade and a half. The Rat died during the Montreal 
Convention. Upon his loss, a French official stated: 
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His nation felt the extent of the loss it suffered, and it was the general opinion that no Indian had 
ever possessed greater merit, a finer mind, more valor, prudence or discernment in understanding 
those with whom he had to deal. His measures were always found wise, and he was never 
without resource; hence he always succeeded.25 
 
 The Great Peace of Montreal, in consensus-driven terms, defined the nature of the 
relationship between New France and her Amerindian allies for the remainder of New France’s 
tenure in North America. In this respect, the Franco-Amerindian Alliance may better be 
represented or befitted with the description The Montreal Union, much as the counter diplomatic 
apparatus between Iroquois League and the British was known by the moniker The Covenant 
Chain. Montreal was host to the annual fur trade fair for over a century and a half, in which some 
Amerindian hunters traveled over a thousand miles to attend.26 The Montreal Peace also afforded 
a place at the table so to speak for France’s tribal enemies. The British Royal Proclamation of 
1763 worked towards a similar end, but unlike the Montreal Peace, it considered Amerindian 
populations as British subjects even though it addresses Amerindian polities as nations. The 
Montreal Peace reflected legitimate international relations, as European and Amerindian nations 
participated in its construction., Meanwhile, the Royal Proclamation was constructed by English 
politicians and delivered to Amerindian society without consulting directly with Amerindian 
leaders. In fact, it was the opinion of the French governor that the success of the Montreal Peace 
hinged on the diplomacy of  The Rat.27 
 Returning to the issue of slavery and captives in New France, it should be noted that 
during the conflict of the 1690s, the Western Wyandot intended to respect an agreement with the 
League in which both parties would cease the practice of killing individuals captured during 
raids. Nonetheless, an incident occurred that would test this agreement whereby French 
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representatives demanded the killing of some League captives and proceeded to murder a pair of 
them. When the Wyandot refused to participate, the Ottawa obliged French requests to proceed 
with the murders of the captives.28 Depredations in the frontier wars were not unique to 
Amerindian society. In contrast to common stereotypes of tribal attitudes toward warfare, earlier 
in the 1680s three Shawnee captives, (who were eventually adopted by a tribe located on the 
Gulf of Mexico) were  offered the chance by the French to return to their former homes.  These 
captives retorted: 
…they were not unnatural enough to abandon their wives and children;…moreover, being in the 
most fertile, healthy, and peaceful country in the world, they would be devoid of sense to leave it 
and expose themselves to be tomahawked by the Illinois or burnt by the Iroquois on their way to 
another where the winter was insufferably cold, the summer without game, and ever in war.29 
 
 The point here is to quell any confusion over the stereotypes often perpetrated upon 
native populations.   By neither culture nor biology were they predisposed to war at least no 
more than the European and maybe less in some cases. Regardless, captives and slaves became 
an institution in the Montreal Union. By 1709, prisoners of war were relegated to slave status and 
commodities under French law. The giving of captives as gifts became a regular part of Franco-
Amerindian diplomacy to augment political and trade relationships. Eventually the gathering of 
slaves would exceed the boundaries of warfare, and slave raiding would become a self-serving 
act in itself. The tribal nations of the western Great Lakes, the Great Plains, and upper 
Mississippi suffered the debilitating effects of slave raids by New France’s native allies. The 
French economy on the St. Lawrence River  became enriched, as land owners benefited from a 
continuous supply of new captives. Upon the capitulation of New France after the Seven Years 
War, the recently arrived English officials failed in their attempts to build relations with tribal 
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nations. The recognition of the slave trade in diplomacy aided the British in developing 
diplomatic relations among former members of the Montreal Union.30 
 When it was politically expedient and economically viable, the French did ban the 
practice of the slave trade. For instance, in provincial Louisiana, the slave trade was suspended 
so that the French could aid in the prevention of the slave raiding being conducted under the 
banner of the British. Louisiana could easily adopt this policy stance since it had ample access to 
African slaves. Three thousand plus native peoples were placed in slavery in New France by 
1800, and the practice would continue until the end of the War of 1812. The slave population 
consisted of ethnic Kansa, Chickasaw, Iowa, Sioux, Apache, Quapaw, Osage, and Pawnee to 
name but a few.31 
 The French/English rivalry spiraled closer to official warfare with the escalation of 
intense competition over the fur trade. The English were limited in their number of options in 
expanding their trade networks, as their traders had great difficulty gaining access to the interior. 
The French ability to control access to the interior was the manner in which they prevented the 
English from introducing their less expensive, imported manufactured goods into the market.32 
The English did not control the river systems of the interior, the significance being that rivers 
literally served as trade highways during colonial times, even as they do today. Nor did the 
English possess the requisite native allies to gain access to those rivers. Rivers were the most 
efficient means of orchestrating a trade that was intercontinental in scope. In many ways, rivers 
were natural extensions of the seas and oceans, and a bridge to the goods of the land. This is why 
the Ohio River became the initial point of contention between the English and French. 
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 English gains in the fur trade market were accomplished primarily through the Iroquois 
Confederacy who controlled the Hudson River access to the Great Lakes. Fur trading was carried 
out through the Mohawk River and city of Albany. In due course, the Iroquois League would act 
as trade arbitrators between the English and the interior tribal nations. The introduction of cheap 
English imports prompted French traders to start an illicit trade with New York by acquiring 
English products that could be introduced into the interior, providing the French trader with 
improved profit margins.33 
 The French system of trade served political objectives as well as economic interests. Two 
basic trade posts were utilized in the French system. Government sponsored posts served the 
political goal of attaching tribal interests to New France. These posts were highly unprofitable in 
that the, “Indians and trader, storekeeper and commandment enriched themselves at the expense 
of the government”.34 The other trade post was a leased post in which the leasee gained exclusive 
trade rights to the operation, which led to local trade monopolies. The cost of the lease also 
increased the cost of  sold goods, which further attracted traders to seek English manufactured 
goods. The means by which New France protected its near trade monopoly on the interior was a 
series of forts that stretched from New France down to Louisiana in the Mississippi River Valley. 
 Entering the 1750s, the French had a clear and centralized two fold strategy to maintain 
control of the interior. Their policy addressed the threat that the Covenant Chain posed to New 
France. The French wanted to secure the Ohio River Valley into their defense network. Former 
Governor Galissoniere saw the Ohio River as a critical strategic point. If this point were to be 
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compromised or fall into British influence, a number of possible scenarios could transpose, all to 
the detriment of the Montreal Union. For example: 
1) Increase of British influence with tribal nations of the interior. 
 
2) The Ohio River offered excellent positioning for military campaigns against French 
strategic forts and trade centers along the Great Lakes, Mississippi and Illinois Rivers. 
 
3) The prevention of successful French military deployments. 
 
4) Spanish Mexico was even considered a possible target for military acquisition if the 
British were to gain control of the Ohio River.35 
 Through such institutions as gift-giving, the French aimed to prevent those tribal nations 
existing outside the Montreal Union from entering into a security/trade bloc with the British 
while maintaining their own regime. The custom of gift giving was deemed by tribal authorities 
as a lease payment for French habitation and subsistence within Amerindian lands.36 Beyond 
direct aid (giving of gifts,) or beneficial trade, the French also employed religious endeavors 
such as missions to disseminate their interests. While there were often doubts as to the sincerity 
of religious conversion, it was a favored method for fragmenting the loyalties of the Iroquois 
Confederacy. Father Abbe Picquet even went so far as to urge the authorities of Quebec to allow 
him to lead a mission down the Ohio River as far south as the Cherokee Nation to secure new 
tribal interests, and to reprimand those tribal polities that would not heed to his voice, or for that 
matter, the French voice.37 The British tried the same methods, but with much less success. 
These diplomatic schemes were the mechanisms of a “Cold War” between England and France.38  
 Plans to proceed with the increased fortification of Canada corroded in the face of an 
agricultural crisis that eroded colony food stocks. More so, the leadership of Governor La 
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Jonquiere was so riddled with corruption and avarice that it depleted New France’s fundamental 
strategic resources. The “Jobbery, robbery, graft, and hunger disaffected the habitants and led to 
near revolts in Quebec and Montreal."39 In 1752, the situation became so grave that the new 
temporary governor was unable to dispatch militia units to the Ohio region, because he did not 
have the necessary logistics to support the operation. Once Marquis Duquesne was appointed to 
the governorship, he proceeded with his orders to remove the British from the Ohio country.  His 
orders further required him to inform the Amerindian nations of the Ohio that British traders 
would not be allowed to conduct business in the region. Instead, tribal representatives would 
have to enter the British colonies to commence commercial activities. By 1753, being unable to 
gain the voluntary goodwill of the Ohio tribal nations, Duquesne sent 2,000 soldiers into the 
region to enforce French ambitions.40 The French, like the British, could resort to outright 
coercion when all other overtures failed. 
 Duquesne enjoyed great but short lived success in the early years of the French Indian 
War, in large part due to France’s tribal allies or other tribal nations fighting in an independent 
effort aimed at checking British aspirations. French Captain Dumas projected 2,500 British 
casualties had occurred by 1756 at the hands of tribal forces. However, by 1759, the British had 
taken Fort Niagara and the French began abandoning their own forts because they could not 
supply them. The British Naval blockade starved New France of her ability to wage war. At Fort 
Duquesne, French soldiers adorned the fort with the heads of Scot Highlanders who had served 
in the British army, before the French completed the abandonment of their post.41 The end of 
New France occurred in the proximity of Quebec at the Plain of Abraham Battle, where a 
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company of “Native Americans and men of mix blood,” known as the “Indian Rangers of the 
Woods,” served the victorious General Wolfe.42 
 Before the ink was dry on the 1763 Paris Treaty, French Minister Choiseul began urging 
the British colonies in North America to rebel and begin an independent nation. France hoped to 
quell British power with such an event. In time, Benjamin Franklin would parley for 51,000,000 
in franc denominated loans, along with accompanying French fleets, soldiers, and aides-de-
camp, to see the effort through.43 The last French governor of Louisiana described the British as 
“men drunk with success, and who regard themselves as masters of the world”.44 France would 
forsake any obligations to her former Amerindian allies.  Had the Amerindian citizen of North 
America been able to extend his credit line beyond the local trading post and into the coffers of 
the European crowns, then perhaps disease, technology, the slave trade, and religion would not 
or could not so easily explain or account for the inevitable demise of Amerindian nationalism.  
Maybe it was not so inevitable, after all. 
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Sect ion III  
 
Chapter 9 - Conclusions 
  
1945 to the Present—Colonialism, Modernism, Globalism—enter the Post 
Modern 
From this study of colonial Trans-Appalachia, the evidentiary record of the interplay and 
formation of three primary security and trade regimes offer a unique opportunity to discuss state 
development, social organization and democratic theory by drawing from multiple disciplines 
such as political science and anthropology. At the same time, this case study enriches the 
dialogue of Postcolonialism and decolonization theory through a historical examination of the 
high politics associated with the colonial drama of the 18th Century. It would be an error to think 
of colonialism in too narrow a time frame, in which European kingdoms, nations, and empires 
were the sole arbitrators of the phenomena.  It is critical to also consider an earlier time when 
much of Europe suffered the intercontinental wars of conquest and colonization by the Romans, 
the Moors, the Ottoman Empire, and even the Mongols of far Asia, In this respect, issues of 
colonization and decolonization have affected large segments of humanity. 
 “Decolonization” in simple terms is nothing more than learning and acknowledging the 
manner in which the practices of colonization change and shape the outcomes applicable to the 
social ordering of communities and issues of social justice that necessarily arise thereafter.  By 
the 18th Century, colonization or the domination of societies by other societies reached new 
 166 
 
heights. As stated before, the French and Indian War was a regional, but central, theater of a 
much broader global war known as the Seven Years War. Colonial warfare in the Modern Age 
had transcended the scope of a few continents to encompass the entire globe. Due to a legacy of 
colonization, there remain to this day unresolved issues of social justice in the Americas in which 
indigenous communities are neither free from external intervention in their community decision-
making practices nor free from foreign institutional authority that prevents a return to 
autonomous societies.  This legacy has evolved in the context of colonizing regimes.A
The process of colonization, globalization, and modernization is spoken of by some as a 
necessary event with both tragic  and redeeming qualities. Japanese scholar Francis Fukuyama in 
the 1990s spoke of this historical era for it is significant because it meant the progress of 
humanity with implications for a universal human experience that is indicative of a socio-cultural 
evolutionary process with a beginning and an end that resulted in democratic governments and 
capitalist economies. This historical evolutionary event was due to the development of Western 
liberal principles of equality and liberty alongside the development of modern era natural 
science. He holds that these once held European cultural specific truths now are the property of 
  The 
current post-modern discourse is rich and provokes thoughtful consideration of what has passed 
and what might come to be. 
                                               
 
A This analysis does not examine in detail the role of Amerindian and Spanish regime building in North 
America. While it could appear there is a northern bias in that the study is weighted toward the events in northern 
Trans-Appalachia, the geographic disposition of northern Trans-Appalachia seemingly favored more rapid 
penetration into the interior through the Great Lakes waterways.  More so the locality of French Montreal and 
British Albany due to their close proximity and the disposition of Indigenous nations seems to focus the struggle in 
this geography. This resulted in a proliferation of commerce and conflict. The French and Indian War was decided 
in the field campaigns of northern Trans-Appalachia. Later during the 1790s The Early Republic would initiate its 
invasion of Trans-Appalachia with federal armies by targeting the Ohio Region. 
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humanity in which Japan serves as the international state standard to "modernization" in Asia 
rather than the United States.1 Fukuyama finds universal validity in the empirical evidence that 
liberal democracy had conquered alternative and rival ideologies such as communism and 
fascism in the 20th Century.B
Yankton Sioux scholar, Vine Deloria in the late 1970s framed the issue a little differently. 
Deloria in his pursuit to acquire a basis or method for universal interpretation of the world was 
apprehensive about initiating a diatribe regarding Western Civilization. Yet, he did hold Western 
Civilization responsible for its choices and by its choices he felt Western Civilization had 
assumed a global leadership role. He was driven to determine if Western traditions were indeed 
adequate to fulfill such a role. Deloria noted how western scientists and other professionals were 
having to increasingly integrate indigenous concepts to advance their technology and intellectual 
 Others have maintained  that democracy and capitalism where 
culturally relevant phenomena with little universal applicability to human society. Regardless, 
Fukuyama maintains that the universal homogenous state, the historical end product of the 
modern era is an incomplete victory as peoples still persist in their identities. In this respect, 
Fukuyama maintains that the international system of states is now an expression of a literal 
dichotomy between the post-historical age of Western liberalism and the historical where liberal 
democracy has not taken hold and ideological conflict remains likely.2  
                                               
 
B The criteria to meet the definition of Western liberal democracy are the establishment basic rights to the citizenry 
of the state and representative government established through regular multi-party elections. Fukuyama also argues 
the philosophical relevance of the Western Tradition that underlies liberal democracies, e.g. Hegel's dialogue on 
humanity's desire for recognition that underpins Hegel's master and slave paradigm. 
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comprehension. His method was a metaphysical approach grounded in empirical evidence and 
experience.3  
He contended that when the "seasoned" cognitive synthesis of historical indigenous society 
could be translated into the provinciality of Western knowledge then perhaps new principles 
could arise that would "reorient" Western epistemology towards a truly universal synthesis.4 In 
addition Deloria foresaw the possibility that North American indigenous society could 
participate in, if not lead, the production of a "more sophisticated, humane, and sensible society 
on this continent" when Amerindians had their own traditional epistemologies reincorporated 
into the practice of living, in part due to a rigorous intellectual discourse that lead to the social 
tolerance, acceptance, even maybe conformity of these traditions in contemporary Amerindian 
society.5  Deloria also reported the parallel event between the completion of World War II and 
the end of the colonial or modern era. In the following decades eighty nations emerged from the 
collapse of colonial empires in which Europeans transplanted their own models of democracy 
onto former colonies. He finishes by noting that "only eleven of those democracies survive."6 & C
                                               
 
C One online source reports that during the 20th Century on an average scale 31% of humanity lived under a 
democratic government. [see Historical Atlas of the 20th Century (1998). Democratic Governments 1945-
1995. http://users.erols.com/mwhite28/govt2000.htm. Retrieved February, 2010.] Today the percentage is 
much greater with the fall of the Warsaw Pact. Significant regions in Africa, the Middle East and Asia remain 
without having incorporated a democratic form of government. China has a rich society grounded in domestic 
government traditions developed through Confucianism along with imported traditions. However, China holds 
reservations and remains skeptical of much of what the West claims. [see Waley-Cohen, Joanna. (1999). The 
Sextants of Beijing—Global Currents in Chinese History. New York: W.W. Norton & Company.] I 
suspect the Middle East runs afoul with Western liberal democracies through their own colonial experiences, along 
with the problems that ensue with decolonization, and the universal claims of their own religious traditions. 
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 Deloria argued that the experiential fluidity presented by dynamic social activity offered 
the opportunity for tribal traditionalists to escape "the trap of Western religion, which seeks to 
freeze history in an unchanging and authoritative past."7 He articulated that the future success of 
traditional religious practices would come not in preserving older forms but in creating new 
forms that confronted new challenges.8 He also figured that traditional Amerindian indigenous 
spiritual practices were free from a central messianic figure and the dictum associated with such 
figures. Deloria wondered if the tribe in a general sense would emerge out of the ideological 
contest of the 20th Century as a "quasi-political entity…an economic structure. Or…become, 
once again, a religious community."9 On a national level Deloria thought Amerindian society had 
been able to again experiment  with intertribal unification for the rest of American society no 
longer found serious relevance to Amerindian polity. For Deloria, the National Congress of 
American Indians or the "small united nations of tribes" is the substantial manifestation of an 
intertribal experiment.10  
During the 1960s, doctor, decorated World War II veteran, and African revolutionary, Frantz 
Fanon contributed to Post-Colonial Theory through his critique of both the European colonizer 
and the colonized of Africa.D
                                               
 
D Frantz Fanon was born in the American Caribbean on the Colonial island of French Martinique . He served with 
Free French Forces and with the French Army in continental Europe. Fanon was awarded a medal of bravery for his 
participation in the Battle of the Colmar Pocket. Later after his studies in France he developed a model of 
psychotherapy that integrated culture into the analysis. 
 He interpreted overly tribal liberation movements as micro-
nationalisms grounded in specific culture that preempted a national consciousness derived from 
the practice of decolonization or the ethical practice of emergent third world idealization to 
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promote freedom, integration, security, and economic development. His "tabula rasa" method of 
achieving this universal man or state was through creating a societal canon developed by 
experience and perception beginning with the experience and perceptions of the colonizer.11 
Here the great contradiction originating in Colonial history arises in that the liberal principle of 
social equality deeply embedded in the psychopathology of racism demands, "the subhuman to 
rise to the level of Western humanity."12 
 Fanon observed many obstacles to a national consciousness that arose from the syncretism 
of the intellectual prose of both the colonizer and the colonized. In the colonial tradition of crude 
and violent syncretism the values of the colonizer were transferred to the colonized in which new 
and independent African states suffered not  from democratic reforms per se but from the 
embedded elitism of Western liberal democracy which was the hallmark of the so called 
liberated African "national bourgeoisie" that was central authority operated from the 
metropolis.13 Paternalistic overtones and the syndrome of the dependent exploited whore 
intercepted the path of a truly national culture. 
 Fanon also felt that defining a national culture on the basis of race was a "dead end" for too 
often the race of the colonized was only defined as that which is not white.14 In Fanon's analysis, 
if a dependency complex did indeed exist it came into being through the contact of societies in 
the context of the colonial vituperative and did not originate in pre-contact aboriginal societies. 
He further undermines pre-contact dependency status or the sub-human syndrome by revealing 
Hegel's normative portrayal of the reciprocal master with the reality of the colonial master that 
indeed was impervious to recognition but desired something altogether different from the slave.15 
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This would explain in philosophical terms the failure of sustainable democracy in regions of 
Africa. I think, Fanon in the experience of the colonized and colonizer reveals fear as a feature of 
the Colonial persona that they both hold of the other and by the breach of that fear  social change 
could occur. 
Fanon, forewarned that Colonialism in Africa was "back on its feet" recovered from early 
efforts associated with African unity and decolonization.16 The re-emergence of colonial practice 
was occurring through the manufacture of religious rivalries—specifically Christian and Islamic 
rivalries.17 Today in Nigeria the country is caught in the middle of a fierce struggle between 
Christianity and Islam in which militias, segregation, and vigilantism are typical. Nigeria 
happens to be the largest African country by population  and holds one of the world's largest oil 
reserves. Its democratic government is riddled with corruption.18 
In 1776, Adam Smith the father of modern economics wrote in his critique of the 
Mercantilist international trade system, a Colonial system, that for the Old World to have 
discovered the trade routes to the Americas along with the East Indies presented the most 
significant events of the modern era. He thought it was an event with the potential to provide an 
advantageous international experience as  nations would be able promote each other's commerce 
thus alleviating wants and multiplying the satisfaction of human society. But a much darker 
experience occurred and Smith wrote: 
At the…time when these discoveries were made, the superiority of force happened to be so great 
on the side of the European, that they were enabled to commit with impunity every sort of 
injustice in those remote countries…perhaps the natives of those countries may grow stronger, or 
those of Europe weaker, and the inhabitants…of the world may arrive at that equality of courage 
and force, by inspiring mutual fear, can alone overawe the injustice of independent nations into 
some sort of respect for the rights of one another. But nothing seems more likely to establish this 
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equality of force than that mutual communication of knowledge and of all sorts of 
improvements which an extensive commerce from all countries to all countries naturally, or 
rather necessarily, carries along with it.19  
  
 Fukuyama fails to address the Colonial context in which Western liberal democracy 
emerged or rather he mentions it briefly in that Western liberal democracy maybe a cultural 
phenomena associated with Europe in the modern era and thrived due to its hegemonic 
qualities.E However, a number of international states still fulfill the criteria of constitutional 
monarchies implying rule of law and some level of hereditary influence in government.F
                                               
 
E Furthermore in regards to the prospects of Western liberal democracy Fukuyama asserts the primacy of Western 
liberal democracy with its ideological victory. Yet, this victory didn't occur in an ideological vacuum from a 
laboratory setting it occurred in the context of politics and a power struggle. There are numerous variables to 
consider such as the deployment of resources, tactical and strategic implementation, and the articulation or 
realization of state goals. Or the fact that the  Marxist experiment in Russia was not an organic event but rather a 
violent social intervention by class of despotic ideologues. Was the Lenin regime ever authentically Marxist. 
 This 
includes at least nine European countries, the United Kingdom for example, along with 
Australia, Canada, and Japan. Albeit they have also integrated varying degrees of representative 
forms of democracy. The democratic republics of the United States, France, Germany, and India 
seem to be the most prominent models of liberal democracy. Yet, states like Communist China 
with single political party systems maintain a constitution and hold periodic elections. Secondly, 
Fukuyama assumes Western liberal democracy was the result of a linear and socio cultural 
evolutionary historical process as liberal democracy became a secular Christian manifestation.20 
It may well be but on a longer timeline in which the universalist historian doesn't discard "pre- or 
F see Central Intelligence Agency: World Fact Book @ https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/fields/2128.html?countryName=Japan&countryCode=ja&regionCode=eas&#ja 
see also The Hawaiian Kingdom—System of Government—Constitutional Monarchies @ 
http://www.hawaiiankingdom.org/constitutional-monarchies.shtml 
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non-historical" even so called primitive societies an all together different picture may emerge as 
a set linear directional process may not correctly explain change in social organization, state 
features, or the international system.21G
 My point here is not to initiate a tirade on Fukuyama's thesis for I think he is a 
decolonization theorist of a different cloak and conducts a probing analysis of the issue 
especially as he directs his dialogue towards realist or real politick international theory which I 
do not address explicitly in this note. But it is exactly his critique of realist theory that the pre-
historical societies of the world cannot be discarded from the analysis. I think Japan in a very 
genuine manner confronts the socio-political changes forced upon its society with a thoughtful 
examination and I find Japanese intellectuals sincerely dedicated to international peace.
  
H
Synchronic and Diachronic Analysis 
 Finally, 
this term pre-historical same as the term primitive is not an adequate descriptor of the world's 
indigenous populations but rather an elitist and racist misnomer. Lastly, an underlying current of 
this Post-Modern dialogue is that it is an attempt by several authors who in large part are 
considering their identities in relation to the rest of the world. In other words they are attempting 
to center their identities to better understand themselves and their relations. 
 If we develop a synchronic model to analyze social organization with the broad 
typologies of government and state systems that is not dedicated  to an evolutionary bias 
concerned with beginnings but is rather limited to a comparative context delineated  by structural 
                                               
 
G Discarding relevant data is an attempt by a social scientist to mimic the hard sciences by removing data that 
doesn't fit their model. 
H Nonetheless Japan does have its own history to address with its indigenous Ainu population. see Ainu of Japan @ 
http://www.ankn.uaf.edu/IEW/ainu.html 
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limitations to human social organization then we may achieve a more objective and meaningful 
picture to human relations with the potential to develop a comprehensive theory of human social 
organization . Structural forms alone cannot explain the outcome of social relations but when the 
underlying components of government, and state types, (their substantive body) are integrated 
into the model then we have a basis for comparative study and theoretical propositions. The body 
of government types and states includes ideological, economic, spiritual, and cultural elements. 
 The criteria could take on a very uniform approach by adopting Schumaker's, Keil's, and 
Heilke's  criteria for political ideology that include such factors as problems, goals, structure, 
citizenship, rulers, authority, justice, change, human nature, society, ontology, and 
epistemology.22 Comparative analysis is not limited and can take on an extreme meticulous 
nature as additional criteria related to society types are integrated into the model from other 
disciplines of study such as anthropology, psychology, or history, e.g. determinism. Or study 
could be limited to specific comparisons such as the political economy of state systems. The 
initial model is an exercise in cataloging the typologies in which base comparisons are 
significant and can be evaluated in general terms or at specific points in time as such criteria for 
evaluation maybe customized. So you could examine Monarchy in conceptual terms or examine 
the French Monarchy in 1776, for example. 
 Here the criteria are further analyzed to their relationship to heterarchical (HT) and 
hierarchical (HR) structural forms. These features provide the essential unifying and definitive 
characteristics to the model. Since neither form is absent elements of the other, except in extreme 
examples, then one can look to see how heterarchical societies modulate hierarchical expressions 
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or the reverse circumstance. In the context of the Colonial or Modern eras the analysis is rich to 
understand the dynamics between the interaction of society types that differ in this orientation. 
Research of this sort may provide a rich empirical base to determine the qualities, processes, and 
features associated with both concepts. 
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 From the synchronic model of social organization we can develop case studies by 
extracting a given society, or geo-political setting indicative of multiple societal actors and begin 
a diachronic analysis of social change or development, and test experimental hypothesis. But at 
this point time I think theory will more like develop as it emerges from the data rather than a 
rigorous application of the experimental method, but I wouldn't dismiss the experimental 
method. In a diachronic analysis a timeframe can be established with a beginning and an end to 
highlight periods of great change and periods that are more static in nature. In the diachronic 
analysis additional factors would be incorporated such as environmental events/conditions like 
surplus agricultural production, famine, disease, or natural resource constraints. Another factor 
for analysis is the condition or interplay of inter-societal contact. Factors like ideology, culture 
relativism, economics, and spiritual cosmologies or even epistemologies remain relevant by 
necessity. Further case studies may elaborate on the manner in which heterarchical and 
hierarchical forms in of themselves become institutionalized or internalized into the other factors 
or as societal values themselves. 
 In the following hypothetical illustration the black line represents a society as it changes 
according to degrees of heterarchical or hierarchical expression through time. Here the peaks  
(HT) and troughs (HR) of the line indicate social direction towards fluctuating modes of either 
heterarchy or hierarchy. The arrows represent the types of factors, already mentioned, that 
influence that change as societies are exposed to them. Admittedly, correlations may be abundant 
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and causality may be difficult to prove, but at minimum strong cases can be made from the 
analysis.  The model in itself is not deterministic for human societies make choices and take 
actions in the face of historical variables which include the resistance to change or take actions 
that appear irrational or mechanistically logical. How societies adjust to historical factors is 
pertinent to this research. In the case in which two societies enter into contact then a second line 
representing the second society could be entered into the illustration. Cross sectional modeling 
applications is really only limited by the ability of the researcher, or research team to illustrate a 
comprehensible and functional presentation of the data. The societal line could deviate and split 
as one society becomes two different societies due to a historical event. These models have 
implications for both empirical and normative theory. It also provides the opportunity to 
elaborate on the claims of social and evolutionary psychology as both are concerned with 
aggression and cooperation .I
 The historical factor can even be directed toward such events as governmental policy or 
resolutions, e.g. decision making. For example the  Royal Proclamation of 1763 was a policy 
developed in the context of a ranked hierarchical society. Here the English Crown represents the 
highest rank of executive authority, or the King's prerogative, in British political order. The 
policy was developed through inputs provided by lower ranked subordinate agents of the Crown 
in the American colonies. This policy was also developed in consideration of British economic 
mercantile goals. The middle rank of authority in this policy process was the King's cabinet or 
 
                                               
 
I Heterarchy as a concept was originally used in brain research in the 1940s, since then it has been used to develop 
theory in mathematics, sociology, archaeology, anthropology, artificial intelligence, computer applications, ecology, 
and operates in a broader framework of Complexity Theory. (Crumley, 2005) 
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ministers and their secretaries. The policy did not consider inputs from either Amerindian society 
or from the colonial governments in its conception. On the ground floor of its implementation 
agreements over its implications were conducted by Crown agents and the authority of 
Amerindian decision makers in an open consensus like dialogue, that precluded broad input from 
colonial governments. Here the authority of the Crown failed to affect desired outcomes with its 
stated policy goals. The later Quebec Act which effectually replaced the Royal Proclamation of 
1763 considered inputs from French Canadians and was an act of British Parliament (a co-
hierarchical structure to executive authority?)  rather than the Crown but it also failed. 
Seemingly, the decision making structure of England seemed to lack either the coercive or moral 
capacity to initiate successful policy. Would a consensus driven solution have affected the 
colonies to consider other alternatives to unbridled expansion. I think the evidence suggest it 
would have not, but maybe. 
 On the other hand, the Great Peace of Montreal of 1701 was a consensus driven policy 
initially a course set upon by peace overtures between the Iroquois League and the government 
of New France. The negotiations were conducted over a two year period. As stated earlier the 
negotiations included over 40 Amerindian nations and New France. By evidence of the 
signatories of the document the polycentric and diverse nature of the delegates reveals that an 
obvious heterarchical process occurred.  Amerindian signatories included martial and civil chiefs 
along with ambassadors who were endowed with a temporary authority to act on the process. 
Amerindian signatories were significant for representation of their nations, villages, clans, and 
individual authority.23  
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 While this agreement recognized the political autonomy of its participants its ability to 
follow through with its stated goals was undermined by the fact that English representatives were 
not directly involved. It was further undermined by the fact that the French participated in the 
event with a covert agenda as the French Crown during these negotiations had directed New 
France to adopt a policy of containment, more specifically the containment of English expansion. 
For New France the Great Peace of Montreal neutralized the aggression of the Iroquois League 
and preserved the Franco-Amerindian alliance.24 Other factors to consider is that the negotiations 
at least in the final document don't reflect a comprehensive dialogue on trade and it should have 
since trade was central to the martial aggression of the previous decades. The Montreal Peace 
like the Franco-Amerindian alliance (Montreal Union) was heterarchical in its process but hidden 
hierarchies also impacted the policy through covert agendas operating under the authority of the 
French Monarch. New France's government was limited in its ability to participate or coordinate 
meaningful inter-societal dialogue. 
 This study of regime formation and state seeking behavior observed in the inter-societal  
conflicts of Colonial Trans-Appalachia that I refer to as the Proclamation Wars is a diachronic 
analysis. What emerged from the analysis was two different models of democracy grounded in 
two different modes of social organization. The subsequent dialogue will continue to examine 
this phenomena hopefully providing a basis for peoples to better understand their own societies 
and the contemporary issues that arise from a clash of civilizations. 
 
 
 180 
 
 
 
 
  
Models of Democracy 
 State development is often explained in a model of social evolution grounded in 
increasing stages of the centralization of authority expressed through structures significant for 
degree or ranks of hierarchy.25 From this perspective, the pre-state model of a chiefdom is 
considered to be a preexisting condition to a given state society. J
                                               
 
J A chiefdom is originates when an individual leader controls or governs more than one village, town, or population 
center with clear top/down authority. 
  A centralized chiefdom model 
lacks but is presumed to have the potential to develop the institutional structures that eventually 
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characterize state level organizations. However, the chiefdom model of organization does not 
become apparent in this study until the latter end of the time frame when the forces of 
colonialism and the successful intervention of European agency into Amerindian nations resulted 
in more centralized, hierarchical authority structures within Amerindian polities. 
 On a broad scale, the regimes of Trans-Appalachia in their interaction and origin reveal a 
dialectic between heterarchically-oriented Amerindian societies and hierarchically-oriented 
European societies. This dialectic suggests a specific model of colonization, state development, 
and democratic theory. Amerindian society of Trans-Appalachia appears to have been organized 
around principles of heterarchy in which both intra- and intertribal authority was dispersed and 
decentralized through different segments of society.  These would have included ceremonial, 
clan, civil, familial, economic, and martial elements that incorporated similar cultural value 
systems and/or ideological underpinnings. Within these arrangements and associations, the need 
for the institutionalization or reinstitutionalization of social elements was a necessity for severe 
political decomposition was becoming rampant within Amerindian polity.  
 The authority of the person as leader and the position held did not imply a formal 
exercise of coercive authority that was acknowledged by all social segments. The Amerindian 
decision maker was generally limited by consensus-driven decision making.  At the level of 
community-building consensus, Amerindian social organization was affected by broad 
community inputs that resulted in leveling effects on leadership. In this respect, decision making 
was conditioned by commitment to consensus based leadership.  It was manifest in a cooperative 
ethic that mitigated intra- and inter societal dilemmas.  At a minimum, this style of leadership 
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also provided for an ethic of non-interference.  The issue of social complexity is relevant for 
interpreting inclusive decision making standards.  It requires extensive dialectical processes that 
must accommodate complicated variables of specific human personae in the context of their 
social responsibilities. 
 This is not to say that coercion was absent in this sort of decision making, but that it 
occurred in specific contexts as a result of collective decision making such as a consensus in 
council, ritual consideration, or the act of a point person.  I suspect this kind of decision making,  
with its inclusive dialogue aimed at achieving public policy accords through comprehensive 
consensus standards, tended to reduce conflict to occurrences that are low in intensity and short 
in duration. Stevens, "Most distasteful to the Indians was the coercive nature of white 
society…"26 He highlights that Amerindian society relied upon persuasion and social sanctions 
to maintain social stability.27 So I suspect that even when coercive application was employed it 
generally acted upon the individual or group in a compelling manner rather than in a hegemonic 
fashion. Stevens records missionary David Zeisberger's comments, "They admit that the whites 
are very ingenious…but regard their manner of living as wearisome and slavish…"28  
 To say the least Amerindian society valued individual liberty, highly. On Amerindian 
reverence for equality one must only observe the practice of incorporating Euro-Americans into 
Amerindian society through captive taking, adoption, marriage and so on. Historical captive 
narratives relate the manner in which Euro-Americans were given the same treatment as any 
other citizen of the community regardless of their sex or skin color. Most adoptees in 
Amerindian society were women and children. Often peace settlements included terms, 
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demanded by English authorities, to return adoptees even the children of adoptees who were 
born in tribal communities. Some adoptees returned to their tribal communities on their own 
accords after such peace settlements. Captive narratives also related the just and moral character 
of tribal communities to the discontent of their colonial counterparts.29  
 In contrast European colonial societies that operated in and around the periphery of 
Trans-Appalachia are noted for hierarchical decision making structures grounded in formal 
offices, titles, and rights established through an institutionalized legal system.  Even at the most 
rudimentary level, as early European legal systems often were, these had to consider the 
inconsistent and extra political measures promulgated by kings. Kingship provided permanent 
coercive authority to the office holder within the given definitions of the office. European 
colonial societies operating in the Americas were dependent upon a higher overseas authority 
that ultimately derived from a hereditary monarchy. Even where democratic structures were 
present, such as in the legislative assemblies of the English colonies, or the developing British 
parliament, their objective was not comprehensive consensus making but rather a simple 
majority consensus within which citizens held very asymmetrical rights.  These were reflected in 
their ability or in ability to participate in their own self-governance. Furthermore, the location of 
governing structures in colonial systems relative to other governing structures reflected a series 
of competing hierarchies rather than a series of cooperative heterarchical structures. This was the 
case in the later days of Colonial Trans-Appalachia with the emergence of U.S. federalism. 
 Whether governing structures reflect a heterarchical organization or a hierarchical 
organization is appropriately measured in any given system’s approach to consensus building. In 
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the European democratic movements of North America and Europe, there was a focus on 
different social agents such as landholders. Ultimately, the individual citizen whether commoner 
or social elite sought to acquire a portion of the monarch’s sovereign authority.  Social relations 
were ultimately defined in this manner.  The monarch’s authority was dispersed throughout a 
society in which different elements could use their new sovereign authority to exploit other 
elements of society through overlapping legal, legislative, and executive structures.  These 
operated on local, regional, and national levels. In this scenario, zero-sum social outcomes are 
probable, if not likely. If these democracies had not developed from a backdrop of monarchies, 
they may have developed differently or along other lines. Despite constitutional enumeration the 
current status of states, may be more indicative of administrative regions that were tied to a 
centralized authority than entities that enjoyed great political autonomy.  
 Anglo-Saxon democratic traditions in part developed because of the British Crown's 
struggle with its own advisory councils that later became the British Parliament, a bicameral 
legislature. Government sanctioned events like the Magna Carta, the Petition of Rights of 1628, 
The Charter of Henry 1st, and the Bill of Rights of 1689 established the rule of law, an elected 
legislature, and executive office. Yet the legislative and executive branches of British 
government to this day retains significant hereditary components.K
                                               
 
K see Britannia History @ http://www.britannia.com/history/docs/index.html 
  While the United States 
broke from this hereditary dimension a great deal of the United States government is structured 
in a similar fashion with its own roots in these same documents. This is not to say that American 
see also Welcome to the United Kingdom Parliament @ http://www.parliament.uk/ 
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democracy was not influenced or inspired by generations of contact with Amerindian society. I 
do think the conceptual individualism of Euro-American society is linked to the consummate  
individual of Amerindian society who could emerge and handle all sorts of roles required by his 
society at any given moment. From this background the United States has attempted to socially 
address the principles of liberty and equality. Initially only white landowners had the right to 
vote. Since then equality and liberty have been expanded through the Women's Suffrage 
Movement and the Civil Rights Movement. 
 In the context of the sovereign's repeating and ranked hierarchies, social elements were 
not required to develop a comprehensive consensus to achieve their agenda. Rather, they had 
multiple offices and other avenues along which they could pursue their goals. This was an 
especially rich “gaming” environment for social elites. Today, we tend to discuss democratic 
governments as to which party is currently holding power. We should also ask which lobbyists 
hold power and what  power hierarchies they represent.  In this system, the nature of an office is 
vulnerable or open to agendas they were not designed to serve. The strategy of the office is to 
expand its authority within the system leading to intra-societal if not inter-societal conflict. The 
nexus between wealth and democracy in this model is the ability of individuals or groups to seize 
upon vulnerabilities to increase social and economic standing while upholding the veneer of 
uncompromised democratic processes. Further potential competitors to such groups are locked 
out through the coercive authority of institutionalized hierarchies. 
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 Adam Smith, forewarned of this dilemma or the dilemma of the shopkeeper lobbyist even 
though he was applying it to the British government's empire building in the Americas it has 
contemporary and historical relevance to U.S. government. Smith wrote: 
Too found a great empire for the sole purpose of raising up a people of customers, may at first 
appear fit only for a nation of shopkeepers. It is, however, a project altogether unfit for a nation 
of shopkeepers; but extremely fit for a nation whose government is influenced by shopkeepers. 
Such statesmen, and such statesmen only, are capable of fancying that they will find some 
advantage in employing the blood and treasure of their fellow citizens, to found and maintain 
such an empire.30 
 
 This analysis of Amerindian society and Euro-American society suggest two different 
models of democracy. I do not think Amerindian society of Trans-Appalachia was without any 
hierarchy nor do I think the development of European colonial democracies were without a total 
absence of heterarchy. Rather, the issue is one of degree. At last, the spiritual cosmologies of 
these two systems provide even greater insight into their differences and structures. The 
definitive feature of European monarchs were their divine right kings. Kings who were subject to 
no earthly authority but only to the authority or will of God. In other words divine right kings 
were second only to the ultimate sovereign and his kingdom. So whether the European was prone 
and prostate in worship before their paternalistic king or prone and prostrate in worship before 
their fatherly God they were in practice submitting their will, conscious, and being to a higher 
authority. Liberal democracy as discussed by Fukuyama is tied up in all sorts of overlapping and 
meandering hierarchies that deeply permeate the individual persona. 
 On the other hand Amerindian spirituality is differentiated through the practice of 
communion with the earth, and to some extent the cosmos in which a meaningful respect and 
appreciation for life developed. In this context the pre-contact Amerindian citizen was a self-
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regulating moral agent who did not raise her/himself over other beings in creation who tried to 
resolve social conflict through consensual standards of conduct rather than through the 
permanence of institutionalized coercive authority. Normatively, I propose that the universal 
nature of man/women will emerge with a mature and more clearly defined character as 
consensus based social interactions are recovered from antiquity. Universal man/woman will be 
born from the experience and practice of consensus driven relations rather than from lofty 
philosophical explanations. The consensus standard of relations becomes an epistemology in of 
itself as man potentially discovers man in which a universal ontology of man comes into being. 
Now whether consensus based social standards can be reincorporated into the post-modern world 
is all together another question that I choose not to address here. 
A Model of Colonialism and State Formation 
 
 A number of issues arise in the formation and tenure of colonial regimes. Their formation 
is linked to the emergence of trade relationships. Two expansionary regimes developed known as 
the Montreal Union and the Covenant Chain. The regimes were expansionary in that they 
attempted to increase the scale of trade through territorial claims, the incorporation of new 
members, and the ruin of actual or potential trade competitors. Trade introduced hegemonic 
forces into tribal polities. In the case of the Covenant Chain, the regime also used land 
annexation practices for the purpose of resettling Amerindian populations while opening lands 
for colonial immigration. Over time, the nature of these regimes moved beyond the tenets of 
mere trade and developed political dimensions with considerations for security and territorial 
authority. These themes were consistent with the high politics that resulted in the French and 
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Indian War. The formation and expansion of these regimes introduced a period of high-intensity 
conflict over a prolonged period of time. In the years preceding the French and Indian War, there 
was an increasing impulse by Europeans to expand further into the Trans-Appalachia Interior in 
order to incorporate new members and expand territorial dominions.  The response to this was an 
Amerindian regime that formed for the purpose of resisting territorial expansion into the interior. 
The various regimes laid an authoritative claim to their respective spheres of influence consistent 
with the basic requirements of a state society. Those requirements included geographic borders, 
domestic political authority, and the recognition of other states in their roles as actors. 
 The era of the French and Indian War is also significant for the number of ways in which 
Amerindian political culture was altered, especially with respect to consensus traditions.  This 
occurred on two tiers and in various forms. On one level, Amerindian individuals or groups who 
controlled trade became less inclined toward consensus building solutions.  They manipulated 
their trade status to affect public outcomes in a unilateral fashion to which Europeans had little 
input. Europeans had to contend with Amerindian polities that exercised greater political agency. 
The nature of Amerindian warfare changed to reflect currents of trade. Over time, the escalation 
of European agency was accompanied by more frequent contact with a larger number of 
Amerindian nations.  These favored regime formation. Fewer Amerindian trade polities could no 
longer enforce or define the terms of trade without the cooperation of European counterparts.  
European agency could manipulate debt factors and trade benefits to exploit Amerindian rivalries 
(or create rivalries that did not exist) through the continuation of intertribal warfare and 
eventually intratribal warfare. Within the Covenant Chain, colonial authorities appeared to work 
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with a duel agenda in which: 1) trade was pursued with Amerindian society while 2) colonial 
authorities simultaneously sought to alter Amerindian culture and society for the benefit of 
European expansion. This was less clear among the member nations of the Montreal Union.  
 Alteration of Amerindian social norms posed challenges to consensus governance. 
Colonial authorities, especially English authorities, routinely demanded Amerindian 
acculturation to English standards and practices of inter-societal decision making and 
negotiation. Colonial authorities attempted to procure and even endorse individuals from 
Amerindian societies that could enforce unilateral agreements within their respective tribal 
nations.  They did so without regard for establishing a community consensus. Amerindian female 
roles were severely curtailed, as were those of other leaders. In this interplay between English 
colonial authorities and Amerindian society, hierarchical command structures gradually and 
increasingly altered Amerindian decision making structures through specific Amerindian 
individuals who exercised roles in this process. The introduction of European-style hierarchical 
authority to Amerindian society intensified as Amerindian nations’ loss of trade parity affected 
tribal authorities.  These began relying more on annuity and gift payments as a source of 
authority to affect public policy. So, too, did the roles of traders, missionaries, and political 
authorities such as Indian agents, all of whom were pivotal players in this process.  
 There were various responses to European demand for Amerindian leaders who could 
act—in a fashion mirroring their own leadership—with unilateral impunity. I think this led to a 
misinterpretation of statements or claims made by certain Amerindian leaders. At different times 
they made public statements to the effect that they were indeed the essential figures representing 
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Amerindian interests. These must be considered in light of the political dynamics that resulted in 
such statements. In many cases, these leaders simply were trying to assert that a consensus had 
been sought and established without co-opting the actual authority that resided in a larger group. 
 A number of Amerindian polities began to establish a nativist cross-national consensuses 
that attempted to mitigate incursions into Amerindian social polities in order to check colonial 
efforts at western expansion. Early manifestations of this nativist movement can be traced to 
tribal leaders in the Ohio River Valley associated with such Amerindian nations as the Shawnee 
or Delaware and in southern Trans-Appalachia with the Creek leader, The Mortar. The 
prominent issue driven by Ohio Amerindian authorities at the Easton negotiations during the 
French and Indian War was land tenure issues, corruption in land transactions, and a stop line in 
which settlements would not occur beyond. After the collapse of the Montreal Union at the close 
of the French and Indian War a new war shortly ensued commonly associated with Pontiac. At 
one level, the initiation of war on behalf of Amerindian nations reflected a general consensus at 
checking British authority and disseminating the terms of land tenure.  On another level, 
Amerindian nations had varying reasons for their participation. Former members of the Montreal 
Union to some degree wanted to restore the French to their former position while other 
participants in the war sought to establish a larger corporate nativist polity.  They wanted this 
whether or not the French would return with any importance. In southern Trans-Appalachia, the 
equivalent to Pontiac’s war occurred during the French and Indian War as the Cherokee became 
disillusioned with their British ally. The Creek successfully maintained a non-alignment posture 
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during the war while the Chickasaw maintained their relations with the British. The Choctaw 
recovered from an internal civil war initiated over an issue of European trading partners. 
  Attempts to establish an intertribal nativist consensuses that spanned geographic Trans-
Appalachia resulted in polities with clear goals but not polities that were successful at securing 
the support and favor of all segments of Amerindian society. The former trade wars and 
competing Amerindian and European regimes weighed heavily in this matter. These goals 
included an end to intertribal warfare, trade reform, the establishment of permanent borders 
between Amerindian and colonial societies. The one demand placed upon Colonial authorities by 
this nativist regime was a requirement that land tenure issues between Amerindian society and 
colonial society could only legitimately be arranged through a unanimous agreement that took 
into consideration all the Amerindian nations involved. Authorities of the United States never 
acknowledged this consensus. 
 This nativist polity remained an effective regime for six decades.  Its status remained 
intact to varying degrees until the end of the War of 1812. This regime cannot be mistaken as an 
empire in work, for its leaders and members did not use martial authority to gain new members.  
Instead, they relied upon consensus building traditions in open councils to incorporate new 
membership who shared similar concerns and values. This regime was an attempt at state making 
on a level that would be recognized by other international actors. The key issues were land 
tenure and the retention of Amerindian political autonomy. The nativist regime maintained a 
primarily defensive war to achieve this recognition.  It did not entertain a scheme that involved 
the conquest of European colonies already in existence. 
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 Trans-Appalachia during this era is unique because it lacked state actors at as we 
typically think of them. If they had been treated by the Europeans as equals, the Montreal Union 
and the Covenant Chain regimes may have eventually developed into state entities that 
incorporated both an Amerindian and European citizenship. Of course, the Montreal Union 
development ended with the French and Indian War. The Covenant Chain Regime didn’t survive 
the American Revolution.  The states that did develop were the United States (British Colonies) 
and Canada. 
Amerindian society that remained within the dominion of the United States after a martial 
conquest  was integrated into the pan-tribal governing structure known as the Bureau of Indian 
Affairs (BIA). The BIA is typical of a hierarchical regulatory structure that can operate with 
unilateral authority within the confines of its enumerated powers. The BIA was originally a 
subordinate agency under the Department of War and it now administered under the direction of 
the Department of the Interior. Normatively, the BIA should not have existed at all for the 
Department of State was the, or is the proper federal agency to address relations significant for 
treaty processes between distinct and separate political agents. Yet a case can be made that the 
terms of the treaties altered this relationship.  
It seems likely that today a number of non-status Amerindian polities choose not to seek 
recognition from the federal government as a means to passively resist additional exposure to 
hierarchical authoritative structures that they perceive as detrimental to their traditional (and 
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successful) indigenous forms of social organization.L
Ending with a speculative dialogue, what does become apparent in the wars of the 
Colonial era and even now is that a western view of property rights hold a central place in the 
scheme of geo-political events whether purposefully by design or by default of the victor. Other 
 Further many groups are well aware of the 
extra-political dimensions of the federal recognition process. The BIA is just as much a political 
tool for covert agendas as any other regulatory agency vulnerable to party politics and the private 
interest of lobby groups, including federally recognized tribes with ties to corporate capital. In 
this respect the federal recognition process is a political means to discredit non-status 
Amerindian polities. That's right, Amerindian casinos have reintroduced the old trade paradigm  
of the Colonial era back into the equation. If the United States Congress can't reach a 
conscionable consensus, even a simple majority consensus as it is entranced by the agendas of 
lobby organizations then how likely is an intertribal consensus going to develop now that federal 
tribal polities are tied to the same sorts of organizations through their partnerships with 
corporations in the tribal Casino industry. Deloria wrote that there were real national issues at 
stake that required a unified consensus but that the politics of Amerindian unity preclude this 
accomplishment. When Deloria was with the National Congress of American Indians a white 
colleague of his informed Deliria that he should speak for those Amerindian nations he 
represented and no more. Deloria thought to publically state at the next NCAI meeting but didn't 
that he, "…represented 107 of 315 tribes, so I could be trusted 107/315 of the time. And that the 
building was on fire."31 
                                               
 
L Spiritual orientations for some groups have a prominent role in this decision. 
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views or systems of property rights have not survived.  At the end of the Cold War with the 
Reagan Administration's decision to finance public spending and increase the military budget 
successfully broke up the Warsaw Pact. This event brought with it a fundamental change in 
property rights for much of the known world leading us to a more global unified trade system. 
Maybe the more current Middle East conflicts have less to do with oil and terrorism as it does 
with property rights and the completion of a global trade system based on the rights of property 
holders in a western context. Global trade has increased and capital is can now cross more 
borders with less risk but at what cost? Could we have not developed a global trade standard 
through consensus and sanctions? The United States has yet to manage its perpetuity to finance 
public spending since the onset of the Cold War as has most of the countries of the western 
world. The European peasant is no longer to tied to the land but to the production and 
consumption cycle of corporate capital or the public welfare of the state. 
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Appendix: Maps and Key to Maps 
 
Map 1) Amerindian Sphere of Influence 
—White Diamonds indicate Amerindian population centers at the time of the French and Indian 
War. Population centers in some cases are indicative of multi-ethnic tribal populations. 
 
Map 2) British Sphere of Influence  
—Red Circles indicate British forts, cities, and/or diplomatic centers at the time of the French 
and Indian War. 
 
Map 3) French Sphere of Influence 
—Blue Circles indicate French forts, cities, and/or diplomatic centers at the time of the French 
and Indian War. 
 
Map 4) Royal Proclamation of 1763 
—White Line indicates the extent of the border created by the Royal Proclamation of  
 1763. 
—Blue Lines indicate the breadth of the Mississippi, Ohio, and Tennessee Rivers. 
—Green Circles indicate Spanish controlled cities at the onset of the French and Indian War. 
—Red Circles indicate British controlled cities at the onset of the French and Indian War. 
—Blue Circles indicate French controlled cities at the onset of the French and Indian War. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 198 
 
Amerindian Sphere of Influence 
 
 
 
 
 
 199 
 
 
Brit ish Sphere of Influence 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 200 
 
 
 
French Sphere of Influence 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 201 
 
 
 
 
Royal Proclamat ion Line of 1763 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 202 
 
Bibliography 
"A Missionary's Tour to Shamokin and the West Branch of the Susquhanna 1753." Pennsylvania 
Magazine of History and Biography. Vol 39 No 4 pp 440-444, 1915. 
A.G. Doughty and N.E. Dionne. Quebec Under Two Flags. Quebec, Canada: The Quebec News 
Compnay, 1903. 
Abernathy, Thomas Perkins. Western Lands and the American Revolution. New York and 
London: D. Appleton--Century Company Incorporated, 1937. 
Baar, Daniel P. "Contested Land: Competition and Conflict Along the Upper Ohio Frontier, 
1744-1784." Dissertation at Kent State University: Ann Arbor, Michigan USA:UMI, 2001. 
Beer, George Louis. British Colonial Policy 1754-1765 . New York: Peter Smith (Reprinted by 
Special Arrangement with the MacMillion Company 1907), 1933. 
Benn, Carl Eric. "The Iroquois in the War of 1812." Dissertation at York University. North York, 
Ontario: UMI, 1995. 
Bluhm, Jr., Colonel Raymond. U.S. Army a Complete History. Arlington, Virginia: Hugh Lauter 
Levin Associates, Inc., 2004. 
Bond, Beverly Jr. "The Quit-Rent System in the American Colonies." The American Historical 
Review Vol 17 No 3 pp 496-516, 1912. 
Boucher, Christophe Jules Maurice. "The Legacy of Iouskeha and Tawiscaron: The Western 
Wendat People to 1701." Disseration at the University of Kansas. Ann Arbor, Michigan: UMI, 
2001. 
Brandao, Jose Antonio. "'Your fyre shall burn no more': Iroquois Policy Towards New France 
and Her Native Allies to 1701." Dissertation at York Univeristy: North York, Ontario. Ann 
Arbor, Michigan: UMI, 1994. 
Braund, Kathryn E. Holland. "Mutual Convenience--Mutual Defense: the Creeks, Augusta, and 
the Deerskin Trade 1733-1783." Dissertation at Florida State University: Ann Arbor, Michigan, 
USA: UMI, 1986. 
Brown, John P. Old Frontiers; The Story of the Cherokee Indians from Earliest Times to the 
Date of Their Removal to the West, 1838. Kingsport, Tennessee: Southern Publishers, Inc, 1938. 
Camenzind, Krista. "From the Holy Expirement to the Paxton Boys: Violence, Manhood, and 
Race in Pennsylvania during the Seven Years War." Dissertation at the University of California, 
San Diego. Ann Arbor, Michigan: UMI, 2002. 
 203 
 
Carter, Clarence E. "British Policy Toward American Indians in the South 1763-1768." The 
English Historical Review, 1918: Vol 33 No 129 pp. 37-56. 
Carter, Clarence E. "Document Relating to the Mississippi Land Company, 1763-1769." The 
American Historical Review, 1911. Vol 16 No 2 pp 311-319: Vol 16 No 2 pp 311-319. 
Chalou, George Clifford. "The Red Pawns Go To War: British-Amerindian Relations 1810-
1815." Dissertation at Indiana University: Ann Arbor, Michigan: UMI, 1971. 
Charlevoix, Pierre Francois Xavier de. History and General Description of New France, Volume 
Four. Shea, John Gilmary, ed. New York, New York: Francis P. Harper, 1900. 
Coker, Williams S. and Thomas D. Watson. Indian Traders of the Southeastern Spanish 
Borderlands: Panton, Leslie, and Company and John Forbes and Company 1783-1847. 
Pensacola, Florida: University of West Florida Press, 1986. 
Collard, Edgar Andrew. Montreal. The Days That Are No More. Toronto, Canada: Doubleday 
Canada Limited, 1976. 
Cook-Lynn, Elizabeth. Anti-Indianism in Modern America A Voice from Tatekeya's Earth. 
Chicago, Illinois: University of Illinois Press, 2001 . 
Corkran, David H. The Creek Frontier . Norman, Oklahoma: Univeristy of Oklahoma Press, 
1967. 
Cox, Brent. Heart of the Eagle Dragging Canoe and the Emergence of the Chickamauga 
Confederacy. Milan, Tennessee: Chenanee Publishers, 1999. 
Crane, Verner W. "Project for Colonization in the South 1684-1732." The Mississippi Valley 
Historical Review, 1925: Vol 12 No 1 pp. 23-35. 
Crane, Verner W. "The Tennessee River as the Road to Carolina: The Beginnings of 
Explorartion and Trade." The Mississippi Valley Historical Review, 1916. Vol 3 No 1 pp 3-18. 
Crumley, Carole L. "Remember How to Organize: Heterarchy Across Disciplines." In Nonlinear 
Models for Archaeology and Anthropology, by Editors. Christopher Beekman and William 
Baden. Burlington, Vermont: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2005. 
De Puy, Henry F. A Bibliography of the English Colonial Treaties with the American Indians: 
Including a Synopsis of Each Treaty . New York: Printed for the Lenox Club, 1917. 
Deloria, Vine. "Civilization and Isolation."  University of Northern Iowa. The North American 
Review, 1978: Vol 263 No 2 pp 11-14.  
—. Custer Died for Your Sins an Indian Manifesto. Norman, Oklahoma: University of Oklahoma 
Press, 1988. 
 204 
 
—. For This Land Writing on Religion in America. New York: Routledge, 1999. 
—. The Metaphysics of Modern Existance. San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1979. 
Dillon, John B. Oddities of Colonial Legislation in America, as Applied to the Public Lands, 
Primitive Education, Religion, Morals, Indians, Etc., Etc., with Authentic Records...with a 
Summary of the Territorial Expansion, Civil Progress and the Development of the Nation. 
Indianapolis, Indiania: Robert Douglas, Publisher-Electrotyped at the Indianapolis Electrotype 
Foundry, Ketcham and Wanamaker, Proprietors, 1879. 
Dowd, Gregory Evans. "Paths of Resistance: American Indian Relgion and the Quest for Unity, 
1745-1815, Volumes 1 & 2." Dissertation at Princeton University. Ann Arbor, Michigan: UMI, 
1986. 
Drew, Bettina. "Master Andrew Jackson: Indian Removal and the Culture of Slavery." 
Dissertation at Yale University. Ann Arbor, Michigan: UMI, 2001. 
Edmunds, David R. "Tecumseh, The Shawnee Prophet and American History: A Reassesment." 
The Western Historical Quarterly, 1983: Vol. 14 No. 3 pp. 261-276. 
Edward, Douglas. "Colonial Indian Wars." In Handbook of North American Indians Volume 4. 
William C. Sturtevant & Wilcomb E. Washburn, Editors: Smithsonian Institution: Washington, 
D.C., 1988. 
Egnal, Marc. "The Origins of the Revolution in Virginia: A Reinterpretation." The William and 
Mary Quarterly, 1980: 3rd Ser. Vol 37 No 3 pp. 401-428. 
Eliades, David K. "The Indian Policy of South Carolina 1670-1763." Dissertation at the 
University of South Carolina. Ann Arbor, Michigan: UMI, 1981. 
Emmanuelli, Loliannette. "Spanish Diplomatic Policy and Contribution to the United States 
Independence 1775-1783." Dissertation at the University of Massachusetts. Ann Arbor, 
Michigan: UMI, 1990. 
Fanon, Frantz. Black Skins White Masks Translated by Charles Lam Markmann. New York: 
Grove Press, Inc., 1967. 
—. The Wretched of the Earth. New York: Grove Press, 1961. 
Fierst, John Timothy. "The Struggle to Defend Indian Authority in the Ohio Valley-Great Lakes 
Region 1763-1794." Dissertation at the University of Manitoba (Canada). Ann Arbor, Michigan: 
UMI, 2000. 
Finger, John R. "Tennessee Indian History: Creativity and Power." Tennessee Historical 
Quarterly, 1995: Vol 54 No 4 pp. 286-305. 
 205 
 
Fixico, Donald. "Federal and State Policies and American Indians." In A Companion to 
American Indian History. Edited by Philip J. Deloria and Neal Salisbury. Malden, 
Massachusetts: Blackwell Publishers, 2002. 
Forbes, Jack D. Africans and Native Americans The Language of Race and the Evolution of Red-
Black Peoples. Urbana & Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1993. 
Foster, Lynn. "Courts and Lawyers on the Arkansas Frontier: The First Years of American 
Justice." The Arkansas Historical Quarterly, 2003: Vol 62, no. 3. 
Franklin, Neil. W. "Oconostota, Cherokee Chieftain, Receives a Military Commission From 
Kerlerec, Louisiania Governor, 1761: French Text and English Translation." East Tennessee 
Historical Society's Publications, 1977: No 49 pp. 3-7. 
Freeman, Shane. "The Land Systems of Colonial America, European and Native American Land 
Tenure Issues in the Colonial Eras of the Americas." Dissertation at West Virginia: Morgan 
Town, West Virginia. Ann Arbor, Michigan: UMI, 2004. 
Fukuyama, Francis. The End of History and the Last Man With a New Afterword. New York: 
Free Press, 1992 & 2006. 
Gilbert Parker and Claude G.Bryan. Old Quebec. New York: The Quebec News Company, 1904. 
Gitlin, Jay Larry. "Negotiating the Course of Empire: The French Bourgeois Frontier and the 
Emergence of Mid-America 1763-1863." Dissertation at Yale University . Ann Arbor, Michigan: 
UMI, 2002. 
Goltz, Jr., Herbert. Tecumseh, The Prophet, and the Rise of the Northwest Indian Confederation. 
Dissertation at the University of Western Ontario: London, Canada, 1973. 
Graves, William Hilton. "The Evolution of American Indian Policy." Dissertation at Florida 
State University. Ann Arbor, Michigan: UMI, 1982. 
Greene, Jack P. The Reinterpretation of the American Revolution 1763-1789. New York, New 
York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1968. 
Grimes, Richard S. "The Emergence and the Decline of the Delaware Indian Nation in Western 
Pennsylvania and the Ohio Country 1730-1795." Dissertation at West Virginia Univeristy. Ann 
Arbor, Michigan: UMI, 2005. 
Gross, Lawrence. "The Comic Vision of Anishinaabe Culture and Religion." American Indian 
Quarterly, 2002: Vol 26 No 3 pp 436-459. 
Haan, Richard L. "Covenant and Consensus Iroquois and English 1676-1760." In Beyond the 
Covenant Chain, The Iroquois and Their Neighbhors in Indian North America 1600-1800. 
 206 
 
Daniel Richter and James Merrell, Editors. University Park, Pennsylvania: The Pennsylvania 
State University Press, 2003. 
Haggard, Dixie Ray. ""Their Own Way of Warring": The Making and Persistence of Cherokee 
and Muscogulge Identity 1500-1800." Dissertation at the Univeristy of Kansas-Lawrence 
Campus. Ann Arbor, Michigan: UMI, 2006. 
Hahn, Steven C. "The Invention of the Creek Nation: A Political History of the Creek Indians in 
the South's Imperial Era 1540-1763." Dissertation at Emory University. Ann Arbor, Michigan: 
UMI, 2000. 
Hamilton, Milton W. The Papers of Sir William Johnson Volume XIII. Albany, New York: The 
University of the State of New York, 1962. 
Hamilton, Peter J. Colnial Mobile. USA: University of Alabama Press, 1976. 
Harvey, Henry. History of the Shawnee Indians, From the Year 1681 to 1854, Inclusive. 
Cincinnati, Ohio: Ephraim Morgan and Sons, 1855. 
Hatheway, G.G. "The Neutral Indian Barrier State a Project in British North American Policy 
1754-1815." Dissertation at the University of Minnesota. Ann Arbor, Michigan: UMI, 1957. 
Havard, Gilles. The Great Peace of Montreal 1701. Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 
2001. 
Henderson, Archibald. "The Creative Forces in Westward Expansion: Henderson and Boone." 
The American Historical Review, 1914: Vol 20 No 1 pp 86-107: Vol 20 No 1 pp 86-107. 
Holm, Tom. "American Indian Warfare: The Cycles of Conflict and the Militarization of Native 
North America." In A Companion to American Indian History. Edited by Philip J. Deloria and 
Neal Salisbury. Malden, Massachusetts. USA: Blackwell Publishers, 2002. 
Hoopes, John W. "The Emergence of Social Complexity in the Chibchan World of Southern 
Central America and Northern Columbia, AD 300-600." Journal of Archaeological Research, 
2005: Vol 13 No 1 pp 1-47. 
Humphreys, R.A. "Lord Shelburne and the Royal Proclamation of 1763." The English Historical 
Review , 1934: Vol 49 No 194 pp 241-264. 
Innis, Harold A. The Fur Trade in Canada. New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, 
1930. 
J.W. Hagy and S.J. Folmsbee. "The Lost Archives fo the Cherokee Nation Part 1 1763-1772." 
The East Tennessee Historical Society's Publications, 1972: No 44 pp 114-125. 
 207 
 
Jacobs, Wilbur R., Editor. Indians of the Southern Colonial Frontier. The Edmond Atkin Report 
and Plan of 1755. Columbia, South Carolina: University of South Carolina Press, 1954. 
Jennings, Francis. "Pennsylvania Indians and the Iroquois ." In Beyond the Covenant Chain. The 
Iroquois and Their Neighbors in Indian North America 1600-1800. Richter, Daniel K. and James 
H. Merrell, Editors. University Park, Pennsylvania: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 
2003. 
—. The Invasion of America Indians, Colonialism, and the Cant of Conquest. Williamsburg, 
Virginia: The University of North Carolina Press, 1975. 
Kelly, James C. "Fort Loudoun: British Stronghold in the Tennessee Country." The East 
Tennessee Historical Society's Publications, 1978: No 50 pp. 72-91. 
Koenig, Alexa and Jonathon Stein. "Federalism and the State Recognition of Native American 
Tribes: A Survey of State-Recognized Tribes and State Recognition Processes Across the United 
States." Santa Clara Law Review, 2007: Vol 48 pp 82-153. 
Kupperman, Karen Ordahl, editor. Major Problems in American History Documents and Essays. 
Lexington, Massachusetts: D.C. Heath and Company, 1993. 
La Duke, Winona. All Our Relations Native Struggles for Land and Life. Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: South End Press, 1999. 
Labaree, Leonard Woods. Royal Instructions to British Colonial Governors 1670-1776 Volume 
II. New York and London: D. Appleton--Century Company Incorporated, 1935. 
Macfarlane, Peter. "Two French Threats to North America 1760-1783 as seen by British 
Colonial Officials." Dissertation at Concordia University, Montreal, Quebec, 1999. 
Mahon, John K. "Anglo-American Methods of Indian Warfare 1676-1794." The Mississippi 
Valley Historical Review, 1958: Vol 45 No 2 pp. 254-275. 
Marshall, Peter. "Lord Hillsborough, Samuel Wharton and the Ohio Grant 1769-1775." The 
English Historical Review, 1965: Vol 80 No 3 pp 717-739. 
Maulden, Kristopher. "The Arts of Conquest: The Rise of Federal Authority in Ohio 1783-1795." 
Dissertation at University of Missouri-Columbia. Ann Arbor, Michigan: UMI, 2005. 
McClure, James Patrick. "The Ends of the American Earth: Pittsburgh and the Upper Ohio 
Valley to 1795 (Volumes 1 & 2)." Disseratation at the University of Michigan . Ann Arbor, 
Michigan: UMI, 1983. 
McConnell, Michael N. "People in Between; The Iroquois and the Ohio Indians 1720-1768." In 
Beyond the Covenant Chain. The Iroquois and Their Neighbors in Indian North America 1600-
 208 
 
1800. Richter, Danile K. and James H. Merrell, Editors. University Park, Pennsylvania: The 
Pennsylvania State University Press, 2003. 
McMillion, Ovid Andrew. "Cherokee Indian Removal: The Treaty of New Echota and General 
Winfield Scott." Dissertation at East Tennessee State University: Johnson City, Tennessee, 2003. 
Mershon, S.L. English Crown Grants the Foundation of Colonial Land Titles Under English 
Common Law. New York, New York: The Law and History Club Publishers 39 Cortlandt Street, 
1918. 
Minges, Patrick. "Beneath the Underdog: Race, Religion, and the Trail of Tears." American 
Indian Quarterly, 2001. Vol 25 No 3 pp 453-479. 
Moore, Charles. The Northwest Under Three Flags 1635-1796. New York and London: Harper 
and Brothers Publishers, 1900. 
Nester, William R. The First Global War Britain, France, and the Fate of North America. 
Wesport, Connecticut: Praeger, 2000. 
O'Callaghan, E. B. Documents Relative to the Colonial History of New York...Volume Five. 
Albany, New York: Weed, Parsons, and Company, Printers, 1855. 
O'Callaghan, E.B. Documents Relative to the Colonial History of New York...Volume Four. 
Albany, New York: Weed, Parsons, and Company, Printers, 1854. 
—. Documents Relative to the Colonial History of New York...Volume Nine. Albany, New York: 
Weed, Parsons, and Company, Printers, 1855. 
—. Documents Relative to the Colonial History of New York...Volume Three. Albany, New 
York: Weed, Parsons, and Company, Printers, 1853. 
Okerson, Barbara Buhr. "Weyapiersenweh Blue Jacket, War Chief of the Shawnees and the 
Contest for Possession of the Ohio River Valley." Dissertation at the University of Memphis. 
Ann Arbor, Michigan: UMI, 1996. 
Otis Ashmore, J.F. Minnis, W.W. Mackall, & T.J. Charlton. Letters of Benjamin Hawkins 1796-
1806 Collections of the Georgia Historical Society. Savannah, Georgia: The Morning News, 
1916. 
Parker, Sara Gwenyth. "The Transformation of Cherokee Appalachia, 1755-1808." Dissertation 
at the University of California Berkely. Ann Arbor, Michigan: UMI, 1991. 
Parmenter, Jon William. "At the Wood's Edge: Iroqouis Foreign Relations 1727-1768." 
Dissertation at the Univeristy of Michigan. Ann Arbor, Michigan: UMI, 1999. 
 209 
 
Pate, James Paul. "The Chickmauga: A Forgotten Segment of Indian Resistance on the Southern 
Frontier." Dissertation at Mississippi State University. Ann Arbor, Michigan: UMI, 1969. 
Patricia Galloway and Jason Baird Jackson. Natchez and Neighboring Groups. Handbook of 
North American Indians, Vol 13. R.D. Fogelson, Editor. Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian 
Institute, 2004. 
Pease, Theodore Calvin, Editor. Anglo-French Boundary Disputes in the West 1749-1763. 
French Series, Vol II. Collections of the Illinois Historical Library Vol XXVII. Springfiield, 
Illinois: Trustee of the Illinois State Historical Library, 1936. 
Peretz, Paul. The Politics of American Economic Policy Making, 2nd Edition. Armonk, New 
York: M.E. Sharpe, Inc., 1996. 
Piecuch, James R. "Three Peoples, One King: Loyalists, Indians, Slaves, and the American 
Revolution in the Deep South 1775-1782." Dissertation at the College of William and Mary. 
Ann Arbor, Michigan: UMI, 2005. 
Pulitano, Elvira. "Native Theory and Criticism-1. United States." In The John Hopkins Guide to 
Literary Theory and Criticism, 2nd Ed. Edited by Groden, Martin and Szeman. Baltimore, 
Maryland: The John Hopkins University Press, 2005. 
Quaife, Milo M. The Preston and Virginia Papers of the Draper Collection of Manuscripts 
Volume I. Madison, Wisconsin: State Historical Society of Wisconsiin, 1915. 
Rafert, Stewart J. "The Hidden Community: The Miami Indians of Indiana 1846-1940." 
Dissertation at the University of Delaware. Ann Arbor, Michigan: UMI, 1982. 
Rea, Robert R. Major Robert Farmer of Mobile. Tuscaloosa and London: The University of 
Alabama Press, 1990. 
Richter, Daniel Karl. "The Orderal of the Longhouse: Change and Persistance on the Iroquois 
Frontier 1609-1720." Dissertation at Columbia University. Ann Arbor, Michigan: UMI, 1984. 
Ropes, Arthur R. "The Causes of the Seven Years' War." Transactions of the Royal Historical 
Society. Royal Historical Society, 1889: Vol 4 New Series pp 143-170. 
Rothrock, Mary U. "Carolina Traders Among the Overhill Cherokees 1690-1760." East 
Tennessee Historical Society's Publications, 1979: No 51 pp. 14-29. 
Rushforth, Brett. "Savage Bonds: Indian Slavery and Alliance in New France." Dissertation at 
the Univeristy of California, Davis. Ann Arbor, Michigan: UMI, 2003. 
Sato, Shosuke (Special Commissioner fo the Colonial Department of Japan. History of the Land 
Question in the United States: John Hopkins University Studies in Historical and Political 
 210 
 
Science, Fourth Series VII-VIII-IX. Herbert B. Adams, Editor. Baltimore, Maryland: N. Murray, 
Publication Agent and Isaac Friedenwald, Printer., 1886. 
Saunt, Cladio. "A New Order of Things: Creeks and Seminoles in the Deep South Interior 1733-
1816." Dissertation at Duke University. Ann Arbor, Michigan: UMI, 1996. 
Savelle, Max. The Diplomatic History of the Canadian Boundary 1749-1763. New Haven, 
Connecticut: Yale University Press, 1940. 
Shea, John Gilmary. Editor. Early Voyages Up and Down the Mississippi by Cavalier, St. 
Cosme, Le Sueur, Gravier, and Guignas. Munsell's Historical Series No. VIII. Albany, New 
York.: Joel Munsell, 1861. 
Sheidley, Nathaniel J. "Unruly Men: Indians, Settlers, and the Ethos of Frontier Patriarchy in the 
Upper Tennessee Wateshed 1763-1815". Dissertation at Princeton University: Ann Arbor, 
Michigan, USA: UMI, 1999. 
Smith, Adam. The Wealth of Nations Introduction by Alan B. Krueger. New York: Bantam Dell, 
2003. 
Smith, Linda Tuhiwai. Decolonizing Methodlogies. Dunedin: University of Otago Press, 1999. 
Stevens, Paul Lawrence. "His Majesty's "Savage" Allies: British Policy and the Northern Indians 
during the Revolutionary War." Dissertation at State University of New York at Buffalo, 1984. 
Stevens, Wayne E. "The Organization of the British Fur Trade 1760-1800." The Mississppi 
Valley Historical Review, 1916. Vol 3 No 2 pp 172-202. 
Stone, Jr. Richard G. "Captain Paul Demere at Fort Loudon 1757-1760." The East Tennessee 
Historical Society's Publications, 1969: No 41 pp. 17-32. 
Stuart, John. "John Stuart to the...Virginia Papers, Papers of the Continental Congress." 
Washington, D.C.: The National Archives. M247 R85, 1763. 
Stumpf, Stuart. "James Glen, Cherokee Diplomacy, and the Construction of an Overhill Fort." 
The East Tennessee Historical Society's Publications, 1978: No 50 pp. 21-30. 
Tanner, Helen Hornbeck. "Cherokees in the Ohio Country." Journal of Cherokee Studies, 1978. 
Vol 3 No 2 pp 94-102. 
Vickers, Paul Thomas. Chiefs of Nations: Review Copy The Cherokee Nation 1730 to 1839, 109 
Years of Political Dialogue and Treaties. www.arkansascherokees.com: IuniversePublishers, 
2005-06. 
 211 
 
Wainwright, Nicholas B. "George Croghan and the Indian Uprising of 1747." Lancaster, 
Pennsylvania: Presentation at the annual meeting of the Pennsylvania Historical Association, 
1953. 
Waley-Cohen, Joanna. The Sextants of Beijing. New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1999. 
Walker, Mabel Gregory. "Sir John Johnson." The Mississippi Valley Historical Review, 1916. 
Vol 3 No 3 pp 318-346. 
Wallace, Anthony F. Jefferson and the Indians The Tragic Fate of the First Americans. 
Cambridge, Massachusetts: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1999. 
Wallace, Anthony F. with the assistance of Sheila C. Steen. The Death and Rebirth of the 
Seneca. New York: Vintage Books, a Division of Random House, 1972. 
Wallace, Paul A. Conrad Weiser Freind of Colonist and Mohawk 1696-1760. Lewisburg, 
Pennsylvania: Wennawoods Publishing, 1996. 
Warren, Stephen. "Between Villages and Nations: The Emergence of Shawnee Nationalism 
1800-1870." Dissertation at the University of Indiania. Ann Arbor, Michigan: UMI, 2000. 
Waters, Jim Great Elk. View From the Medicine Lodge. Santa Ana, California: Seven Locks 
Press, 2002. 
White, Richard. The Middle Ground Indians, Empires, and Republics in the Great Lakes Region 
1650-1815. New York, New York: Cambridge Univeristy Press, 1991. 
Willig, Timothy D. "Restoring The Thin Red Line: British Policy and the Indians of the Great 
Lakes 1783-1812." Dissertation at the University of Massachusetts Amherst. Ann Arbor, 
Michigan: UMI, 2003. 
Yellow Bird, M. "Cowboys and Indians Toys of Genocide Icons of American Colonization." 
Wicazo Sa Review, 2004: University of Minnesota Press. 
Yoho, James. "Interest Groups in America, 1498-1861." Dissertation at the University of 
Virginia. Ann Arbor, Michigan: UMI, 1999. 
Young, Robert J.C. Postcolonialism: An Historical Introduction. Malden, Massachusetts: 
Blackwell Publishers, 2001. 
